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ABSTRACT  
In recent years, Botnets have been adopted as a popular method used to carry and spread 
many malicious codes on the Internet. These codes pave the way to conducting many 
fraudulent activities, including spam mail, distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) 
and click fraud. While many Botnets are set up using a centralized communication 
architecture such as Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), 
peer-to-peer (P2P) Botnets can adopt a decentralized architecture using an overlay 
network for exchanging command and control (C&C) messages, which is a more resilient 
and robust communication channel infrastructure. Without a centralized point for C&C 
servers, P2P Botnets are more flexible to defeat countermeasures and detection 
procedures than traditional centralized Botnets. 
Several Botnet detection techniques have been proposed, but Botnet detection is still a 
very challenging task for the Internet security community because Botnets execute attacks 
stealthily in the dramatically growing volumes of network traffic. However, current 
Botnet detection schemes face with significant problem of efficiency and adaptability.  
The present study combined a traffic reduction approach with reinforcement learning 
(RL) method in order to create an online Bot detection system. The proposed framework 
adopts the idea of RL to improve the system dynamically over time. In addition, the traffic 
reduction method is used to set up a lightweight and fast online detection method. 
Moreover, a host feature based on traffic at the connection-level was designed, which can 
identify Bot host behaviour. Therefore, the proposed technique can potentially be applied 
to any encrypted network traffic since it depends only on the information obtained from 
packets header. Therefore, it does not require Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and cannot 
be confused with payload encryption techniques. 
The network traffic reduction technique reduces packets input to the detection system, 
but the proposed solution achieves good a detection rate of 98.3% as well as a low false 
positive rate (FPR)  of 0.012% in the online evaluation. Comparison with other techniques 
on the same dataset shows that our strategy outperforms existing methods. The proposed 
solution was evaluated and tested using real network traffic datasets to increase the 
validity of the solution. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Introduction 
Internet services are increasing in popularity and many new online services appear every 
day. The use of online services leads to a massive volume of online financial transactions, 
where sensitive information is exchanged via the Internet. The attacker's interest may thus 
be converted from curiosity to economic benefit. Attackers utilise different types of 
malware to accomplish their goals. Among the diverse types of malware, the Botnet is 
considered to be the most dangerous means of performing online crimes  (Rgio S. C. 
Silva, Rodrigo M. P. Silva, Raquel C. G. Pinto, & Ronaldo M. Salles, 2013). 
A Botnet network contains Bots, which are computers infected by malware such as Trojan 
horses, backdoors or worms without the user’s permission. The Botmaster remotely 
manages a Botnet through a C&C channel (Gu, Perdisci, Zhang, & Lee, 2008). Recently, 
Botnets have been sold and rented in an underground market by Botmasters for 
commercial profit. They can begin many cyber-crimes: creating phishing web pages, 
carrying out massive amounts of spam emails, stealing sensitive users information and 
generating DDoS attacks (Ullah, Khan, & Aboalsamh, 2013).  
According to a recent Symantec Internet Security Threat Report in April 2014 (Symantec 
Corporation, 2014), Botnets accounted for 76% of all spam sent out in 2013, which was 
about 10 billion per day on average. Botnet infections are a global pandemic. Recently 
Microsoft alone estimated that, as of April 2015, more than one million machines are 
currently infected by the Ramnit worldwide Botnet (Batchelder et al., 2014). 
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The scale of Botnet contaminations worldwide makes the detection of Botnet activity an 
important task. Botnet detection has been a significant subject in the cyber security 
domain for the last decade. Despite concerted efforts reported in the literature degrade the 
malicious activities of Botnets, the diversity of Botnet structures and protocols creates 
from the Botnet detection a demanding task for the cyber-security society (Demarest, 
2014; IBM, 2013; Plohmann, Gerhards-Padilla, & Leder, 2011) 
1.2 Research Motivation 
Analysing network traffic and identifying host malicious activity inside a network is a 
significant requirement for network admin in order to manage their networks and detect 
infected computers. Therefore, network administrators require an efficient strategy to 
keep the network free from any suspicious activity. Additionally, Botnets grow rapidly in 
terms of both volume and variety, and they have begun to infect infrastructures such as 
industrial control systems (Falliere, Murchu, & Chien, 2011) and smartphones (Mullaney, 
2012). 
As a result, Botnets have been realized to be one of the most dangerous threats to Internet 
safety. It is therefore crucial to detect, prevent and mitigate Botnet activities. Developing 
Botnet detection systems is a primary concern since it serves as an essential step in further 
prevention and mitigation strategies. In this regard, network-based Botnet detection 
systems are particularly desired due to the visibility of the network behaviour of all hosts 
in monitored networks. 
The number of networked computers and devices is enormous and keeps grow, and 
volumes of network traffic are high and rapidly increasing. This means that detection 
systems require the efficiently processing of a massive volume of network traffic. 
However, most existing Botnet detection systems (Chen & Lin, 2015; Goebel & Holz, 
2007; Gu, Perdisci, et al., 2008; Gu, Zhang, & Lee, 2008; Lu, Rammidi, & Ghorbani, 
2011; Rafique & Caballero, 2013; Seewald & Gansterer, 2010; R. Tyagi, Paul, Manoj, & 
Thanudas, 2015; Yen & Reiter, 2008) rely on DPI to analyse packet content, which is 
computationally expensive and inefficient in recognizing unknown payload signatures. 
Consequently, when these detection systems are deployed in high-speed or high-volume 
networks, they may not be able to perform a comprehensive analysis of all network traffic 
and thus lead to the failure to immediately detect Bot hosts. 
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However, identifying infected computers before the Bot exploits a host machine in a 
serious way is a challenging task in cyber-security. In the few last years, several methods 
have been proposed to identify Botnets threats that represent a risk for cyber-security 
systems. The majority of these studies have focused on ways of improving offline Botnet 
detection systems. Generally, the exact detection results obtained using these approaches 
reflect only the past situation of the network traffic. 
Therefore, the results of these approaches may become worthless later the when status of 
the network environment changes. In this case, all of these offline methods may become 
invalid since they do not use online detection approaches. Therefore, a Bot detection 
system needs to be developed that is able to monitor Bot host activities in an online 
manner and to repeat Bot host activities to network admin as soon as possible. 
1.3 Research Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to develop an online P2P Bot host detection system based on 
RL. The approach proposed in this research has the following characteristics. It detects 
Bots during the propagation phase before any malicious action has been taken. 
Furthermore, it does not require DPI analysis for signature matching, and does not need 
to analyse the entire network traffic. It detects Bots independent of port numbers, IP 
addresses and host characteristics. Therefore, the main objectives of this research are: 
1. To investigate the characteristics of network traffic that can be used to 
discriminate the behaviour of P2P Bots from normal traffic. 
2. To develop a RL system has the ability to recognize zero-day attacks caused by a 
P2P Botnet. 
3. To generate a host traffic representation based on traffic reduction, that is used to 
detect the hosts of Bots. 
1.4 Thesis Contributions 
The objective of this thesis is to develop an efficient network-based Bot host detection 
system. The thesis introduces a network-based solution, which achieves the following 
requirements. Firstly, efficiency is enhanced by using a traffic reduction method to build 
a lightweight detection system able to deal with massive network volumes of traffic. 
Secondly, Bot detection is accomplished earlier by detecting the Bot in the propagation 
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phase before it starts malicious activities. Finally, it is adaptable due to the use of a RL 
approach to a detection system able to learn online new Bot behaviour from the network 
environment. This thesis makes three specific contributions which as following: 
1. A network traffic reduction approach has been designed which will be able to 
increase the performance of the proposed framework.  
2. The ‘connection-based’ detection mechanism is payload-independent, and 
depends on only information obtained from the headers of TCP control packets.  
3. A new model-based RL algorithm computes the reward from the dynamic 
environment. 
Firstly, in Chapter 3, a new traffic reduction technique is introduced to facilitate the 
deployment of Bot host detection systems on a high-speed network. As discussed above, 
the majority of Botnet detection schemes rely on DPI and examine the entire network 
traffic. The use of DPI assumes access to the payload of each packet. This method can be 
accurate in classifying network traffic if the packet payloads are not encrypted. However, 
the majority of new malware applies evasion methods such as the encryption of payloads 
or protocol encapsulation and obfuscation which mean that the payload is covered (P. 
Wang, Wu, Aslam, & Zou, 2015). Furthermore, examining all packets on a high-speed 
network is an expensive task because of the speed of the networks and the amounts of 
packets transferred via a network is increasing daily. However, a detection system which 
applies DPI may suffer from efficiency limits when processing a large volume of traffic 
from high-volume or high-speed networks (Jun et al., 2008). The goal of the present study 
is to increase the effectiveness of detection systems by decreasing the volume of traffic 
which needs to be analysed without affecting the accuracy of the detection process in an 
ideal solution. To achieve this goal, a novel traffic reduction method is proposed for a Bot 
host detection framework which selects only TCP control packets. This framework can 
efficiently and effectively reduce the amount of traffic that will be entered into the 
detection system.  
Reducing network traffic can be accomplished by generating a representation of all of the 
entire network packets. Moreover, the behaviour of the representative traffic should 
reflect the behaviour of all network traffic. Using a representative traffic approach will 
reduce the volume of the traffic needed to be analysed. Therefore, it means faster analysis 
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and lower computation time. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first P2P Bot host 
detection approach applying such a reduction technique to achieve efficiency in Bot 
detection host. 
Secondly, in Chapter 4, host traffic features have been designed based on the connection-
level that can differentiate between a Bot and a legitimate network host. More 
specifically, the proposed features contribute to the identification of the Bot host by using 
a minimum set of packets that need to be utilized in developing an efficient Bot detection 
system. The goal of the proposed feature set is designed to boost the effectiveness of P2P 
Bot detection in three challenging scenarios: i) the Bot performs malicious activities in a 
stealthy way by using an evasion approach such as encryption techniques; ii) the earlier 
detection of P2P Bot at the primary stage of its life cycle, the propagation stage; iii) the 
feature set helps the detection method to detect an infected machine if it is the only one 
in the network. The framework solves the above challenges by working on the headers of 
TCP control packets to bypass encrypted network traffic. Moreover, focusing on the 
connection behaviour will help the detection system to recognize Bot behaviour at an 
earlier stage when the Bot propagates and tries to contact other peers to find new updates. 
Furthermore, the proposed feature sets are estimated for every host in the network in order 
to detect any single infected machine. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time 
that connection-based features have been used in P2P Bot host detection. As the features 
are extracted from the headers of the network packets, they do not rely on packet 
payloads. With this characteristic, our detection approach will not be affected by traffic 
encryption. Moreover, the proposed approach can also be used to detect unknown P2P 
Bots. Furthermore, the feature set helps the detection system to identify P2P Bot infects 
even if it just one. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, a new model-based reinforcement learning method is built to solve 
a Bot host detection problem. More specifically, an online RL system is designed to detect 
a P2P Bot in the connection (propagation) stage. The goals of the RL model are to satisfy 
the requirements of adaptability, novelty and early detection. To accomplish these goals, 
a new algorithm for RL is designed to boost the adaptability of the detection system, 
evaluate any new Bot host pattern and adapt the detection system according to the new 
Bot pattern. 
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The neural network has been adopted with a resilient back-propagation learning algorithm 
as a classification technique. This has robust capabilities for dealing with a nonlinear 
problem due to its ability of approximation. In addition, utilizing a feature set based a 
traffic reduction technique with the RL algorithm improves the capability of the detection 
system to detect timely Bot host behaviour and enhances of the online system so as to 
learn new kinds of attack patterns (zero-day). To the best of our knowledge, this work is 
the first to provide an online Bot detection method that is based on a new RL algorithm. 
Also, RL techniques require some set of action-selection procedures, which guarantee 
that there is an balance between exploration and exploitation. The difficulty is to obtain 
good action-selection tactics which apply a good balance of exploration and exploitation. 
The proposed approach introduces an adaptive threshold factor to manage the adaption 
of a new Bot pattern and to make a balance between exploration and exploitation. The 
proposed online Bot host detection is timely because detection is achieved for each host, 
and when the required features accumulated from the host are adequate then the judgment 
can be made instantly. Hence, an infected host can be identified within a short time. Also, 
to ensure the generalization of the proposed detection approach, we use a testing dataset 
from a different network traffic source in order to ensure the generalization of the 
classifier. 
However, Bots and the users of computers exploit the Internet network in the same way, 
but with different objectives. The proposed framework should be able to differentiate 
between malicious traffic generated by Bot activity and legitimate user or application 
activities. Therefore, the main expected contribution of this research is to design an online 
detection of a P2P Bot host which focuses on both traffic reduction and RL in order to 
achieve efficient Bot detection able to complete detection in a short time.  
1.5 Research Methodology  
The general research methodology used in the research is the positivist approach. 
According to (Iivari, Hirschheim, & Klein, 1998) this method contains hypothesis and 
testing experiments, therefore, it’s suitable for the research. Besides, the general 
experimental procedures used in statistics approaches such as neural network, machine 
learning and fuzzy to obtain conclusions from the data comprise the following steps 
(Wechsler & Harry, 2000):  
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 1. State the problem 
 2. Formulate the hypothesis 
 3. Design the experiment/generate the data 
 4. Collect the data and perform pre-processing 
 5. Estimate the model 
 6. Interpret the model/draw the conclusions  
The main stages of the adopted research methodology in this research as show on in 
Figure 1.1 include the literature review, the literature analysis, design and modelling and 
performance evaluation.  
1.6 Thesis Scope 
The scope of this thesis is limited to developing a P2P Bot detection approach based only 
on TCP network traffic. The TCP network traffic is captured from a local area network. 
Moreover, the information of the control packets header is used. 
The UDP packets are excluded in this research because UDP is a connectionless protocol, 
the information in a UDP packets is inadequate to decide if it as control or payload packets 
unless we have information about packet’s application. Thus, it is impossible to classify 
UDP packets into control and payload packets immediately as in the state of TCP. 
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Figure 1.1 Research Methodology 
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1.7 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. This chapter presents the objectives of this 
thesis. It starts by presenting a background discussion of the Bot problem along with the 
research goals and contributions. 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of Botnets concepts. The Botnet life cycle is described, and 
the risks of Botnets are listed. Previous Botnet detection approaches and relevant research 
using machine learning are reviewed as well. Taxonomy of Botnet detection techniques 
is provided, and the advantages and disadvantages of each type are discussed. 
Chapter 3 discusses the design of the proposed traffic reduction algorithm which aim to 
increase the efficiency of the Bot detection system.  Besides, a briefly detailed for each 
component of the Botnet detection system is presented.  Also, a detailed description of 
the network datasets used in this study are introduced in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 explains the connection-based feature extraction process. In addition, the 
chapter presents the offline Bot detection system based on connection-level feature set.  
Also, the procedures followed in the experiments are discussed. 
Chapter 5 provides an introduction to RL, Markov decision processes and the partially 
observable Markov decision process.  In this chapter, a formulation is given of Botnet 
problems based on RL. Besides, a new model-based RL algorithm for Bot host detection 
is introduced in a dynamic partially observable environment. Finally, assessment based 
on a real-world dataset is presented in the chapter. 
Finally, Chapter 6 draws the conclusion of the thesis and discusses potential future 
research directions to improve or extend the present work. 
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2 BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in Botnet problems compared to others 
threats to computing. Malware has infected every area of the Internet, and this shows no 
signs of stopping. Despite the relative novelty of Botnets, a significant number of studies 
have attempted to find a solution to the problems they create. 
Botnet hazards have increased in the internet environment subsequent to the first known 
Botnets found at the beginning of the 1990s based on the Internet Relay Chat (IRC). The 
IRC was set up in the late 1980s to allow the computer user to connect to the Internet 
anywhere and to join live chats. Botnets exploited the benefits of this channel so as to set 
up communication between the Botmaster and the Bot in the victim’s computer.  
The reason for investigating the Botnet threat in depth is that electronic crime has 
increased, and in the past few years, Botnet targets have changed so that secret 
information found on the victim’s machines is taken. The difficulty of detection has given 
the Botnet the leading position in cyber-crime. Furthermore, Botnets are improving 
methods of evasion along with the development of spreading techniques, and this also 
increases the difficulty of Botnet detection. Although, a considerable number of studies 
have been published on Botnet detection, new types of Botnet continually come up with 
new techniques to avoid detection by existing methods.  
This thesis focuses on establishing a P2P Bot detection strategy that utilizes neural 
networks combined with a RL approach to detect hosts on the network that generate 
malicious traffic behaviours. Furthermore, this approach should work online, and at the 
same time achieve good accuracy and high detection rates. 
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This chapter began by introducing the history of Botnets. The following section gives 
definitions of terms related to Botnets and explains the life cycle. Section 2.3 introduces 
the threats from Botnets and Section 2.3 illustrates Botnet evolution. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 
classify Botnets and Botnet detection approaches respectively. A summary of this chapter 
and its relevance to the present study are given in Section 2.6. 
2.2 Background of Botnets 
This section describes Bots, Botnets, C&C and victim hosts, and then elaborates on the 
role of Botnet in cyber-crime. 
2.2.1 Definitions related to the Botnet   Bot: the word Bot derives from the word robot, which means "worker.” In the 
world of computers, a Bot is a general term adopted to describe an automated 
operation (Schiller & Binkley, 2011). In other words, a Bot refers to a malicious 
code on victim computer that allows the attacker to control the computer remotely 
and perform specific operations (Rgio S. C. Silva et al., 2013). 
 A Botnet: is a collection of compromised computers (zombies) connected through 
the network, and it is under the control of a Botmaster via a C&C channel  (Huy, 
Xuetao, Faloutsos, & Eliassi-Rad, 2013; Lashkari, Ghalebandi, & Reza 
Moradhaseli, 2011). The Bot is commonly installed on the victim’s computer in 
several ways, such as when an untrusted website is surfed or a malicious email 
attachment is open. Generally the Bot is configured to be launched when it infects 
the victim’s machine, and then the Bot will be ready to receive a command from 
the Botmaster through the C&C server (Rgio S. C. Silva et al., 2013). 
 Command and Control (C&C): is a communication channel used to transfer orders 
between the Botmaster and Bots to achieve various distributed attacks remotely 
(Feily, Shahrestani, & Ramadass, 2009; Nagaraja et al., 2011). Furthermore, the 
interaction between the Botmaster and Bots through the C&C communication 
channel can be classified into three groups: message types, message directions 
and communication protocols (Rodríguez-Gómez, Maciá-Fernández, & García-
Teodoro, 2013). C&C message types can be classified as command or control 
messages. A command message is used by the Botmaster to send an order to the 
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Bots to execute an action on the victim's computer. The other type of C&C 
message is a control message that gives the Botmaster information about the status 
of Botnets, such as the number of active Bots. What is more, C&C message 
directions may be divided into two categories: pulls and pushes (Gu, Zhang, et al., 
2008). In a pull style, the C&C server sends a command to Bots and waits for 
them to respond before sending the second order. On the other hand, if the C&C 
server sends a command and it does not wait for a response, from this is a push 
case message. These approaches are used by centralized Botnet structures such as 
IRC and HTTP Botnet-based. The communication protocols perform a significant 
part of the communication between the C&C server and the Bots. IRC, HTTP and 
P2P protocols are the most common types of  the protocol used in C&C server 
communications (Rodríguez-Gómez et al., 2013). 
 The Botmaster (attacker): is the person who creates the Bots and coordinates all 
the operations going on between the Bots and the C&C server. In addition, the 
Botmaster builds and develops the ability of the Bots to infect a victim’s machine 
as well as coordinating the communication between Botnet system components 
(Boshmaf, Muslukhov, Beznosov, & Ripeanu, 2013). However, on the internet 
there are many toolkits that can be used to build and manage Botnet systems 
(Boshmaf et al., 2013). 
 The victim, the main aim of the Botmaster is to spread the Bot code to infect any 
connected computer and then control these computers via the C&C server. For 
instance, system, person or network could be a Botnet targets. The victims vary 
depending on the objective of the attacks or the Botnet type, for example, 
receiving spam email or stealing confidential information from the victim’s 
machine. In another example, DDoS attacks have played a key role in companies 
losing millions of dollars (Rodríguez-Gómez et al., 2013). 
2.2.2 Generic Botnet Life Cycle  
This section reviews the main stages of the Botnet life cycle. Botnet behaviour is 
addressed in terms of the set of operations used by a Botnet during its life cycle phase. 
The majority of Botnet detection approaches focus on the specific stage of a Botnet life 
cycle via studying its behaviour during these phases. As a result, the analysis of the Botnet 
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life cycle is also important in understanding previous work on Botnet detection and Botnet 
behaviour. (Zhaosheng et al., 2008), (Feily et al., 2009) and (Rgio S. C. Silva et al., 2013) 
addressed Botnet life cycles in similar ways with slight differences, dividing it into three 
stages: infection, communication and attack. However, the Botnet life cycle can be 
described in details in five phases: initial infection, secondary injection, connection, 
command and control, and updating  and maintenance (Feily et al., 2009) as illustrated in 
Figure 2.1. 
Botnetmaster
(1) (2)
(3)
(4)
(4)
and
 (5)
(1) Initial infection
(2) Secondary injection 
(3) Connection
 (4) Command and Control
 (5) Update and maintenance 
Botnet
Victim machine
 
Figure 2.1 Generic Botnet life cycle (Feily et al., 2009).  
The first phase of creating a Botnet is a critical phase; the Botmaster tries to exploit a 
known computer operating system’s vulnerability to infect the user’s machine. Moreover, 
scanning techniques are used by an attacker to insert the Bot inside the target’s machine 
(Feily et al., 2009). There are several methods for installing Bots in end-user computers, 
such as opening malicious spam email attachments or browsing malicious webpages (Lu 
et al., 2011).  
When the initial infection is accomplished, then the secondary injection phase starts by 
executing the dropper script code in the infected machine. The execution of the dropper 
script code downloads the Bot binary from specific internet server using a File Transfer 
Protocol (FTP), HTTP or Peer-to-Peer (P2P), and then setup a newer Bot code on the 
victim machine. At the end of this phase, the infected machine turns into a zombie (Bot).  
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After that, the third phase begins by launching the C&C server to issue the communication 
channel with an army of recruited Bots which gives the Botmaster control ever the Botnet 
network (Feily et al., 2009). The fourth phase starts when the Botmaster has the ability to 
use the C&C server to send commands to the Bot in order to execute it on the target's 
machine. The final phase of the Botnet’s life cycle is updating and maintenance, where 
the Botmaster updates the Bot software for several reasons. For instance, the Botmaster 
may need to add a new function to enhance the Botnets future attacks or to improve the 
evasion methods. In addition, update the IP address of a new C&C server can be updated 
to keep it working and thus then prevent it from being blocked due to the evolution of 
Botnet detection techniques. 
2.2.3 P2P Botnet Life Cycle  
The lifecycle of the P2P Botnet consists of four primary phases, namely: initial infection, 
peer propagation, secondary injection and attack. These phases are shown in Figure 2.2 
(Felix, Joseph, & Ghorbani, 2012). Firstly, the Bot code is created for insertion into an 
end-user computer using different techniques such as vulnerability exploitation, web 
downloads, automatic scanning and email attachments (Chao, Wei, & Xin, 2009) 
Secondly, the Bot tries to connect with other Bots on infected hosts based on its own hard-
coded peer list. Thirdly, the Bot downloads the latest update of the Bot code through the 
C&C channel, which will update it for future tasks. In this phase, a host is considered a 
Bot in the Botnet network. Finally, the Bot initiates malicious activities such as spam or 
phishing emails, DDoS, stealing information, and scanning activities. 
 
Figure 2.2 P2P Botnet life cycle. 
2.3  Botnet Threats 
A Botnet is more dangerous than previous more traditional threats such as worms and 
viruses. The Honeynet project listed many kinds of Botnet attacks, including such as 
DDoS, Spam, Stealing information and Exploiting resources (Bacher, Holz, Kotter, & 
Initial 
infection
Peer 
propagation 
Secondary 
injection Attacks
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Wicherski, 2005). Moreover, Lanelli et al. reported that Botnets can be exploited in 
several kinds of cybercrimes (Ianelli & Hackworth, 2005). 
2.3.1 Distributed Denial of Service 
The DDoS is one of the most potent threats produced by Botnets. In the 2014 Information 
Security Breaches Survey report in the UK, 38% of big organisations were attacked by 
DDoS in the previous year (Mille, Horne, & Potter, 2014). The massive number of 
members in a Botnet network gives the DDoS considerable destructive power. The 
Botmaster uses the Botnet network to take down the victim system of control as the Bots 
members send huge numbers of requests to this system. In addition, some massive Botnets 
can even be harmful to Internet Service Providers (ISPs). 
2.3.2 Spam 
Spam is an operation where an overwhelming quantity email messages containing 
advertisements or malicious links are sent to a large number of users. A Botnet is the best 
choice for an attacker use as a tool to send spam emails. The spam attacks start by sending 
commands to the Bots from Botmaster before they begin sending spam email to the 
victim's address. In this case, the detection approaches that used a blacklist technique 
become useless and hereby hard to detect a real attacker. 
Ramachandram et al. identified Botnets as the major cause of email spam problems 
(Ramachandran & Feamster, 2006). In a study which set out to determine the source of 
email spam, John et al (2009) found that the Botnets were responsible for 79% of spam 
email received at the University of Washington (John, Moshchuk, Gribble, & 
Krishnamurthy, 2009). 
2.3.3 Stealing Information 
A Botmaster employs Bots to collect secret information from victim hosts by using 
techniques such key logging, reading log files and screen capture. For example, the 
SDBot is a type of Botnet which employs a keylogging technique to gather users’ 
sensitive information. This can then be sold to others in order to perform illegitimate 
actions (Bailey, Cooke, Jahanian, Yunjing, & Karir, 2009). In addition, the Zeus Bot’s 
main tools use keylogging methods to steal credit card information and private bank 
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accounts, which allows the Botmaster to extract passwords and usernames from a bank’s 
web page, emails, and social network accounts (Selvaraj, 2014). Moreover, this Bot 
exploits the Windows application program interface (API) to extract private user 
information before the web browser can encrypt it (Hannah & Gianvecchio, 2015). 
2.3.4 Exploiting resources 
Bot hosts are controlled to perform illegal activities. For example, the Bot uses the 
victim's computer to visit a website periodically to increase the number of website visitors 
without the user’s permissions. In addition, they can be used to cast fake votes or to grow 
the number of followers on Twitter and Facebook. 
2.4 Botnet Classification  
As can be seen from the Botnet life cycle, the C&C server mechanism is the most 
important component of a Botnet system. Based on the C&C mechanism, the Botmaster 
able to communicate with Bots, and infrastructure of the C&C communicational channel 
is the main difference between a Botnet and other malware (Zeidanloo, Bt Manaf, 
Vahdani, Tabatabaei, & Zamani, 2010). In contrast to other malware which is used to 
perform malicious behaviour individually, a Botnet works as a group of infected hosts 
based on the C&C communication channel. Therefore, the Botmaster can use this channel 
to deliver a command to thousands of Bots in order to launch an attack or receive 
information from victim computers. In 2005, Cooke and co-workers classified Botnets 
depending on their C&C mechanism into three different groups: centralized, distributed, 
and random. This paper also contained the first academic analysis of the P2P Botnet 
(Cooke, Jahanian, & McPherson, 2005). Dittrich and Dietrich grouped Botnets into four 
classes in terms of their development environments as  IRC, HTTP, P2P and hybrid 
Botnets (David Dittrich & Sven Dietrich, 2008). However, in this thesis, the Botnet 
network is described based on the structure of its C&C channels and the type of protocol 
used in Botnet communications as follows. 
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2.4.1 Botnet Classification According to Control and Command 
Structure 
The C&C server is what makes Botnets more powerful than other types of malicious 
malware. Botnet structure based on the C&C server can be classified into centralized, 
decentralized and unstructured C&C architectures (Chao et al., 2009). 
 Centralized architecture: Here, all Bots member are connected to one or many 
C&C servers as shown in Figure 2.3, such as in HTTP and IRC Botnets. The C&C 
server plays a significant role in delivering commands from the Botmaster to Bots, 
and there are no direct connections between Bots. In addition, the centralized 
architecture is considered to be the easiest type of Botnet to construct, but it does 
suffer from the fact that it has a single point of failure in the C&C server. A 
shutdown of the C&C server would result in the loss of communication between 
the Bots and Botmaster (Ludl, McAllister, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2007). In spite of 
this weakness, it is widely used in cyber-crimes, because the commands are sent 
more quickly with low latency. However, it is not so difficult to detect the C&C 
server, and thus to crush the whole Botnet network.  Decentralized (P2P) Botnet: In this architecture, there is no centralized point for 
the C&C, so mitigating or detecting these Botnets is very challenging. Due to the 
distributed network structure of P2P systems, all peers in the network work as a 
Bot (client) and C&C (server) at the same time. In this case, the Botmaster plays 
the main role by sending commands to any infected peers to execute any order or 
requesting information at any time as shown in Figure 2.4. However, in order to 
avoid the weakness of a single point of failure, Botnet attackers have recently 
started to build Botnets based on decentralized C&C infrastructures such as the 
P2P Botnet (Felix et al., 2012), the P2P model was adopted by many types of 
Botnet, for example Storm Bot, Conficker Bot and Waledac Bot (Davis, 
Fernandez, & Neville, 2009).  
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Figure 2.3 A typical centralized Botnet structure. 
In 2007, the Storm Botnet showed that the power of decentralizing C&C structure 
to protect the viability of a Botnet. Decentralizing the C&C introduces a serious 
challenge to defenders who cannot remove an individual set of points to destroy 
a Botnet (Grizzard, Sharma, Nunnery, Kang, & Dagon, 2007; Stover, Dittrich, 
Hernandez, & Dietrich, 2007). A decentralized Botnet architecture is hard to 
detect as a result of the anonymity involved and the dispersed nature of the P2P 
network’s design (Han & Im, 2012). 
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Figure 2.4 A typical decentralized (P2P) Botnet architecture. 
 Unstructured C&C (Hybrid) architecture, as demonstrated in Figure 2.5, this 
model is considered an extreme form of P2P Botnet; where every Bot has a 
connection with one peer and it does not own information about other peers in the 
Botnet network. Furthermore, the Bots are organized randomly in this architecture 
(Rgio S. C. Silva et al., 2013). In this type, there cannot be a direct communication 
between the Botmaster and the Bot where has to search randomly on the Internet 
to find a Bot in ordered to submit a new task. What is more, it is not affected by a 
single point of failure, as is centralized architecture. In addition, Wang et al.(2010) 
introduced a hybrid Botnet model as a new idea that combined the fundamental 
characteristics of centralized and decentralized C&C mechanisms in order to gain 
the benefits of both a low latency of communication and P2P flexibility (P. Wang, 
Sparks, & Zou, 2010).  However, this architecture does not have a warranty for 
the message delivery, and it suffers from a high rate of  C&C message latencies 
(Bailey et al., 2009). 
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Figure 2.5 Unstructured C&C architecture. 
The general properties of the different Botnet structures are summarized in Table 2.1 
(Bailey et al., 2009). 
Table 2.1 C&C structures and basic properties (Bailey et al., 2009).  
Topology Complexity Detectability Message Latency Survivability 
Centralized Low Medium Low Low 
Decentralized 
(P2P) Medium Low Medium Medium 
Unstructured Low High High High 
2.4.2 Botnet Classification Based on the Communication 
Protocols 
It is necessary to own a communication channel linking the Botmaster with their Bots 
inside victim machines in order to facilitate the flow of send/receive information between 
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them. Based on existing network communication protocols, Botnets can be categorized 
according to protocols as IRC-based, Web-based, P2P-based and Custom protocols (A. 
K. Tyagi & Aghila, 2011). Table 2.2 shows a comparison of Botnet communication 
protocols. 
 IRC-based: In this type of Botnet, an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel plays a 
key role in Botnets development. Initially, the idea of IRC Bots was developed to 
support chatting services, not taking into account the fact that this idea was 
utilized by malicious developers, and then the first IRC-based Botnet appeared. 
The Botmaster used the IRC Botnet to bring the victim machine under control and 
to exploit it to execute malicious activities. According to Trend Micro report, 
examples of IRC Botnets are Rbot, Phatbot, GTBot and Sdbot (Trend-Micro, 
2006). Nevertheless, the IRC can be efficiently identified by configuring the 
devices of network security in order to hinder IRC traffic.  
 Web-based: HTTP protocol is used by this type of Botnet as the main 
communication channel, as the basis of the widespread HTTP protocol. The 
Botmaster uses this protocol to spread malicious activities, which is difficult to 
detect and capable of bypassing network security devices. Through the World 
Wide Web, the Botmaster uses HTTP to manage his Bots. The Botmaster 
identifies a web server, and then the Bots periodically connect to the specific web 
server in order to receive commands or send information. Unlike IRC Botnets, 
HTTP Botnet communication can be hidden in legitimate HTTP traffic in order 
to evade detection systems. There are many examples of this Botnet such as the 
Rustock Bot (Chiang & Lloyd, 2007) and blackEnergy Bot (Daswani & 
Stoppelman, 2007). However, HTTP Botnets and IRC Botnets suffer from the 
disadvantage of a single point of failure in the C&C server (K. Wang, Huang, Lin, 
& Lin, 2011). 
 P2P-based: Napster was the one of the first peer-to-peer networks; P2P protocols 
then became popular. The main concept of the P2P network is that every node 
works as a server and client at the same time. Several protocols may be followed 
such as Gnutella, eDonkey, BitTorrent and Kademlia. The core of these protocols 
is totally decentralized and that attracted the attention of Botmasters 
(Mukamurenzi, 2008). P2P Botnets adopt a decentralized architecture using an 
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overlay network to exchange command and control data making their detection 
even more difficult. So, the P2P Botnet is named based on its use of P2P 
mechanisms or protocols. Many Botnets utilize the P2P network, such as the 
Conficker (R. Weaver, 2010), Storm (Holz, Steiner, Dahl, Biersack, & Freiling, 
2008), Nugache (Stover et al., 2007) and Waledac (Stock et al., 2009).  
 Custom protocols: In addition to the previously listed types, there are kinds of 
Botnets that use their own protocols based on the TCP/IP stack, and they only use 
transport-layer protocols such as UDP, TCP and ICMP. 
Table 2.2 Comparison of Botnet communication protocols. 
Communication 
protocols Example Topology Weakness Advantages 
IRC-base 
Rbot, 
Phatbot, 
GTBot and 
Sdbot. 
Centralized 
Single 
point of 
failure in 
the C&C 
server. 
It is widely used in 
cybercrimes, 
because the 
commands are sent 
quickly with low 
latency. 
Web-based 
(HTTP) Rustock Centralized 
Single 
point of 
failure in 
the C&C 
server. 
HTTP Botnet 
communication can 
be hidden in 
legitimate HTTP 
traffic to evade 
detection systems. 
P2P-based 
BlackEnerg,
Storm and 
Zeus 
 
Decentralized - 
Avoid the 
weakness of a 
single point of 
failure. 
2.5 Taxonomy of Botnet Detection 
Recent years have witnessed several Botnet detection techniques which can be classified 
as signature-based, anomaly-based, DNS-based and data mining-based (Feily et al., 
2009). Other researchers such as Han et al. have classified P2P Botnet detection systems 
into three general types: data mining, machine learning and network behaviour and traffic 
analysis (Han & Im, 2012). What is more, Zeidanloo and colleagues classify the Botnet 
detection system as Honeynets or intrusion detection systems (IDS), and they also divide 
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the IDS system into three sub-groups of anomaly-based, specification-based and 
signature-based. In addition, the Botnet detection system can be classified based on its 
installation point as host-based, network-based and hybrid systems (Zeidanloo, 
Shooshtari, Amoli, Safari, & Zamani, 2010). Lu et al (2011) have classified Botnet 
detection techniques on the basis of machine learning type as supervised or unsupervised 
Botnet detection (Lu et al., 2011). 
2.5.1 Honeynet-based Detection 
Honeynets are one of the most common detection methods used by many researchers 
recently. This technique that imitates an infected machine so as to convince the Botmaster 
that it is a Bot in his Botnet in order to record all communication and actions between 
them. This mechanism is commonly used in the initial phase of Botnet detection. A 
Honeynet method contains two components: the Honeypot and Honeywell (Bacher et al., 
2005). The Honeypot points out a vulnerable host. What is more, the Honeywell refers 
the group of tools used to capture and analyse the send and receive traffic from the 
honeypot. By utilizing the information gathered by a Honeynet, it is possible to perform 
a comprehensive analysis and to extract the main features of a Bot to understand its 
technology and therefore uses the extracted features in improving Botnet detection. 
GenIII (Balas & Viecco, 2005) and Honeyd (Provos, 2003) are two popular Honeynets 
in the field of malware detection.  
In 2006, Baecher et al. introduced a Nepenthes platform as a framework for collecting 
information from self-replicating malware based on the honeypot. The Nepenthes 
framework is one of the most practical ways to provide the developer of an antivirus 
system with information about unknown malware (Baecher, Koetter, Holz, Dornseif, & 
Freiling, 2006).  Rajab and co-workers proposed distributed multifaceted Honeynets, 
effectively capturing the activities of IRC Bots (Rajab, Zarfoss, Monrose, & Terzis, 
2006). Moreover, the honeypot mechanism was used in the Botminer method to 
understand the behaviour of two Botnets, Nugache and Storm. However, there are many 
Botnet detection techniques which utilize Honeynets such as (Barford & Yegneswaran, 
2007; Cooke et al., 2005; Freiling, Holz, & Wicherski, 2005; Kang et al., 2009; Pham & 
Dacier, 2011). 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
24 
Despite the success of the Honeynet in reducing the effects of Internet malware, it has 
some shortcomings. It takes time to analyse information about the malware binaries. 
Moreover, if an attacker has knowledge of the existence of the Honeypot, therefore, it 
will not send anything to it, or it may send fake commands in order to give the honeypot 
the wrong information. Table 2.3 summarize Botnet detection methods that utilize the    
Honeynet. 
Table 2.3 Summary of Honeynet detection methods. 
Method Technique Shortcoming 
(Baecher et al., 
2006) 
Collecting information from 
self-replicating malware 
based on the honeypot. 
- Malware binaries 
analysing time.  
- Providing false attack 
information by the 
attacker. (Rajab et al., 2006) 
Distributed multifaceted 
Honeynets. 
2.5.2 Signature-based Detection 
Signature-based detection includes exploring the traffic in the network to find a set of 
traits such as a series of bytes or sequences of packets and a matching set of pre-specified 
signature lists. Whenever there is a match in particular network traffic, the administrators 
are alerted or there a predefined action will be taken by the system. Some IDS, applying 
the signature approach use a repository to store signatures. The repository is frequently 
explored to match predefined patterns such as the content of payload packets or system 
activities to determine whether it contains known signatures. So, the quality of signatures 
plays a significant role in the performance of signature-based detection. Despite an 
attempt to generate automatic signatures for malware (Kreibich & Crowcroft, 2004), it is 
still a restricted to human expertise and knowledge. 
Unfortunately, signature-based detection does not have the ability to detect an unknown 
Botnet. For example (Lu et al., 2011) proposed an approach for detecting the Botnet’s 
malicious traffic by using an n-gram feature selection algorithm to analyse payload 
content. Then they clustered P2P applications into groups based on payload content using 
a decision tree model to distinguish between known applications and malicious Botnet 
traffic. In the clustering stage, three clustering algorithms used in the approach are K-
means (Jain, Murty, & Flynn, 1999), merged X-means and un-merged X-means (Pelleg 
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& Moore, 2000). Moreover, the approach is based on the hypotheses that the diversity of 
Botnet packet content is less than that of legitimate traffic. Although the approach is able 
to detect Botnets independently of protocol and network structure, it is vulnerable to 
methods of encryption of payload content and authorization to read the actual content of 
the packets. Clearly, this method will no longer work because today’s Botnets are much 
more sophisticated.  
SNORT is one of the popular network intrusion detection schemes. It examines the 
network traffic and applies certain rules/patterns to identify well-known signatures of 
Bots (Alder et al., 2007). SNORT is suitable for detecting Bots that have information 
about it, with low FPR and instant detection. However, it fails to classify similar Bots 
with hardly changed signatures or new types of Bots till their signatures have been 
determined and attached to the rule set database.  
In 2007, Goebel and Holz presented another technique of using a signature-based 
approach called Rishi. The method works by comparing the IRC communication traffic 
with known IRC Bot nickname patterns, or using unusual channels for communication 
(Goebel & Holz, 2007). But the Rishi approach fails to detect non-IRC Bots or new 
(unknown) nicknames, or if the Bot applies an encryption algorithm in communication. 
In 2007, Gu and colleagues suggested a BotHunter that utilizes the correlation analysis 
of malicious behaviour. It correlates SNORT (Roesch, 1999) alarms in the bidirectional 
communication between external and internal hosts to detect the C&C communication 
and malicious activities such as scanning and exploit usage. Then this evidence is used in 
a rule-based system to detect the host infected by the Botnet (Gu, Porras, Yegneswaran, 
Fong, & Lee, 2007). The BotHunter also has its weaknesses. This method will be avoided 
if Botnets update their predefined infection procedures or if the C&C interactions 
frequency is very low (Gu, Zhang, et al., 2008). In general, the main advantage of 
signature-based approaches is to achieve a high detection rate since it uses the signature 
found in the database. However, a major drawback is its incapability to detect new Bot 
attacks, or so-called zero-day attacks (N. Weaver, Paxson, Staniford, & Cunningham, 
2003). Another drawback of signature-based detection is that it needs the involvement of 
human expertise to create the signatures.  
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Table 2.4 Summary of signature-based methods. 
Method Technique Shortcoming 
(Lu et al., 2011) 
K-means, Un-
merged X-means, 
Merged X-means 
clustering 
- Payload encryption 
content. 
-  Privacy issue. 
(Goebel & Holz, 2007)  N-gram analysis 
- Fail to detect non-IRC 
Bots. 
- Payload encryption. 
- Detect zero-day attack.  
BotHunter (Gu et al., 
2007). 
Correlation 
analysis 
- Detect zero-day attack. 
- Need human expertise 
to create the signatures. 
2.5.3 Anomaly-based Detection 
Anomaly-based detection techniques have been explored a lot in the last decade, and they 
are the most general detection technologies. They try to determine the “normal” behaviour 
of the system to be protected and then look for any considerable changes in network 
behaviours (García, Zunino, & Campo, 2014). This includes any behaviour that is 
considered an unusual activity such as traffic at uncommon ports, network traffic with 
high volumes, latency with high network traffic and abnormal system behaviour based on 
a predefined pattern of normal system behaviour. These approaches attempt to build a 
model of abnormal system behaviour in order to find any similarities with previously 
expected malicious behaviour located in the range of a given threshold. According to 
Zeidanloo and co-workers, anomaly-based methods are classified on the basis of data 
collection location into host-based and network-based. Network-based techniques can be 
broken down into active and passive (Zeidanloo, Shooshtari, et al., 2010). The main 
advantage of anomaly-based methods is their ability to detect new types of attacks, known 
as zero-day attacks. These attacks are malicious activities that are not already known by 
the detection system, and cannot be detected by signature-based approaches. However, 
the quality of the features selected for  use in the detection system and high false alarm 
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rates are the most common limitations of such detection approaches which apply 
anomaly-based techniques (N. Weaver et al., 2003). 
Host-based 
A host-based Botnet technique attempts to detect a Bot binary as a virus and so, it treats 
the infected machine as a way of anti-virus software. This approach is based on the 
hypothesis that a Bot programme executes a series of calls to system libraries which are 
dissimilar to those performed using normal processes (Trend-Micro, 2006). Host-based 
techniques monitor the machines activities and record system events such as remote 
control activities, register updates, file deletion and traffic sent to or received from a host. 
An alert is activated when it detects Botnet activities on the host.  
In 2007, Stinson and Mitchell proposed a BotSwat as a host-based detection technique 
based on the above premise. BotSwat has tools to monitor and track the interactions of 
computer program calls with system libraries that receive data from the untrusted network 
in order to discriminate between Botnet command responses from normal host activities. 
Moreover, this method was created with the aim to detect Botnets independent of C&C 
architectures or communication protocols (Stinson & Mitchell, 2007). 
EFFORT (Seungwon, Zhaoyan, & Guofei, 2012) a host-based detection approach that 
collects Bot characteristics at client and network levels, and correlates Bot-related 
information by monitoring local computer activity such as keystrokes and monitoring 
connections with other computers. This approach applies one class of supervised support 
vector machine algorithms to model legitimate user behaviour (Witten & Frank, 2005). 
Furthermore, fifteen Bot samples were used to evaluate the method and a 100% true 
positive rate was achieved with less than 1% FPR. The main advantage of this method is 
that it does not depend on the protocol and communications topology used. In addition, 
it is able to detect Bots that use encryption techniques to hide malicious behaviour. The 
major limitations of this method are critical to evasion techniques, such as fast-flux, and 
it also cannot be proven as a real-time detection approach. 
In 2008, Liu and colleagues introduced a BotTracer as a Botnet detection tool based on a 
virtual machine. This method is based on the idea that a Bot has three features. Firstly, 
the Bot has automatic start-up activities without involving any user actions. Secondly, the 
Bot must establish C&C a communication channel with its Botmaster. Finally, a Bot must 
launch an attack remotely or locally. These features represent the three basic stages of a 
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Bot attack: injection, update, and attack. Besides this, a Bot should communicate with a 
rendezvous point in order to launch a C&C channel with its Botmaster, and BotTracer 
catches these channels and analysed them to identify the Bot C&C channels. The 
BotTracer runs a virtual machine on the host that contains a copy of the host system file 
that automatically starts without human interaction. Then, it will monitor all auto start 
communication processes to find a Bot C&C channel fingerprint (Liu, Chen, Yan, & 
Zhang, 2008). Therefore, it will detect the Bot when it begins a malicious activity. This 
is a real-time technique that is capable of detecting unknown Bots without considering 
the communication protocol. Moreover, it achieves a low FPR regardless of the 
encryption of Botnet communication traffic. However, in BotTracer high levels of 
computation are required due to the virtual machine’s degradation of host performance. 
What is more, many Bots have the ability to check for the presence of a virtual machine, 
so, in this case, the BotTracer will not work. 
Al-Hammadi and Aickelin proposed a P2P Botnet detection approach by correlating 
behavioural features. The approach developed a program to monitor and extract 
suspicious API function calls in order to use these features as input to the correlation 
algorithm. Moreover, the Storm P2P Bot was used as a case study (Al-Hammadi & 
Aickelin, 2010). However, the main shortcomings of this technique are that the detection 
threshold is undefined, and it is evaluated using only one type of Bot. Another host-based 
study in Botnet detection introduced by Nummipuro presented some of the P2P Botnet’s 
behavioural characteristics such as using the System Service Table (SST) Hooking 
(Nummipuro, 2007). Although this host-based approach achieved satisfactory results in 
reducing the spread of malware, it works an individual host and so the monitoring and 
analysis operation is costly, complex and non-scalable.  
Table 2.5 summarize a host anomaly-based Botnet detection methods. 
Network-based 
Nowadays, network-based approaches are widely used for Botnet detection by analysing 
the entire network traffic (Barsamian, 2009). Furthermore, this technique is installed at 
the end of the network such as in the firewall or router unlikely host-based methods that 
analyse individual host activities. Network-based approaches have been further divided 
into active and passive monitoring.  
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Table 2.5 Summary of host anomaly-based methods. 
Method Technique Shortcoming 
EFFORT (Seungwon 
et al., 2012) 
SVM and one 
Class SVM. 
- Critical to evasion 
techniques, such as fast-flux. 
- Not proven as a real-time 
detection approach. 
BotTracer (Liu et al., 
2008). Virtual machine. 
- Virtual machine’s 
degradation of host 
performance.  
- Providing false attack 
information by the attacker. 
(Al-Hammadi & 
Aickelin, 2010) 
Correlation 
algorithm. 
- The detection threshold is 
undefined.  
- Evaluated using only one 
type of Bot. 
(Nummipuro, 2007) 
Using the System 
Service Table 
(SST) Hooking. 
- The leak of scalability. 
 
In passive monitoring techniques, information about traffic on the network is gathered to 
find suspicious communications in order to detect Botnets. A key idea behind passive 
monitoring is that Bots create communication behaviour different from that of a normal 
host and Bots belongs to a Botnet network that presents  similar communication patterns 
(Trend-Micro, 2006). The Botmaster has to make connections with its Bots to issue an 
attack or update command. Moreover, because the Bot is pre-programmed, they react 
with the Botmaster using a similar pattern. Furthermore, the Botnet uses the same protocol 
in each phase of the Botnet life cycle (Trend-Micro, 2006). Many researchers have 
investigated such similarities in network traffic to identify Bot behaviour. 
For example, Gu colleagues (2008) use the fact that Bot is pre-programmed software and 
has a similar pattern to the C&C server to develop a BotSniffer detection method based 
on the spatial-temporal correlation. It depends on the hypothesis that Botnets favour to 
contact in an extremely synchronized way, unlike human activities. BotSniffer can 
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identify C&C servers and a compromised host based on the similarity of spatial-temporal 
data. Additionally, it can recognize C&C channels for IRC-based and HTTP-based 
Botnets. What is more, this technique is network-based, so it can identify a host with 
comparable suspicious network behaviour such as spamming and scanning (Gu, Zhang, 
et al., 2008). However, Botsniffer was developed to detect Botnets with a centralized 
architecture. Consequently, it cannot identify Bots that use a different architecture for the 
C&C server and it is not able to recognize an individual infected host. Moreover, it was 
developed to identify a Botnet in a local area network, so it is not applicable at the Internet 
level. Also despite having a low FPR, the Botsniffer can be avoided by utilizing encoded 
channels or using a decentralized architecture for the C&C server as in P2P Botnets. 
In 2007, Karasaridis et al. presented an anomaly-based algorithm for detecting IRC 
Botnet controllers using the transport layer data in the backbone of the network, such as 
Tier-1 ISP networks. The statistical characteristics of the C&C server traffic are used to 
find considerable quantities of the data of the network traffic. This data is gathered by 
utilising the sceptical host activity findings (ports scan, email spam and generating 
distributed denial of service attack traffic) collected from chosen network connections by 
matching a well-known IRC traffic signature, such as the low amount of network traffic, 
chat-like or a network traffic which has a PING-PONG pattern. After collecting network 
data methods are applied to detect the connections of candidate controllers that use 
unusual IRC ports. Firstly, it finds the suspected Bot flow with a remote machine that acts 
as a server. Secondly, it identifies flows whose behaviour is within the range of normal 
IRC traffic. Finally, they analyse the conversation of a candidate control to recognize 
suspicious controllers and their ports (Karasaridis, Rexroad, & Hoeflin, 2007). However, 
although the Karasaridis technique is able to work passively with large-scale networks 
and achieve less than 2% FPR, and so it is suitable to detect IRC Bots, but it may not be 
able to detect modern kinds of Botnet such P2P and HTTP.  
As opposite to passive monitoring that interacts with Botnet behaviour, active monitoring 
techniques interact with a Botnet directly by probing the network host with active 
communication and analysing its responses. Moreover, it actively confuses Botnet 
activity by meddling with the Bots’ communication with the C&C server. The majority 
of detection techniques are passive, while only a few, such as BotProbe (Guofei, 
Yegneswaran, Porras, Stoll, & Wenke, 2009), are active. 
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BotProbe was introduced by Gu and colleagues as an active detection mechanism. The 
main target of BotProbe is to determine whether or not a Bot or user is using the host at 
that side by injecting packets dynamically in a communication session. The authors noted 
that a Bot is a pre-programmed reply to any contact based on a set of predefined rules. 
So, they discriminated the human client from a Botnet with regards to the frequency and 
pattern of responses. This technique was tested on a number of IRC Bots and around 100 
real users (Guofei et al., 2009).  
However, active techniques have the serious shortcoming of greatly increasing network 
traffic by sending extra packets to suspicious clients. Furthermore, and most essentially, 
injecting packets to facilitate detection may be lead to legal issues. In addition, the passive 
detection approach has the advantage of detecting a Botnet without any direct interaction 
with the Bot, but only using the Bots behaviour within a network. Table 2.6 summarize 
network anomaly-based Botnet detection methods. 
Table 2.6 Summary of network anomaly-based methods. 
Method Technique Shortcoming 
BotSniffer (Gu, 
Zhang, et al., 2008) 
Spatial-temporal 
correlation 
- Payload encryption content. 
- Privacy issue. 
- Detect single Bot infection. 
(Karasaridis et al., 
2007) Correlation algorithm 
- Fails to detect non-IRC Bots. 
- Detect Zero-day attack. 
BotProbe (Guofei et 
al., 2009) 
Injecting packets in a 
communication 
session. 
- Increasing network traffic 
- Injecting packets to facilitate 
detection may be lead to legal 
issues. 
2.5.4 Machine learning based Detection 
Machine learning plays a significant role in the domain of artificial intelligence because 
it has excellent performance, and so it is widely used in many fields such as date mining, 
pattern recognition, and medical diagnosis. Machine learning algorithms extract hidden 
relationships and rules within data, which can be used to create models for prediction and 
classification, and thus its goal is to construct systems which have the ability to learn from 
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data (Mitchell, 1997; Witten & Frank, 2005). Learning in this context indicates the ability 
to identify complicated patterns and utilize labelled data to make qualified decisions. One 
of the main challenges in machine learning is how to make a generalization of knowledge 
extracted from a previous dataset or derived from a limited set of previous experiences, 
in order to construct a prediction system for new and unseen datasets. To deal with this 
problem, algorithms are developed based on statistical, artificial intelligence, information 
theory, biology, philosophy, cognitive science, control theory and computational 
principles (Mitchell, 1997). Machine learning algorithms are classified in terms of the 
type of learning involved, which are: supervised learning, unsupervised learning and RL.  
Supervised learning algorithms are trained using a labelled dataset to generate a model 
that is able to classify an unlabeled dataset in the future. It is as if a supervisor is helping 
you out, to be able to classify in the future, which is why it is called supervised. The 
principle of supervised learning is used by popular machine learning algorithms, for 
example, in Classification and Regression Trees (CART) (Breiman, Friedman, Olshen, 
& Stone, 1984), neural networks (Gurney, 1997) and Support Vector Machines (SVM) 
(Cristianini & Shawe-Taylor, 2000). The field of supervised learning may be divided into 
classification and regression problems. In Botnet detection problems, supervised machine 
learning mechanisms are employed to train with both Botnet traffic datasets and normal 
traffic datasets in order to construct classifiers.  
Compared to supervised learning, unsupervised learning algorithms do not require a 
labelled dataset for training. The goal of unsupervised learning methods is to divide an 
unlabeled dataset into different sub-groups depending on specific metrics. Furthermore, 
the dataset is learned from in order to understand its structure and to find patterns, instead 
of creating a generalization model from an available labelled dataset as in supervised 
learning approaches. Nilsson  defined unsupervised learning as the use of  “procedures 
that attempt to find natural partitions” (Nilsson, 1996). The most common unsupervised 
learning algorithms used to detect Botnets are hierarchical clustering, X-means and K-
means algorithms. 
In RL approaches, an agent learns what to do via some experiences including trial and 
error (Barto & Andrew, 1998). RL agents modify themselves according to the states of 
the environment to increase the number of rewards gained in the long run. To maximize 
the gains, RL agents estimate action-value function, which are specified as the 
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relationships between state-action pairs and the measures of returns that the agents will 
obtain in the future. More details of RL are given in Chapter 5. 
A recent study in the field of P2P Botnet detection by Babak et al.(2014) proposed a 
PeerRush, which uses a one-class classification approach to classifying various types of 
normal and abnormal P2P traffic. One-class classifies including the k-Nearest 
Neighbors algorithm (KNN), Parzen, and Gaussian data description classifiers (TAX, 
2001) are used. An application profile is initially created by learning traffic samples of 
known P2P applications. Moreover, features such as interval delays between packets and 
flow duration are used to classify P2P applications (Babak, Roberto, Andrea, & Kang, 
2014). This approach achieves high accuracy rates in classifying P2P applications 
depending on the features selected. On the other hand, this method does not show clearly 
how to detect P2P Botnets, and also detection can be easily avoided by changing the delay 
between packets. 
Garg et al. (2013) presented several machine learning algorithms, such as KNearest 
Neighbour, Naive Bayes, and J48. These were analysed for the detection of P2P Botnets 
using various network traffic features. The results show that the accuracy of the classifiers 
trained using the Nearest Neighbour and J48 is good (Garg, Singh, Sarje, & Peddoju, 
2013). However, the detection of legitimate traffic is very weak. 
Jiang and Shao (2012) presented a method that focuses on the C&C traffic of P2P Bots 
regardless of how they perform their malicious activity. This method developed a 
detection mechanism based on Bots that exhibit connection flow dependency with other 
Bots in the same Botnet network. According to the flow dependency behaviour, this 
approach uses a single-linkage hierarchical clustering mechanism to differentiate between 
P2P Bots and normal hosts  (Jiang & Shao, 2012). This method was built based on the 
similarity of Botnet traffic, and so it will fail to detect Botnets that use the irregularity of 
traffic flow, such as Storm Bot (Li, Hu, & Yang, 2012). Also, it has a limitation in 
identifying individual Bot behaviour. 
One study by Junjie et al.(2011) introduced a P2P Botnet detection system that can 
identify stealthy P2P Botnets. The proposed approach focuses on identifying Bots based 
on the monitoring of C&C traffic. They extracted four features for each traffic flow, 
including the numbers of bytes received and sent and numbers of packets received and 
sent. The hierarchical clustering (Jain et al., 1999) and BIRCH algorithms (T. Zhang, 
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Ramakrishnan, & Livny, 1997) were used to cluster network flow (Junjie, Perdisci, 
Wenke, Sarfraz, & Xiapu, 2011). Furthermore, the approach is independent of payload 
signatures and has also achieved high detection rates of both malicious and legitimate 
hosts, with an FPR of 0.2% and TPR of 100%. Although this system can detect Botnets 
regardless of how they perform their malicious activities, it focuses only on P2P Botnets 
and cannot detect other types such as IRC or HTTP Bots. However, the proposed 
technique is vulnerable to some evasion methods such as flow disturbance packets and 
using the DGA and Fast-flux algorithms as a communication facility to provide a high 
level of C&C privacy. 
Wen-Hwa and Chia-Ching (2010) used a methodology based on packet size to distinguish 
between P2P Botnet traffic and legitimate P2P traffic. They presented the following 
observations. Firstly, P2P Bots try to update information for other Bots rather than staying 
idle. Secondly, the Bot mainly transmits data with a minimum rate of connections. 
Bayesian networks, Naïve Bayes and J48 are used to classify network traffic (Wen-Hwa 
& Chia-Ching, 2010). Furthermore, the accuracy rates for these three algorithms are 87%, 
89% and 98% respectively. However, it was found that the size of P2P Botnet packets is 
smaller than that of any other P2P applications. 
Zhao and co-workers (2010) introduced a P2P Botnet detection system using machine 
learning techniques based on the flow intervals of network traffic. In addition, they 
applied a Bayesian network and decision tree (REPTree) as a classification method to 
investigate online P2P Bot detection (Zhao et al., 2013). The main drawback of this 
technique was its sensitivity to evasion methods such as the random connection interval. 
For example, the connection interval of the Srizbi Bot is random in the interval from 60 
to 1200 seconds (Dae-il, Kang-yu, Minsoo, Hyun-chul, & Bong-Nam, 2010). 
Nogueira et al.(2010) introduced a Botnet detection approach based on the identification 
of traffic using artificial neural networks to classify legal and illegal patterns (Nogueira, 
Salvador, & Blessa, 2010). This technique has several advantages, such as being 
independent of protocol and network structure and having the ability to detect encrypted 
Bot traffic. Nevertheless, the trained neural network was able to classify only 87% of 
network traffic. The main drawback is the need for external judgment in order to provide 
adaptive operation. 
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In 2012, F. Tegeler et al. introduced a network Botnet detection approach called 
BotFinder, which detects separate hosts infected by Bots focusing on the statistical 
features of network flow based on frequent Bot C&C communications constructed in a 
controlled environment. Additionally, they used clustering based on a local Shrinking 
algorithm (X. Wang, Qiu, & Zamar, 2007) as the machine learning method used to 
separate the captured network flow into legitimate and malicious classes where the final 
model will decide whether the flow generated by hosts is malicious or not  (Tegeler, Fu, 
Vigna, & Kruegel, 2012). On the other hand, BotFinder has detection rates varying from 
49% for the Bifrose Bot to 100% for the Banbra Bot. This technique has several 
advantages such as IP address blacklisting or DPI of contents being unnecessity.  
The detection system introduced by Fedynshyn et al (2011). uses a host-based approach 
to detect Bots using the property of temporal persistence. They utilized a J48 classifier 
and a Random Forest algorithm to sort various kinds of Botnet infection categorized 
according to C&C model (HTTP, IRC and P2P). Moreover, they found similarities in 
C&C structures for different categories of Bots that are different from those of legitimate 
network traffic (Fedynyshyn, Chuah, & Tan, 2011). 
A recent study in the Botnet detection field by Saad et al.(2011) addresses the P2P Botnets 
detection problem by using several machine learning techniques, including an artificial 
neural network (ANN), linear SVM, a Gaussian based classifier, Nearest Neighbour 
classifier, and a Naive Bayes classifier (Witten & Frank, 2005). The study evaluated the 
ability of these machine learning techniques in terms of on-line Botnet detection 
requirements such as adaptability, novelty detection and early detection (Saad, 2011). 
They showed that all of the machine learning algorithms had great potential for detecting 
patterns of Botnet traffic, achieving detection rates greater than 89%. However, SVM and 
ANN took the most time in the training phase. Furthermore, the performance of these 
techniques is highly dependent on the features selected for classification or cluster 
analysis and they often have high computational requirements. 
Strayer et al.(2006) introduced one of the first techniques that utilize machine learning 
for the purpose of Botnet detection in network traffic. This approach is an extension of 
Strayer’s previous work (Strayer, Walsh, Livadas, & Lapsley, 2006) and works conducted 
by Livadas et al. (Livadas, Walsh, Lapsley, & Strayer, 2006). Bayesian Network, C4.5 
Tree and Naive-Bayes classifiers as machine learning approaches were evaluated in 
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classifying IRC traffic as legitimate or malicious flows (Timothy, David, Robert, & Carl, 
2008). Although these methods were effective in detecting Botnets, the techniques are 
still restricted to particular types of Botnets such as IRC Botnets or specific architectures 
such as centralized hierarchies. Furthermore, they need human experts to make the final 
decision. 
Masud et al. (2008) introduced an approach to Botnet detection based on the observation 
that a Bot has many reaction patterns that are different from those of humans. This 
approach can detect Bots by correlating incoming packets with outgoing packets, new 
outgoing connections, and application startup in hosts. Several machine learning 
algorithms such as the C4.5 decision tree, support vector machine, Naive Bayes, Bayes 
network classifier and Boosted decision tree (Witten & Frank, 2005) were compared and 
evaluated in the detection of IRC Botnets. The result of the evaluation showed that all 
machine learning algorithms achieved over 95% detection rates, less than 3% FPR and 
under 5% false negative rates (FNR). The greatest overall performance was reached by a 
Boosted decision tree (Masud, Al-khateeb, Khan, Thuraisingham, & Hamlen, 2008). 
However, one major drawback of this approach is that it cannot detect Botnets that use 
encrypted communication due to the need to access the contents of payload packets. On 
the other hand, the method has been tested on IRC Bots, so it is unable to deal with modern 
types of malware such as P2P Botnets. 
Gu et al. (2008) introduced Botminer as a network-based detection method which detects 
Botnet by correlating machines with comparable malicious activities and comparable 
C&C communications. Botminer utilizes X-means and hierarchical clustering methods to 
identify a Botnet using the observation that a Botnet is a collection of malware instances 
that are administered through the C&C channel and it has a similarity of the temporal 
behaviour. The detection process operates by detecting hosts with activities of similar 
communications  in the C-plane where hosts are communicating with different hosts, in 
other words, hosts which its traffic flows are related in respect of flows per hour (fph), 
bytes per second (bps), bytes per packet (bpp) and packets per flow (ppf). Besides this, 
hosts are defined with traffic of similar attack in the A-plane showing who hosts is doing 
what, such as hosts performing ports scan, downloading the same files and spamming. 
The detection results are obtained by creating a cross-correlation between the A-Planes 
and C-Planes in order to classify machines that share similar malicious activity patterns 
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and similar communications (Gu, Perdisci, et al., 2008). The main advantages of 
Botminer it can identify several Botnet kinds such as IRC-based, P2P-based and HTTP-
based Botnets with 99% true positive rate and low FPR around 1%. Nevertheless, 
correlating activities that generated by various hosts needs at least two machines on the 
network be infected by the similarly Bot type. Consequently, Botminer fails in the 
situation of an individual machine is infected by Bot or when several machines inside the 
network are infected with diverse Bots types. Furthermore, Botminer fails to detect Bots 
that exchange C&C messages without any suspicious activity. 
In Wei et al. (2009) study, they suggested BotCop as an online Botnet traffic detection 
system. In this method, network traffic is categorized into various applications using a 
decision tree technique. The network’s payload characteristics are utilized and then, based 
on each application community obtained, the temporal frequency properties of their flows 
are examined to classify a communication as malicious or legitimate traffic (Wei, 
Tavallaee, Rammidi, & Ghorbani, 2009). Table 2.7 summarize machine learning based 
Botnet detection methods. 
2.5.5 DNS-based Detection 
At the same time as efforts to detect Botnet passively based on network traffic, other 
researchers started to look for suspicious Botnet behaviour in DNS traffic. The Domain 
Name System (DNS) is a distributed naming system for devices that are connected to the 
Internet; the DNS is responsible for converting domain names to IP addresses (Goerzen, 
2004). Bots exploit the DNS to find the Botmaster IP address, and the DNS responds by 
giving IP addresses that connect the compromised computers with the C&C server. 
Accordingly, Kristoff (2005) introduced a technique that can identify a Botnet by 
monitoring the DNS traffic, and the technique blacklists any connected servers that spread 
malicious malware (Kristoff, 2005). In 2005, Dagon detected the activity of Botnets using 
a comparison of the rate of malicious DNS to legitimate DNS traffic (Dagon, 2005). 
However, both approach can easily be avoided, whenever the Botmaster generates a fake 
DNS query or applies DDNS queries. 
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Table 2.7 Summary of machine learning based detection methods. 
Method Technique Shortcoming 
PeerRush (Babak 
et al., 2014) 
One-class classifies including 
the k-Nearest 
Neighbors algorithm (KNN), 
Parzen, and Gaussian data 
description classifiers 
- Evaded by changing the 
delay between packets. 
(Garg et al., 2013) KNearest Neighbour, Naive Bayes, and J48 
- Detection of legitimate 
traffic is very weak. 
(Jiang & Shao, 
2012). 
single-linkage hierarchical 
clustering mechanism  
- Detection single Bot 
infection. 
(Junjie et al., 
2011). 
The hierarchical clustering  
and BIRCH algorithms  
- Fail to detect non-P2P Bots. 
- Evaded by DGA and Fast-
flux algorithms. 
(Wen-Hwa & 
Chia-Ching, 2010) 
Bayesian networks, Naïve 
Bayes and J48  
 
-  NAT technology makes it 
difficult to detect P2P 
flows. 
(Zhao et al., 2013). Bayesian network and REPTree decision tree  
-  Sensitivity to evasion 
methods such as the random 
connection interval. 
(Nogueira et al., 
2010) Artificial neural networks 
- Need an external judgment 
to provide adaptive 
operation. 
(Timothy et al., 
2008) 
Bayesian Network, C4.5 Tree 
and Naive-Bayes classifiers 
- Fail to detect non-IRC Bots. 
- Need human experts to 
make the final decision. 
(Masud et al., 
2008) 
C4.5 decision tree, SVM, 
Naive Bayes, Bayes network  
and Boosted decision tree 
- Payload encryption content. 
- Privacy issue. 
Botminer (Gu, 
Perdisci, et al., 
2008). 
Spatial-temporal correlation 
- Detection single Bot 
infection. 
- detect Bots that exchange 
C&C messages without any 
suspicious activity. 
 
Choi et al.(2009) introduced BotGAD as an anomaly detection approach based on group 
activities on Botnet DNS traffic (Choi, Lee, & Kim, 2009). The authors indicated that the 
group activities of DNS were key features of traffic used to differentiate a Botnet DNS 
from a normal DNS request. BotGAD is capable of detecting novel Botnet attacks on 
networks of huge scale in real time. The main weakness of the method is that it requires 
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a long time for processing to monitor large volumes of network traffic (Han & Im, 2012). 
What is more, it is able to detect Botnets that execute group DNS traffic activities. Thus, 
it cannot detect Bots, which use the DNS once and never return to it.  
Some of the common DNS-based techniques try to detect Botnets by detecting anomalies 
in DNS traffic (Villamarin-Salomon & Brustoloni, 2008), or detecting Bots based on 
DNS group behaviour (Choi & Lee, 2012), using DNSBL (DNS Black List) 
(Ramachandran, Feamster, & Dagon, 2006), or constructing a reputation system for DNS 
queries (Antonakakis, Perdisci, Dagon, Lee, & Feamster, 2010). But many new models 
of Botnets as P2P and hybrid P2P do not involve DNS services in their operation, and so 
these approaches are significantly limited in detecting such Bots (Stevanovic, Revsbech, 
Pedersen, Sharp, & Jensen, 2012). Summarize of DNS-based Botnet detection methods. 
Summarize of DNS-based Botnet detection methods. 
Table 2.8 Summary of DNS-based detection methods. 
Method Technique Shortcoming 
(Kristoff, 2005) White and black lists 
- Avoided by generating a fake DNS 
query 
- Avoided by using DDNS queries. 
(Dagon, 2005). Correlation 
algorithm 
- Avoided by generating a fake DNS 
query 
- Avoided by using DDNS queries. 
BotGAD (Choi et 
al., 2009) 
Monitoring 
group behavior 
through DNS 
traffic. 
- Detection single Bot infection  
- Processing time. 
2.5.6 Hybrid Botnet Detection Approaches 
In parallel with standard network-based and client-based detection techniques a new class 
of hybrid detection methods has appeared. This type of method detects Botnets by 
collecting the features of Bots at both client and network levels. The main reason behind 
hybrid strategies is that it is likely to afford increases in performance in Botnet detection 
by connecting findings from client-based and network-based detection systems.  
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For example, Yuanyuan et al. (2010) proposed a hybrid detection approach that detects 
Botnets by combining the host and network level behaviour. The approach is based on 
the hypothesis that two sources of Bot observations will complement each other in making 
detection decisions. The structure of the approach consists of three parts: network analysis 
host analysis and a correlation engine (Yuanyuan, Xin, & Shin, 2010). Another study by 
Wang et al. combined three detection approaches (Szymczyk, 2009). In Honeypot-based 
Botnet detection, were host-based Botnet detection and network-based Botnet detection 
methods are all utilized. 
2.6 Summary 
The existing Bot and Botnet detection systems described above have advantages and 
shortcomings compared to others. Different Botnet detection methods can be categorized 
based on various measures, such as being host-based or network-based, detecting 
individual Bots or Botnet networks, machine learning based, anomaly-based or signature-
based Bot detection. They may be limited to one class of C&C topology or can detect 
Bots that apply multiple C&C structures. 
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3 TRAFFIC REDUCTION 
APPROACH FOR BOT 
DETECTION 
3.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters have presented the Botnet phenomena and demonstrated why former 
work has not been adequate to counter the Botnet menace. Furthermore, various existing 
detection methods are still confined to detecting Botnet in an off-line way because it was 
unable to analysis the whole network traffic immediately. 
One challenge of a network-based Botnet detection system is the inability to monitor and 
analyse the network traffic in high-speed networks in the real time. Packets that are not 
checked on time can be ignored and these packets may comprise the attack signature 
(Yang, Fang, Liu, & Zhang, 2004). 
On the one hand, the benefit of the network-based detection is that it has a more extensive 
scope than the host-based detection schemes (Egele, Scholte, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2008; 
Marpaung, Sain, & Hoon-Jae, 2012).  On the other hand, the difficulty of network-based 
systems is that the volume of traffic will grow, which indicates that extra traffic will be 
added to the network traffic (Rgio S. C. Silva et al., 2013).  Therefore, traffic reduction 
technique becomes essential to help the detection system to work online. Consequently, 
the main goal of this chapter is to introduce traffic reduction method gives the detection 
approach the ability to work online at the network level despite the size of network traffic. 
Furthermore, it not influenced by packets encryption algorithm. 
The next section provides an overview of the proposed detection system. A briefly 
detailed for each component of the Botnet detection framework is presented. Section 3.3 
presents the network traffic capture approach. Section 3.4 presents the traffic reduction 
technique. Section 3.5 introduces the traffic reduction algorithm and traffic reduction 
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evaluation. Discussion and the chapter summary are given in Section 3.6. and 3.7 
respectively. 
3.2 Overview of Bot Detection Approach 
The architecture of the proposed P2P Bot detection system consists of four main 
components: network traffic capturing, network traffic reduction, network traffic feature 
extraction and malicious activity detection using a RL agent as shown in Figure 3.1. 
The traffic capture module is an interface between packets of the network and the 
proposed system; packets detected in the monitored network will be forwarded in their 
raw form to the subsequent phase in the framework. The phase of the reduction network 
traffic is responsible for filtering that traffic and is achieved by selecting TCP control 
packets as a representative of the connection conversations of the captured network 
traffic. 
In the feature extraction phase there are two processing phases: parsing connection 
conversations and host feature extraction. The parsing connection conversations phase is 
responsible for constructing connection features between nodes inside the monitored 
network, according to packets captured and the size of the selected slide window. The 
connection is defined as a 5-tuple: source IP, destination IP, source port, and destination 
port and protocol type. In the node feature extraction phase, the vectors of node features 
are constructed that represent the status of the node based on connection features during 
the current sliding time-window. More details of connection-level features are given in 
Chapter 4. 
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Figure 3.1 Bot detection framework  
The malicious activity detector takes a node feature vector as input and classifies nodes 
according to their features into two categories: malicious nodes infected with a Bot or 
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normal legitimate nodes. So, a multi-layer feedforward neural network with resilient 
learning is selected as a classification algorithm due to its high adaptive and the accuracy 
rates. The RL agent is responsible for evaluating neural network decisions in order to 
extract new features which help to improve the detection system in recognizing a zero-
day attack. More details of RL are given in Chapter 5. 
3.3 Network Traffic Capture 
The network traffic capture tool is utilized as an interface between the monitored network 
and the second stage of the proposed detection system. The primary objective of this 
phase is to sniff network traffic according to the specific size of the sliding time-window 
mechanism in order to forward it to the traffic reduction phase 
The result of this stage consists of raw captured packets. In our experiments, network 
packets are passively captured using a Java library used for capturing network traffic, 
namely Jpcap (Shen & Wang, 2009). One of the primary reasons for adopting a passive 
strategy is that it does not raise the amount of the traffic inside the network. In addition, 
the passive detection approach has the advantage of detecting Botnets without any direct 
interaction with them, but only the Bot behaviour within the network is used. This means 
that the detection technique operates stealthily and cannot be detected by the Botmaster. 
However, in this research several time-window sizes are evaluated in order to determine 
a suitable size of time-window that can improve the accuracy.  
The packets traffic flows appear continuously at the network edge, which is difficult to 
analyse all packets streams immediately. In the proposed method, it only deals with the 
new packets in the traffic flow in order to detect malicious behaviour instantly. 
Consequently, we adopt the sliding time window mechanism to capture the recent 
packets. As shown in Figure 3.2, the time window slides are going to hold the newest 
packets continuously as time passing, and then send these packets to the next step of the 
proposed approach.  
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Figure 3.2 The sliding time-window mechanism. 
3.4 Network Traffic Reduction 
Nowadays, the number of packets passing through a high-speed network is massive and 
is affected by the capacity of the links and the number of Internet users. Thus, the 
reduction of network traffic for the detection of malicious activities is essential in order 
to manage enormous amounts of network traffic when resources such as memory and 
hard disk space are restricted. The most difficult part of the reduction of network traffic 
is to identify it is behaviour by inspecting a small number of packets per flow.  
Therefore, this study introduces a new traffic reduction technique to facilitate the 
deployment of Bot host detection systems on high-speed networks. As discussed above, 
the majority of Botnet detection systems rely on DPI and examine the entire network 
traffic. DPI assumes that the payload of every packet will be examined. This technique 
can be accurate when the payload is not encrypted. However, the majority of new types 
of malware generation apply evasion methods such as the encryption of payloads or 
protocol encapsulation and obfuscation, which mean that the payload is concealed (P. 
Wang et al., 2015). Furthermore, examining all packets in a high-speed network is an 
expensive task because of the speed of networks and the amounts of packets transferred, 
which is continually increasing. However, a detection system which applies DPI may 
suffer from efficiency limits due to on processing a large volume of traffic from high-
volume or high-speed networks (Jun et al., 2008). The goal of the present work is to 
increase the effectiveness of detection systems by decreasing the volume of traffic to be 
analysed, without affecting the accuracy of the detection process. To achieve this goal, a 
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novel traffic reduction method is proposed in a Bot host detection framework which 
selects only TCP control packets. 
In this work, the filtration of TCP control traffic packets is used in order to reduce the 
volume of network traffic as well as to increase the performance of the proposed 
approach. The filtering phase splits the operation into two steps: filtering all traffic related 
to the TCP protocol; then extracting the TCP control packet SYN, ACK, FIN and RST. 
Algorithm 3.1 shows the process of redacting network traffic. In Line 2 an array of 
TCP_Control_Packets_list is initialized. By iterating over the packets, new packets are 
added to the array of the (TCP_Control_Packets_List) from Line 3 to 15 until the last 
packet in the file is reached. Line 4 examines the TCP packet headers and Line 5 selects 
packets with no payload data. Line 6 then gets the packet header. From Lines 7 to 10, the 
code reads the packet, which is TCP, and extracts the packets which have SYN, ACK, 
FIN and RST flags. 
The framework can efficiently decrease the volume of traffic that will enter the detection 
system. Network traffic reduction is achieved by generating a representative traffic of the 
entire network. The characteristic of this representative traffic has to reflect the behaviour 
of network traffic as a whole. Using the proposed traffic reduction approach decreases 
the quantity of network traffic to be examined. In summary, the network traffic reduction 
Algorithm 3.1 includes six rules to pick the desired packets: 
  Rule 1 (R1): Packet contents Syn flag. 
  Rule 2 (R2): Packet contents Syn-Ack flag. 
  Rule 3 (R3): Packet contents Ack flag.  
  Rule 4 (R4): Packet contents Fin-Ack flag. 
  Rule 5 (R5): Packet contents Rest-Ack flag. 
  Rule 6 (R6): Packet contents Rest flag. 
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Algorithm 3.1 Network Traffic Reduction. 
1: Procedure Traffic Reduction (packets) 
2: ArrayList <Packet> TCP_Control_Packets_List ; 
3: For i=1 to size(Packets) 
4:  IF Packets(i) has (TCP header)  then 
5:   IF Packets (i) has (TCP. payloadSize==0) then 
6:       pktheader= packet.getHeader(Packets(i)); 
7:    IF ((pktheader.flags.syn=1OR pktheader.flags.ack=1 OR    
     pktheader.flags.rest=1 OR pktheader.flags.fin=1)  
    AND NOT (pktheader.flags.cwr=1 OR  
    pktheader.flags.ecn=1 OR pktheader.flags.push=1  
    OR pktheader.flags.urg=1)) 
8:      TCP_Control_Packets_List.Add(packets(i)); 
9:        ELSE  
10:             Discard the Packet; 
11:         End IF 
12:   End IF  
 13: End IF 
 14: End For  
 15: Return TCP_Control_Packets_list; 
 16: End Procedure 
 
3.5 Traffic Reduction Evaluation 
3.5.1 Description of Experimental Datasets 
In this research, three main datasets, which contain malicious and non-malicious traffic, 
were used in evaluating the proposed system. The first is the Information Security And 
Object Technology (ISOT) dataset (Saad, 2011) that contains malicious traffic from the 
French Chapter of the Honeynet Project involving the Waledac and Storm Bots. It also 
contains non-malicious traffic collected from the Traffic Lab at Ericsson Research in 
Hungary and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). Whereas the second 
dataset is the Information Security Centre of Excellence (ISCX) dataset (Shiravi, Shiravi, 
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Tavallaee, & Ghorbani, 2012) which includes legitimate activity traffic. The third dataset 
contains four legitimate volumes of traffic from P2P applications, namely Vuze, 
Frostwire, eMule and uTorrent, and the traffic of three P2P Botnets, namely Zeus, Storm 
and Waledac. These volumes were acquired from the University of Georgia, UAS (Babak 
et al., 2014), whose authors generated the P2P application traffic using AutoIt scripts in 
order to simulate human- activity on P2P hosts, as shown in Table 3.1 
Table 3.1 Dataset distribution. 
Traffic Source Purpose Duration 
Storm Bot traffic -   ISOT dataset 
(D1) Train 3115 seconds 
Waledac Bot traffic - ISOT dataset 
(D2) Train 605 seconds 
Normal traffic -  ISOT dataset (D3) Train 126273 seconds 
eMule - University of Georgia 
dataset (D4) Train/Test 24 hours 
uTorrent - University of Georgia  
dataset (D5) Train/Test 24 hours 
Vuze - University of Georgia  
dataset (D6) Train/Test 24 hours 
FrostWire -  University of Georgia 
dataset (D7) Train/Test 24 hours 
Normal traffic – ISCX  dataset (D8) Testing 24 hours 
Storm Bot traffic -   University of 
Georgia (D9) 
Testing (Zero-day 
attack) 24 hours 
Waledac Bot traffic - University of 
Georgia (D10) 
Testing (Zero-day 
attack) 24 hours 
Zeus Bot traffic -  University of 
Georgia (D11) 
Testing (Zero-day 
attack) 24 hours 
 
The total size of the dataset used in our experiment about 216 GB, which is distributed in 
10.09 GB from ISOT dataset, 16.1 GB from ISCX dataset and 189 GB from Georgia 
university dataset. 
3.5.2 Traffic Reduction Approach Evaluation 
The goal of the traffic reduction technique is to reduce the size of the captured traffic by 
using TCP control packets to represent the whole of network traffic. To evaluate this goal, 
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a set of an experiment on dataset was performed, and show that the reduction traffic 
algorithm reduces the traffic within average 50% of network traffic as shown in Table 
3.2. 
Table 3.2 Traffic reduction rates. 
Traffic Source Number of packets 
Number of 
control 
packets 
Rate of traffic 
reduction 
D1 128241 64551 50.3% 
D2 118379 69936 59.1% 
D3 564999 226308 40.1% 
D4 6736353 2780725 41.3% 
D5 6278385 4237135 67.5% 
D6 11732688 741677 6.3% 
D7 4429535 2406066 54.3% 
D8 3776931 1686962 44.7% 
D9 4251875 1169900 27.5% 
D10 12915757 9395310 72.7% 
D11 114548 59255 51.7% 
 
Table 3.3 shows the rate of control packets that obtained by each traffic reduction rule. 
Meanwhile, Figure 3.3 compares the efficacy of the proposed traffic reduction rules 
between legitimate traffic and Botnet traffic. As shown in Figure 3.3 the rule (R1) 
obtained the highest reduction rates for both Bot and legitimate traffics rates around 
30.7% and 24.1% respectively. Furthermore, the rule (R6) has the highest percentage of 
traffic about 19.6% on Botnet dataset evaluation comparing with the legitimate dataset 
traffic about 7.9% rate. 
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Table 3.3 Network traffic reduction rules rates 
Traffic Source Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4 Rule 5 Rule 6 
D1 34.7% 7.0% 13.0% 8.7% 16.7% 20.0% 
D2 30.0% 11.2% 8.8% 6.7% 21.3% 22.0% 
D3 22.5% 25.8% 20.5% 17.8% 8.3% 5.0% 
D4 20.0% 26.7% 15.8% 17.5% 13.3% 6.7% 
D5 26.7% 22.2% 22.8% 10.7% 7.7% 10.0% 
D6 25.0% 21.3% 18.3% 18.2% 5.2% 12.0% 
D7 26.7% 19.3% 24.0% 15.0% 8.5% 6.5% 
D8 23.8% 20.0% 19.0% 22.7% 6.7% 7.8% 
D9 29.8% 8.2% 8.5% 8.8% 22.8% 21.8% 
D10 29.0% 15.0% 6.0% 8.0% 17.0% 25.0% 
D11 30.2% 7.7% 4.0% 9.8% 20.5% 27.8% 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Average rates of network traffic reduction rule :(a) Legitimate traffic and (b) 
Botnet traffic. 
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3.6 Discussion 
Recent years have witnessed of many Botnet detection techniques due to the severity of 
Botnet threats. Botnet detection has attracted intense research effort. For example, in 
flow-based detection schemes such as (Babak et al., 2014; Gu, Perdisci, et al., 2008; 
Timothy et al., 2008; Zhao et al., 2013), every packet is analysed one by one. Thus, that 
situation is not suitable for the online detection in a high-speed network.  
In addition, several detection systems have been suggested (Goebel & Holz, 2007; Gu, 
Perdisci, et al., 2008; Gu et al., 2007; Gu, Zhang, et al., 2008; Yen & Reiter, 2008), but 
despite excellent detection results, these methods may suffer from restrictions of the 
scalability when they analyse huge volumes of network traffic. Their shortcomings in 
scalability mainly derive from their reliance on DPI techniques. For example, BotHunter 
(Gu et al., 2007) utilizes a payload-based anomaly detector and a signature-based 
detection engine, BotSniffer (Gu, Zhang, et al., 2008) and Rishi (Goebel & Holz, 2007) 
require the parsing of the IRC communications contents and TAMD (Yen & Reiter, 2008) 
inspects the payloads of packets in order to estimate similarities in contents. Therefore, 
the proposed a network traffic reduction mechanism gives the detection approach the 
ability to work online at the network level despite the size network traffic, because we 
only focus on a small part of the TCP packets, which are used to initialize the connections. 
 The bottleneck of the machine learning approaches for Bot detection relates to the 
dimensionality and size of the dataset considered, because the amount of the packets, 
needing to be scanned is enormous. Therefore, this study proposed a network traffic 
reduction approach to reduce the amount of network traffic to be analysed. The approach 
reduces the packets to around 50%, which will lead to enhancing the features extraction 
stage (Chapter 4), and online RL stage (Chapter 5). 
 Table 3.4 compares the performance of several detection approaches based on the use of 
traffic reduction. It is noticed that the proposed approach has a high detection rate with a 
relatively low FPR as shown in Section 4.5.5 in Chapter 4. Moreover, this approach 
proves the possibility of finding the Botnet activities without analysing all the network 
flow. Based on the above discussion, the proposed reduction method presented in this 
study showed the rate of traffic reduction is high comparing to the other methods.  
The bottleneck of the machine learning approaches for Bot detection relates to the 
dimensionality and size of the dataset considered, because the amount of the packets, 
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needing to be scanned is enormous. Therefore, this study proposed a network traffic 
reduction approach to reduce the amount of network traffic to be analysed. The approach 
reduces the packets to around 50%, which will lead to enhancing the features extraction 
stage (Chapter 4), and online RL stage (Chapter 5). 
Table 3.4 Comparison of traffic reduction with other Bot detection techniques. 
Approach Rate of traffic 
reduction 
True positive 
rate 
False positive 
rate 
Babak et al. (2014) 0% 99.09% 0.1% 
Zhao et al. (2013)  0% 98.1% 2.1% 
Timothy et al. (2008)  N/A 92% 11-15% 
Gu et al. (2008)  N/A 100% 0-6% 
K. Wang et al. (2011) > 70% 95% 0-3% 
The proposed approach 40% -70% 99.1% 0.01% 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we have introduced a solution to this problem, which includes a network 
packet reduction algorithm. The evaluation results of the proposed reduction approach 
show that our solution achieves suitable reduction rate using real-world network traces. 
The next chapter will present the proposed connection-level features and the offline Bot 
detection method. 
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4 CONNECTION-LEVEL 
FEATURES FOR BOT 
HOST DETECTION 
4.1 Introduction  
It is a concern of a network administrator to recognize hosts in the network that are 
infected by a Botnet. Infected computers can be used by adversaries to extract valuable 
information or they may wait for an order from a Botmaster to reroute spam. However, 
the detection of Botnets is currently a special challenge for the following reasons. Botnets 
employ hidden tactics such as using a random port rather than the usual port or utilizing 
an encryption technique to hide malicious behaviour on network traffic (D. Dittrich & S. 
Dietrich, 2008; Holz et al., 2008). Besides that, Botnets utilize regular protocols such as 
IRC, HTTP, and P2P. Therefore, it is very difficult to differentiate Botnet behaviour from 
legitimate network traffic (Grizzard et al., 2007; Jiang & Shao, 2012). Therefore, to 
discriminate the Botnet behaviour from legitimate network traffic, the feature extraction 
and selection set is a critical point for the efficiency of any Botnet detection system. 
The quality of the feature set is one of the most important factors that affect the 
performance of the machine learning algorithms. Therefore, the main goal of this chapter 
is to introduce the host traffic feature based on the connection-level that can differentiate 
between a Bot and a legitimate network host. More specifically, the feature able to 
identify Bot host by using a minimum set of packets after network traffic reduction stage 
(Chapter 3). In addition, to achieve earlier Bot detection and bypass the encrypted 
network traffic, the feature set utilizes the information in the header of TCP control 
packets that helps the detection system to efficiently analysis massive volume of network 
traffic without suffering from encrypted traffic. 
The previous chapter introduced the traffic reduction approach that helps to reduce the 
amount of the network traffic to be analysed. In this chapter, we will utilise the traffic 
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reduction to present our contribution on feature extraction at a connection-level. 
Furthermore, the chapter presents the evaluation of the offline Bot detection system. 
4.2 Overview of Offline Bot Detection Approach 
The architecture of the proposed offline Bot detection system consists of four main 
components: network traffic reduction, network traffic feature extraction and malicious 
activity detection as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The phase of the reduction network traffic 
is responsible for filtering that traffic to increase the scalability and avoiding DPI problem 
as we addressed in the previous chapter.  
In the feature extraction phase, there are two processing stages: extracting connection 
conversations and host feature extraction. The extracting connection conversations phase 
is subject to constructing connection features between nodes. In the node feature 
extraction phase, the vectors of node features are assembled that represent the status of 
the node based on connection features. 
Finally, the malicious activity detector takes a node feature vector as input and classifies 
nodes according to their features into two categories: malicious nodes infected with a Bot 
or normal legitimate nodes. Therefore, a multi-layer feedforward neural network with 
resilient learning is selected as a malicious activity detector due to its high adaptive and 
the accuracy rates. 
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Figure 4.1 Overview of Offline Bot detection phases. 
4.3 Features Extraction  
The proposed connection features relies on two fundamental concepts. Firstly, it passively 
monitors network traffic (Zeidanloo, Shooshtari, et al., 2010). Secondly, it utilizes the 
fact that Bots during the propagation phase will frequently communicate with their C&C 
servers/peers in order to discover other peers and receive the latest updates of tasks due 
to their pre-programmed nature (Han, Lim, & Im, 2009; Sang-Kyun, Joo-Hyung, Jae-
Seo, Bong-Nam, & Hyun-Cheol, 2009). Bots are different from other types of malware; 
they work as a group and primarily need a communication channel in order to coordinate 
malicious activities. These connections are described as the way by which the Botmaster 
communicates with his Bots (Chao et al., 2009). 
Features are composed of a small set of attributes that are needed to characterize a dataset. 
In particular, a vector of an attribute that represents each instance of data is used as input 
to a machine learning algorithm. The quality of features is significant in order for the 
machine learning algorithm to detect the behaviour of the network traffic class. The 
network traffic features could be extracted at three levels as follows: packet-level, flow-
level, and connection-level (Roughan, Sen, Spatscheck, & Duffield, 2004). Moreover, 
classification can be based on the level of packet inspection, as in shallow or DPI. 
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The features in data packets are extracted from the packet payload or header. For example, 
features such as packet length, average packet length, the variance of packet length, TCP 
flag and the packet direction are simple to calculate and can be gathered directly from the 
packet. It is very beneficial for the detection approach to using packet-level data to 
represent the states of the network. 
Flow-level features introduce a statistic summary of the network flows. Flow is described 
as packets with the same 5–tuple (source IP, destination IP, source port, destination port 
and protocol type). For instance, flow-level features are the cumulative number of packets 
in a flow, the duration of the flow and the average packet size. This statistic can be 
collected at the edge of the network using tools such as  Cisco NetFlow (Cisco, 2012).  
At the flow-level, the difference between the outbound and inbound traffic can be 
recognized. The main advantage of flow-features is that they do not require the extra 
resources and exhaustive processes of packet-level features. However, a shortcoming is 
that the flow may sometimes accumulate packets that relate to several applications in a 
single flow, which would distort the features of the flow. On the other hand, connection-
level features are required when it is necessary to track some behaviour which correlates 
with a connection-oriented protocol such as TCP. The contrast between connection and 
flow is that the start and termination of a TCP connection are well-defined handshakes 
between a client and a server. The connection-level data affords more high-quality 
information than flow-level features (Roughan et al., 2004) but requires further overhead 
to follow the state of the connection. 
Packet inspection approaches that have been used in practice in networking environments 
can be divided into two categories. These are shallow and DPI. Techniques that use DPI 
approaches are designed to permit network administrators to recognize specifically the 
header and the payload content of each packet of data that crosses over the network. 
According to AbuHmed et al. when applying DPI approaches on the network traffic there 
exists various challenges, such as the complexity of the search algorithm, a growing 
number of intruder signatures, signatures overlapping, unknown signature locations and 
encrypted packet payload contents (AbuHmed, Mohaisen, & Nyang, 2007). On the other 
hand, techniques that apply shallow packet inspection to read information from the 
network and transport layers of the OSI model. Thus, they cannot examine the session, 
presentation and application layers of a packet (Petersen, 2014). 
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In the proposed framework, a combination of connection and packet levels are used. The 
features are captured at both packet-level and connection-level. For example, the feature 
of inter-arrival time between packets in each connection requires data to be gathered at 
packet-level and then aggregated into connections to collect statistical information about 
connection states. Thus, the proposed Bot detection system can capture the local 
characteristics at packet-level and collect connection-level characteristics as the global 
features. Based on this approach, the features will have the benefits of both packet and 
connection levels. Thereby, in contrast to other relevant work, the proposed system can 
potentially be applied to any encrypted application since it applies a shallow packet 
inspection approach in order to extract connection features without using IP addresses, 
port numbers and payload content.  
The features used in the proposed framework are extracted in two phases. Firstly, the 
connection feature are extracted. Secondly, the connection features as host features are 
aggregated to represent the state of the host during the sliding time-window. Therefore, 
the final detection decision is based on the host features extracted according to the headers 
of control packets (packet-level) and connection statistical features (connection-level). 
Connection and host levels features are discussed in more detail in the next sections. 
4.3.1 Connection-level Features  
In this phase, features that are important in detecting the P2P Botnet’s malicious 
behaviour are extracted. Forty-three features are collected based on the size of the sliding 
window. These features are extracted based on the definition of a connection as a group 
of control packets exchanged between two different hosts, which are identified by the 5-
tuple (source IP address, destination IP address, source port and destination port, 
protocol). In proposed method, all features are extracted directly from the control packet 
header, which is different from previous approaches that use a deep inspection of the 
payload (Dan, Yichao, Yue, & Zongwen, 2010; Lu et al., 2011; Perdisci, Guofei, & 
Wenke, 2006; Xiaomei, Fei, Xiaohua, & Xiaocong, 2010). Consequently, performance is 
increased while the use of system resources such as memory and computation in the 
processor is reduced. Table 4.1 shows 43 features extracted in the proposed connections-
based P2P Botnet detection approach. These features are generated from a sliding time-
window and are composed of a feature vector to represent the connection status through 
the duration of the sliding window. 
CHAPTER 4: CONNECTION-LEVEL FEATURES FOR BOT HOST DETECTION 
58 
Table 4.1 Extracted features of network traffic connections. 
Features Description ̂ܨ1 Number of control packets per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ2 Number of control packets transmitted per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ3 Number of control packets received per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ4 Number of transmitted bytes per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ5 Number of received bytes per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ6 Number of transmitted SYN packets per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ7 Number of received SYN packets per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ8 Number of transmitted ACK packets in a sequence of one per 
connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ9 Number of received ACK packets in a sequence of one per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ10 Number of transmitted duplicate ACK packets per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ11 Number of received duplicate ACK packets per connection in a given 
time interval. ̂ܨ12 Average length of transmitted control packets per connection in a given 
time interval. ̂ܨ13 Average length of received control packets per connection in a given 
time interval. ̂ܨ14 Average length of control packets per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ15 Number of transmitted failed connection per connections in a given 
time interval. ̂ܨ16 Number of received failed connection per connections in a given time interval. ̂ܨ17 Number of transmitted SYN-ACK packets per connection in a given 
time interval. ̂ܨ18 Number of received SYN-ACK packets per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ19 Number of transmitted SYN-ACK packets in a sequence of one per 
connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ20 Number of received SYN-ACK packets in a sequence of one per 
connection in a given time interval.  
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̂ܨ21 Total number of bytes per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ22 Ratio of incoming control packets per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ23 Ratio of average length of outgoing control packets over the average length of control packets per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ24 Ratio of the difference between the number of transmitted SYN packets and the number of received ACK packets in a sequence of one over the 
number of transmitted SYN packets. ̂ܨ25 Difference between the number of transmitted SYN packets and the number of received SYN-ACK packets per connection in a given time 
interval. ̂ܨ26 Number of transmitted FIN-ACK packets per connection in a given 
time interval. 
F27 Number of received FIN-ACK packets per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ28 Number of transmitted RST-ACK packets per connection in a given 
time interval. ̂ܨ29 Number of received RST-ACK packets per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ30 Average time between attempts to create connections in a given time interval. ̂ܨ31 Number of received RST packets per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ32 Number of transmitted RST-ACK packets in a sequence one of per 
connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ33 Number of transmitted RST packets in a sequence of one per 
connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ34 Number of received RST-ACK packets in a sequence of one per 
connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ35 Inter-arrival time of packets between SYN and ACK packets that generated by the host per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ36 Inter-arrival time of packets between SYN and RST packets that generated by the host per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ37 Inter-arrival time of packets between SYN and RST-ACK packets that generated by the host per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ38 Inter-arrival time of packets between SYN packet from host side and RST packet from another side per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ39 Inter-arrival time of packets between SYN packet from host side and RST-ACK packet from another side per connection in a given time 
interval. 
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̂ܨ40 Inter-arrival time of packets between FIN-ACK packet from host side and RST packet from another side per connection in a given time 
interval. ̂ܨ41 Inter-arrival time of packets between ACK packet from host side and RST packet from another side per connection in a given time interval. ̂ܨ42 Inter-arrival time of packets between SYN packet from host side and SYN-ACK packet from another side per connection in a given time 
interval. ̂ܨ43 Connection duration. 
4.3.2 Connection Features Reduction  
Feature reduction is a technique of reducing the number of attributes, with the purpose of 
eliminating those features from the learning algorithm that have only a small influence 
on the classification problem (Nguyen, Petrović, & Franke, 2010). Feature reduction is 
used to decrease the ‘over-fitting’ problem (Livadas et al., 2006) and is important in 
overcoming the imbalanced dataset problem (Van der Putten & Van Someren, 2004). 
Therefore, the quality of the feature reduction mechanism is one of the most important 
factors that affect the accuracy of the classification algorithm. 
In this study, the aim of feature reduction is to choose a suitable subset of features which 
will improve neural network performance and decrease the complexity of a classification 
model without significantly decreasing accuracy rates. A classification and regression 
tree (CART) (Breiman et al., 1984) is employed as the feature reduction approach used 
to eliminate worthless features, with the aim of reducing the quantity of data needed to 
obtain better rates of neural network learning and classification accuracy. 
The decision tree produced by the CART algorithm consists of two types of nodes: 
internal nodes with two children, and leaf nodes without children. Any internal node is 
associated with a decision function to indicate which node to visit next. To begin the 
construction of the tree, the training samples that contain a set of features and their class 
labels are required. Recursively the training dataset is partitioned into smaller subgroup 
during the construction of the tree. Depending on the confusion matrix of the classes 
distribution in the training set, all resulting node is assigned a predicted class. 
The test at internal nodes is determined based on a measure of impurity to select which 
feature and threshold values are selected. The best-known measure of impurity for CART 
is entropy impurity, which is given by: 
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ܧሺݐሻ =  −∑ ݌ (݆ݐ) ݈݋݃ଶ ݌ (݆ݐ)�௝  (4.1) 
where ܧሺݐሻ is the entropy impurity at node ݐ, ݌ ቀ௝�ቁ is the relative frequency of class ݆ at 
node ݐ, and ܥ is the number of classes.  
The best value of the split node  ሺݐሻ is chosen from a set of all values splittingሺݔሻ, so that 
the maximum drop in impurity is a difference between the impurity at the root node and 
the impurity at the children nodes: ∆ܧሺݔ, ݐሻ = ܧሺݐሻ – ሺ �ܲܧሺݐ�ሻ  + �ܲܧሺݐ�ሻሻ (4.2) 
where ∆ܧሺݔ, ݐሻ is the drop of impurity, ܧሺݐ�ሻ and ܧሺݐ�ሻ are the impurities of the left and 
right branch nodes, �ܲ  and  �ܲ  are the percentage of objects go to the left  ሺݐ�ሻ or right ሺݐ�ሻ 
child nodes.  
Table 4.2 provides a ranking of the importance of features selected by the entropy 
algorithm using training dataset. The features ̂ܨ1, ̂ܨ3, ̂ܨ6, ̂ܨ7, ̂ܨ8, ̂ܨ9, ̂ܨ15, ̂ܨ19, ̂ܨ20, ̂ܨ 25, ̂ܨ 26, ̂ܨ 27, ̂ܨ 31, ̂ܨ 32, ̂ܨ 33, ̂ܨ 34, ̂ܨ 35, ̂ܨ 36, ̂ܨ 37 and ̂ܨ 43 show the best 
discrimination of connection behaviour, whereas the features ̂ܨ4, ̂ܨ5, ̂ܨ10, ̂ܨ11, ̂ܨ12, ̂ܨ13, ̂ܨ14, ̂ܨ16, ̂ܨ17, ̂ܨ18, ̂ܨ21, ̂ܨ22, ̂ܨ23, ̂ܨ24, ̂ܨ28, ̂ܨ29, ̂ܨ30, ̂ܨ38, ̂ܨ39, ̂ܨ40, ̂ܨ41 
and ̂ܨ42 do no discrimination between legitimate and malicious connections.  
Feature selection is performed depending on the contribution of the input samples that 
made the creation of the decision tree. Feature importance is decided by the role of each 
input sample either as a main splitter or as a surrogate. Surrogate splitters are represented 
as backup rules that approximately simulate the action of the primary splitting rules. The 
features that give the best discrimination of connection behaviour it will be used to 
generate host features in the next step of features extraction. 
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Table 4.2 Features importance ranking by entropy algorithm. 
Feature Importance Feature Importance Feature Importance ̂ܨ1 0.8130 ̂ܨ33 0.5319 ̂ܨ18 0 ̂ܨ2 0.8100 ̂ܨ34 0.5092 ̂ܨ21 0 ̂ܨ3 0.7876 ̂ܨ35 0.4493 ̂ܨ22 0 ̂ܨ6 0.7741 ̂ܨ36 0.3712 ̂ܨ23 0 ̂ܨ7 0.7634 ̂ܨ37 0.2870 ̂ܨ24 0 ̂ܨ8 0.7548 ̂ܨ43 0.1944 ̂ܨ28 0 ̂ܨ9 0.7438 ̂ܨ4 0.082941 ̂ܨ29 0 ̂ܨ15 0.7181 ̂ܨ5 0.069167 ̂ܨ30 0 ̂ܨ19 0.7031 ̂ܨ10 0.012049 ̂ܨ38 0 ̂ܨ20 0.6604 ̂ܨ11 0.01191 ̂ܨ39 0 ̂ܨ25 0.6198 ̂ܨ12 0.01153 ̂ܨ40 0 ̂ܨ26 0.6010 ̂ܨ13 0.000515 ̂ܨ41 0 ̂ܨ27 0.5734 ̂ܨ14 3.81E-06 ̂ܨ42 0 ̂ܨ31 0.5670 ̂ܨ16 6.12E-09   ̂ܨ32 0.5512 ̂ܨ17 0   
4.3.3 Host Feature Extraction  
Table 4.3 shows the 16 host features created in the proposed approach. However, our P2P 
Bot detection framework is based on the following three observations. Firstly, the Bot 
hosts share certain malicious characteristics in their network behaviours that are distinct 
from those of normal hosts (Yen, 2011). Secondly, the behaviour of Bot in the 
propagation phase repeats itself frequently whenever it infects the hosts during the 
propagation stage (Felix et al., 2012; Han et al., 2009; Sang-Kyun et al., 2009). Thirdly, 
the Bot connections are generated by a software program (Scanlon & Kechadi, 2012).  
The feature extraction phase can start immediately if packets are transferred between 
hosts. In order to extract the properties of a node more accurately, the collection of 
adequate network traffic is required before the feature extraction operation starts. 
Therefore, in the proposed approach the behaviour of hosts is observed by analysing their 
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traffic packets within the time of the sliding window in order to gain adequate packets. 
As a result of the feature extraction stage, each host is represented by its individual feature 
vector. This host feature vector set is then utilized to differentiate between malicious 
Botnet traffic and legitimate network traffic by employing online machine learning 
methods with reinforcement techniques.  
Table 4.3 Host features of network traffic. 
Feature Description 
F1 Total number of transmitting connection per host in a given 
time interval 
F2 Total number of transmitting unique connections per host in a 
given time interval. 
F3 Total number of connection tries per host in a given time 
interval. 
F4 Rate of high severity destination port numbers in a given time 
interval. 
F5 Rate of using unique destination ports per host in a given time 
interval.  
F6 Rate of using unique source ports per host in a given time 
interval.  
F7 Rate of transmitting unique connections per host in a given 
time interval. 
F8 Rate of high severity source port numbers in a given time 
interval. 
F9 Rate of failures in connection per host in a given time interval. 
F10 Entropy rate of total control packets in a connection per host in 
a given time interval. 
F11 Entropy rate of transmitting control packets in a connection per 
host in a given time interval. 
F12 Entropy rate of receiving control packets in a connection per 
host in a given time interval. 
F13 Average time between connections per host. 
F14 Average client Inter-arrival time between control packets.  
F15 Average connection duration. 
F16 Index of dispersion.  
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Port scanning is one of the most famous malicious activities. Port scanning is used by 
Bots in many aspects of the Botnet life cycle, such as propagation and attack behaviours. 
For example, in the propagation phase, a Bot tries to discover and contact other Bots in 
the same network in order to receive copies of the latest updates. Therefore, monitoring 
and analysing the rate of newly established connections is important in measuring and 
detecting malicious Bots behaviour. Port scanning may be divided into three classes: 
vertical scanning, horizontal scanning, and block scanning (Staniford, Hoagland, & 
McAlerney, 2002). A horizontal distribution scan is achieved by specific port access for 
many numbers of destination IP addresses. On the other hand, a vertical scan is performed 
on a specific destination IP address over a range of ports. Finally, a block scan is a mixture 
of horizontal and vertical scanning for different ports and destination IPs. The diversity 
of port number and destination IPs often indicates the capability of a Bot to exploit the 
victim host. In addition, computer ports are divided into two categories: high-severity and 
low-severity ports. According to the Dshield organization (Dshield.org, 2013) high-
severity ports contain those most likely to be scanned; all other ports are marked as low-
severity ports. Thereby, this research utilizes the port scanning for malicious activities, 
and so, features F1-F8 represent scanning behaviour. 
Based on our understanding and observation of Botnet traffic behaviour, it is natural for 
Bots to produce network connection failures. When a Bot joins a Botnet, it needs to find 
an entrance point, which could be either a C&C server or a peer host, to notify its current 
situation and receive new instructions. Consequently, any peers attempting to establish a 
connection with these hosts could lead to failures in connection. A failed connection 
feature F9 based on the TCP is represented as failed if the 3-step handshake is incomplete 
(Limmer & Dressler, 2009). 
The control packet count of legitimate Internet traffic shows more diversity than that of 
Bot connection traffic. Computer-human users can use many applications, which each 
one has a different behaviour for the number of control packets in concoctions. Therefore, 
we do not expect to notice any trend in the control packet frequency. On the other hand, 
in the propagation phase Bots try to contact other peers on the Botnet network to inquire 
for an update. Thus, they repeat the same connection behaviour, and this shows a trend in 
the style of connection. Therefore, an entropy algorithm (Cover & Thomas, 2012) is used 
in this study to measure the amount of entropy or randomness in control packet variation 
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per host, and an entropy algorithm is utilized by modelling the number of control packets 
in connections per host as a discrete symbol. A legitimate connection is expected to have 
high entropy while a Botnet connection is expected to have low entropy. The entropy of 
control packet frequency per host is calculated from a set ܥℎ  =  [ܿଵ, ܿଶ, . . . . ܿ�], where 
each ܿ௜ denotes the number of control packets per host connections. This is estimated as ܧሺݐሻ =  −∑ ܿ௜  ݈݋݃ଶ ܿ௜ �௜  (4.3) 
However, Jian et al. (2009) introduced approaches to detecting Storm Bot by utilizing 
entropy theory (Jian & Jun-Yao, 2009). A significant difference between their method 
and the present strategy is that Jian et al. applied the entropy theory over the packet 
payload content with DPI, which is not suitable for the detection of Botnets that use 
encryption techniques. 
Features F13-F15 are related to the client’s inter-arrival control packets. The inter-arrival 
packet time is the required time for the application to create and transfer data to the 
transport layer (Jaber, Cascella, & Barakat, 2011), and is estimated by extracting the time 
between any two consecutive packets in the same connection. We assume that additional 
time added because of the changes in network conditions is negligible. The proposed 
framework focuses on host features based on the network level and the target is to detect 
an infected machine, so it focuses on the time between of packets outgoing from the host. 
Finally, for feature F16, the index of dispersion for counts (IDC) is adopted to 
discriminate arrival processes consisting of packets sent by the host on the network. R. 
Gusella highlighted the importance of using the indices of dispersion in identifying packet 
variability (Gusella, 1991), where the index of dispersion is a measure used to quantify 
whether a set of observed events is clustered or scattered in correlation with a standard 
statistical model. The IDC is represented as the ratio of the variance to the mean. The 
following equation gives the definition of the IDC:  ܫܦܥ = �ଶ�  (4.4) 
where μ, σଶ  denote the mean and variance respectively. 
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4.4 The Malicious Activity Detector 
The operation of the malicious activity detector consists of three stages: an off-line stage 
(training), the online detection stage, and a reinforcement learning stage. In the training 
phase, the classifier is provided with a set of labelled Bot feature vectors and legitimate 
feature vectors for the training mission. Once the training stage is finished, the detection 
phase starts by entering the extracted features to the classifier in order to classify the 
activities of the hosts inside the network as malicious or legitimate. 
A neural network is used as a malicious activity detector because it has robust capabilities 
for nonlinear system identification and control due to an inherent ability to approximate 
an arbitrary nonlinear problem (Nigrin, 1994; Razi & Athappilly, 2005; Tsai, Hsu, Lin, 
& Lin, 2009). The neural network is trained with a resilient back-propagation learning 
algorithm, where the use of this algorithm is to minimize the damaging effects of the 
volumes of fractional derivatives. The sign of the derivative is only used to locate the 
trend of the weight update, whereas the volume of the derivative has no negative role 
overweight update. The size of the weight change is solely determined by the following 
formula (M. Riedmiller & Braun, 1993): 
∆ݓ௜௝ሺ�ሻ = {  
  −∆௜௝ሺ�ሻ ,            ݂݅ �ܧሺݐሻ�ݓ௜௝  > Ͳ  +∆௜௝ሺ�ሻ ,            ݂݅ �ܧሺݐሻ�ݓ௜௝  < ͲͲ,                        ݈݁ݏ݁              (4.5) 
where ∆ݓ௜௝ሺ�ሻ is the change in weight between the input layer and hidden layers in the 
current iteration ሺݐሻ, and  ∂Eሺtሻ∂w౟ౠ  denotes the partial derivative with respect to each weight. 
Once the weights are calculated, the new updated weight value is determined. This is 
accomplished with the following formula: 
∆௜௝ሺ�ሻ= {  
  ߟ+. ∆௜௝ ሺݐሻ ,            ݂݅ �ܧሺݐ − ͳሻ�ݓ௜௝ . �ܧሺݐሻ�ݓ௜௝  > Ͳ  ߟ−. ∆௜௝ ሺݐሻ ,            ݂݅ �ܧሺݐ − ͳሻ�ݓ௜௝ . �ܧሺݐሻ�ݓ௜௝   < Ͳ∆௜௝ ሺݐ − ͳሻ ,                  ݈݁ݏ݁                                (4.6) 
where ∆௜௝ሺ�ሻ  denotes the updated value for the current iteration t, and ߟ+ is the positive 
step value which is typically 1.2 and ߟ− is the negative step value which is typically 0.5 
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(M. Riedmiller & Braun, 1993). The neural network classifier proposed in this study 
contains 16 input and two output parameters. To avoid over fitting by using too many 
hidden layers, the method proposed in a previous study (Boger & Guterman, 1997) is 
used to determine the number of neurons in the hidden layers. 
4.5 Experimental Results and Evaluation 
4.5.1 Experimental Tools 
To estimate the performance of the proposed solution a series of experiments on the 
dataset were carried out. These experiments are carried on an Intel Xeon processor with 
a six-core monster clocked at 2.1GHz (with a 2.6GHz Turbo) and 64 GB RAM. Besides, 
the proposed approach implemented using Matlab 2014b. Table 4.4 shows the software 
tools and libraries used in the experiments. 
Table 4.4 Experimental Tools. 
Name Description Version 
Wireshark 
(Wireshark, 2015). Network protocol analyser. 1.12.4 
Jpcap  
(Shen & Wang, 2009). 
Java library for capturing and 
sending network packets. 0.7 
Tcpreplay 
(TcpReplay, 2014). Replays Pcap files onto the network 3.4.4 
4.5.2 Experimental Procedure  
To evaluate the proposed offline Bot detection approach, an experimental dataset  
Table 3.1 was obtained to evaluate its capability on Bot detection. Additionally, for the 
purpose of simulating a real network traffic situation, a testbed was configured in order 
to replay malicious Botnet traffic, normal daily activity traffic and P2P application traffic 
using the TcpReplay tool (TcpReplay, 2014). The reply network traffics runs on the same 
network interface card for the purpose of homogenizing the network traffic behaviour 
presented by all datasets. TcpReplay is utilized to replay the traffic from the traffic files. 
The replayed network traffic is then captured by the JPCAP tool (Shen & Wang, 2009).  
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The experimental procedure was scheduled into five steps, listed as following: 
1. Replay entire malicious trace and legitimate trace file, and capture packets using                       
various time-window sizes. 
2. Reduce network traffic using the proposed network traffic reduction technique.  
3. Extract feature vectors to generate host feature set. 
4. Get the classification results by using the prepared training and testing sets using 
the offline proposed Bot detection approach. 
5. Identify the time window size that achieves a better detection performance and 
better stability in the offline and online stages. 
The reason behind dividing the network traffic in time-windows is to analyse the massive 
traffic volume of packets. Moreover, time-window is required to submit a result to the 
network administrator in a timely fashion. The idea behind of not using time-window 
smaller than 10s is that the number of captured packets is too small to show the traffic 
behaviour characteristics. In the other hand, the reason for not using time-window larger 
than the 60s is that it cannot satisfy earlier of detection when using a large time-window 
size. In addition, Bots tend to generate a temporal behaviour following the infection phase 
(Hegna, 2010), and so this behaviour helps to capture the necessary Bot behaviours in the 
time-window. Therefore, in this research, we start with 10-seconds time-window and 
gradually increase the size of time-window in order to reach the acceptable performance 
rate. On the other hand, 10% of the time-window size is utilized as sliding interval 
between time windows to achieve rapid detection of any malicious activities instead of 
idling for the next entire time window to ending and then the network traffic to be 
collected. 
4.5.3 Evaluation Metrics 
The present assessment used P2P Bot host instances as positive instances and legitimate 
host instances as negative instances. Moreover, various metrics were used to evaluate the 
result of the experiments, namely detection rate (DR), FPR, precision, F-measure, 
accuracy (ACC), Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), Non-Dimensional Error Index 
(NDEI), Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) and area under the ROC (AUC). 
 Despite accuracy metrics have been adopted to measure performance in some studies 
(Saad, 2011; Wen-Hwa & Chia-Ching, 2010; Zhao et al., 2013), its use could be doubtful. 
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With the use of imbalanced datasets, where the numbers of instances relating to each class 
are significantly diverse, using accuracy as a measure of classification performance can 
be inaccurate. For instance, if a classifier is applied to a dataset that contains 95% 
legitimate activity and 5% malicious activity and the classification model predicts that all 
activity is legitimate then an accuracy rate of 95% is obtained. Nevertheless, this result 
does not mean a successful classification, since no malicious activity was detected. 
Consequently, imbalance measurements such as MCC and area under the ROC were 
applied in the evaluation in order to comprehensively assess of the proposed approach in 
situations of imbalanced datasets. The evaluation metrics were calculated using Equations 
4.7 to 4.14. 
 True positive (TP): represents the number of Bot instances accurately 
identified as malicious activities.  True negative (TN): indicates the number of normal instances accurately 
identified as legitimate activities.  False positive (FP): shows the number of normal instances identified as 
malicious activities.  False negative (FN): represents the number of Bot instances identified as 
legitimate activities. 
The FPR shows the percentage of legitimate instances misclassified as Botnet instances: ܨܴܲ = ܨܲሺܶܰ + ܨܲሻ (4.7) 
DR, also called recall, indicates the percentage of Botnet instances that were detected as 
Botnet instances. ܦܴ = ܶܲሺܶܲ + ܨܰሻ (4.8) 
ACC indicates the percentage of correct predictions of all instances. ܣܥܥ = ሺܶܲ + ܶܰሻሺܶܲ + ܶܰ + ܨܲ + ܨܰሻ (4.9) 
Precision indicates the percentage of instances correctly classified as positive instances. ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ = ܶܲሺܶܲ + ܨܲሻ (4.10) 
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The F-measure is a measure of a test’s accuracy. It considers both the precision and the 
recall of the test to compute the score. ܨ −݉݁�ݏݑݎ݁ = ሺʹ ×   ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ×   ܴ݁ܿ�݈݈ሻሺ ܲݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ + ܴ݁ܿ�݈݈ሻ  (4.11) 
RMSE indicates the differences between the target value and the actual value estimated 
by the detection method. 
ܴܯܵܧ = √∑ሺݕ݅ − ݐ݅ሻଶܰ�௜=ଵ  (4.12) 
where ܰ is the number of input samples, ݕ݅ represents the actual output of the model, and ݐ݅ is the targets of the samples. ܴܯܵܧ =  Ͳ indicates that the output of the model exactly 
matches the targets. Root mean square Error (ܴܯܵܧ ) is an important measure of 
variations between the values expected from a model or an estimator and the values 
actually observed. 
NDEI is defined as the RMSE divided by the standard deviation of the target series, which 
is used to estimate the prediction quality (Espinosa & Vandewalle, 2000). ܰܦܧܫ = ܴܯܵܧ ݏݐ݀ሺݐ݅ሻ (4.13) 
The MCC is used to evaluate the efficiency of the classifier in imbalanced classes 
(Matthews, 1975). ܯܥܥ = ሺܶܲ × ܶܰሻ − ሺܨܲ × ܨܰሻ√ሺሺܶܲ + ܨܲሻሺܶܲ + ܨܰሻሺܶܰ + ܨܲሻሺܶܰ + ܨܰሻ (4.14) 
The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) is a graphical plot that depicts a binary 
classifier’s performance. ROC curves plot the TPR on the vertical axis against the FPR 
on the horizontal axis. The AUC denotes the classifier’s performance (Swets, 2014). 
Moreover, the AUC is known to be a much more robust estimator of classifier 
performance (Fawcett, 2006). 
To ensure the quality of the learned neural network agent, a cross-validation method is 
used to estimate the error rate of classifiers. In cross-validation, the dataset is partitioned 
randomly into ܰ samples and evaluations are run for ܰ iterations. At each iteration, ܰ −
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ͳ samples are selected for training and the final sample is used to evaluate the accuracy 
of the classifier. 
4.5.4 Host Feature Set Evaluations 
To assess the quality of the proposed detection approach and the selected of the hosts 
features (Table 4.3) towards a successful detection, the normalized average for each 
feature is estimated by using Min-Max Normalization (Al Shalabi & Shaaban, 2006). �′ = �݅ − � ݉݅݊� ݉�ݔ − � ݉݅݊ (4.15) 
Where �′ is the normalized value of �݅. The �݉݅݊  and �݉�ݔ  are the minimum and 
maximum values of features vector.  
Figure 4.2 shows the average distribution of the normalization value for each feature. We 
found different distributions between Bot host traffic and normal host traffic. As shown 
in Figure 4.2 the features F5, F10, F12, F15 and F16 are a decrement features to help in 
Botnet detection. Whereby the features F14, F1 and F3 have a low differentiate between 
network traffic. 
 
Figure 4.2 Normalized host features comparison. 
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Figure 4.3 shows the difference in entropy values for the total number of control packets 
between flows for normal and Bot traffic. The plots show the entropy values for normal 
host traffic is between 0 to 5 while it is under 0.5 for a Bot host traffic.  
 
Figure 4.3 Entropy rates of total control packets per host. 
Interestingly, there were also differences in the ratios of the entropy of transmitting and 
receiving numbers of control packets between Bot host traffic and normal host traffic as 
shown in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5. The contrast in entropy values between normal and 
Bot hosts due to the Bot is an automated computer programme and has regularity in 
control packets count. Whereby, the normal host traffic has a diversity and random value 
for the count of control packets. Consequently, normal hosts have a high entropy value, 
whereas the Bot has a low entropy value.  
 
Figure 4.4 Entropy rate of transmitting control packets per host. 
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Figure 4.5 Entropy rates of receiving control packets per host. 
4.5.5 Offline Bot Detection Approach Evaluation 
The assessment results of the offline phase based on training dataset (Table 3.1) are 
demonstrated in Figures 4.6 - 4.9 the x-axis represents the size of the time window used 
for the feature extraction phase. It can be clearly seen that different performance 
measurements result from different time-window sizes. Based on these, the average 
values of cross-validation results for the time-windows are calculated. Therefore, the 
proposed approach with offline dataset gives the highest ACC, DR and F-measure rates 
of around 98.3%, 99% and 98.9 respectively based on a 60-seconds time-window; 
meanwhile, the worst performance achieved with a 10-seconds time window as shown in 
Figure 4.6 
Figure 4.7 gives the AUC and MCC results of the Botnet detection system using the 
various time window sizes. The results show that the highest average AUC and MCC 
rates were 99.1% and 95.6% respectively with the training dataset and a 60-second time 
window; while the lowest AUC and MCC rates were 97.5% and 88.1% with the system 
with 10-second time-window. AUC and MCC are considered the most reliable 
performance measures for imbalanced datasets. 
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Figure 4.6 (a) ACC rates, (b) DR rates, (c) F-measure rates. 
Subsequently, the performances of the proposed approach according to time window size 
was compared based on the average RMSE and NDEI, and the 60-second time-window 
achieved the best RMSE and NDEI rates at around 0.068 and 0.136 respectively as shown 
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in Figure 4.8. In addition, the lowest FPR and FNR were given with 60-second time 
window size as shown in Figure 4.9 
 
Figure 4.7 (a) AUC rates, (b) MCC rates. 
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Figure 4.8 (a) RMSE rates, (b) NDEI rates. 
 
Figure 4.9 (a) FPR rates, (b) FNR rates. 
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From the results, the proposed approach in the offline phase is able to detect Bots with 
high identification accuracy along with low rates of false positives. Note that these 
outcomes are with the training dataset and not the testing dataset. The primary target of 
the offline phase is to prepare the classifier agent to start work in the online phase. More 
details for the experiment parameters are provided in Appendix C.   
4.6 Discussions 
The results of the offline phase were estimated using the average of cross-validation. It 
can clearly observe that the classifier showed various performances levels with different 
sizes of time-window. The time-window of 60-seconds achieved the best performance 
based on the ACC, DR, F-measure, FPR, AUC, MCC, NDEI and RMSE measures as 
shown in Figure 4.6 to Figure 4.9.  
In addition, to measure the stability of the results in the offline phase, the standard 
deviation between cross-validation folds results was estimated. As shown in Table 4.5 the 
time-window size of 60-seconds achieved the lowest standard deviation for FPR, F-
measure, NDEI, RMSE and AUC at 0.08%, 0.05%, 0.220%, 0.0123% and 0.002% 
respectively. Meanwhile, a time-window size of 10-seconds achieved the lowest standard 
deviation for DR, ACC, and MCC at 0.03%, 0.0045% and 0.03% respectively. 
In summary, 10-seconds and 60-seconds time-windows showed the better stability of the 
results than the other time-window sizes as shown in Table 4.5. But the 60-second 
window based on imbalanced dataset measurements such as AUC and MCC achieved the 
best performance. Therefore, from the time-window size evaluation, 60-seconds were 
determined to be an appropriate window size in the proposed detection framework in the 
offline stage. 
The 60-seconds time-window achieves high-performance along with acceptable stability 
results in our experiment. Meanwhile, a small time-window size, such as 10-seconds does 
not contain sufficient amount of network traffic which required classifying the network 
traffic as malicious or legitimate behaviours. Moreover, the Bots tend to generate a 
temporal behaviour following the infection phase (Hegna, 2010). Therefore, the 60-
seconds time window size is suitable to capture adequately of the network traffic that 
helps in correct classification as discussed in the experimental procedure Section 4.5.2.  
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Table 4.5 Standard deviation of evaluation matrices. 
Time 
window Size 
FPR 
S.D% 
DR 
S.D% 
ACC 
S.D% 
F-Measure 
S.D% 
RMSE 
S.D% 
NDEI 
S.D% 
MCC 
S.D% 
AUC 
S.D% 
10-seconds 0.0974 0.03 0.0045 0.06 0.0124 0.238 0.03 0.0024 
30-seconds 0.11 0.178 0.024 0.16 0.0339 0.246 0.035 0.0035 
60-seconds 0.08 0.04 0.031 0.05 0.0123 0.220 0.041 0.002 
However, due to its design, our solution is able to detect single Bot infections and it is 
not necessary to associate activity among multiple hosts during the detection phase, as in 
the case with TAMD (Yen & Reiter, 2008), BotMiner (Gu, Perdisci, et al., 2008) and 
BotSniffer (Gu, Zhang, et al., 2008). On the other hand, several existing schemes (Goebel 
& Holz, 2007; Gu et al., 2007) support the detection of individual Bot infections, but they 
use DPI. In contrast, our solution needs only information about network connections; it 
does not examine payload content. Therefore, it is immune to Botnets that use encryption 
methods. 
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we have introduced the connection-level feature set and the main 
component of the proposed offline Botnet detection mechanism. Besides, we have 
evaluated the introduced feature set using real network traffic. The output model of the 
offline stage it will be utilized in the next stage of the online Bot detection system. 
Therefore, the next chapter will present the proposed RL approach for online Bot 
detection scheme. 
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5 REINFORCEMENT 
LEARNING APPROACH 
FOR ONLINE BOT 
DETECTION 
5.1 Introduction  
Identifying infected computers before the Bot exploits the host machine is a challenging 
task in cyber-security. In the past few years, several methods have been proposed to 
identify Botnet threats, which represent a risk to cyber-security systems. The majority of 
these studies have focused on improving offline Botnet detection. However, the results 
obtained using these approaches reflect only the state of network traffic at the time. 
Therefore, these approaches may become useless once the network environment changes. 
In this situation, all offline techniques may become invalid since they do not include 
online strategies. Thus, the main goal of this chapter is to introduce an efficient online 
Bot detection approach using RL. 
The previous chapters focused on the network traffic reduction, feature extraction and 
introduced the offline Bot detection approach. This chapter gives a brief introduction to 
RL including the components of an RL system, the Markov property, the partially 
observable Markov decision process and a classification of RL models. Furthermore, this 
chapter formulations the Botnet problem based on RL, followed by a model-based 
algorithm to achieve an online efficient Bot detection in a dynamic environment. 
5.2 Reinforcement Learning  
RL is a domain of machine learning inspired by behavioural psychology, based on how 
software agents take action in an environment in order to increase rewards. RL is learning 
by trial and error, where information about the state of an environment is received by the 
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agent, who performs an action. Once the action is completed, the agent estimates the 
numerical reward resulting from the action. Increasing the rewards received is the goal of 
the agent at all times. 
A wide range of algorithms has been suggested that use selective action in order to explore 
the environment, and to develop a strategy that leads to achieving the best reward (Barto 
& Andrew, 1998; Kaelbling, Littman, & Moore, 1996). These algorithms have been 
successfully utilized to solve complicated problems, for instance, elevator dispatch 
(Crites & Barto, 1998), board games (Tesauro, 1995), motor control tasks (Schaal & 
Atkeson, 1994) and job-shop scheduling (W. Zhang & Dietterich, 1996)  
Along with the disciplines of supervised learning (Harmon & Harmon, 1996) and 
dynamic programming, reinforcement learning is used to generate robust machine 
learning algorithms (Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996). Beyond a technique for solving 
control problem, RL can be considered as “one of the only designs of value in 
understanding the human mind” (Werbos, 1992). It is a way of learning optimal policy in 
an undiscovered or partially observed environment. Thereby, RL is based on the idea of 
trial and error in interplay with a dynamic environment (Barto & Andrew, 1998). 
5.2.1 Components of Reinforcement Learning System  
The main components of the RL or control problem are briefly reviewed in this section. 
The relationships between these components are also depicted in Figure 5.1 (Barto & 
Andrew, 1998). 
 Environment: The environment is matched to any system such as elevator 
dispatch, motor control tasks, board games or an intrusion detection system. The 
development of the environment depends on the history and actions executed by 
the agent. For each interaction, a reward ܴ� is transmitted to the agent, and this 
operates as an evaluation measure for the agent’s subsequent action in the new 
environment state. The environment states can be continuous or discrete. 
 Agent: The agent refers to the controller of the system. It has completed an 
observation or at least partial observation of the environment while interacting 
with it to receive an observation about state ��. Therefore, the agent receives the 
rewardܴ�+ଵ from performing action ܣ� based on receiving the environment status ��. Furthermore, the reward ܴ�+ଵ can apply to enhance the agent policy. 
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 Actions ሺܣሻ: Actions result from the evolution of the environment. They refer to 
changes in the agent’s environment. Moreover, some actions cannot instantly 
change the system, but often need a specificied delay. However, actions of agent 
can be restricted depend on the problem solution setting. Corresponding to the 
setting of the problem, actions can be discrete or continuous. 
 Policy ሺ�ሻ: is the mapping between the environment’s state and the action which 
can be considered in this state, and is a sequence of actions which reflects the 
agent’s learning rate at a given time. In some situations, the policy can use a 
lookup table of rules or simple functions. According to Sutton and Barto ”the 
policy is the core of a RL agent in the sense that it alone is sufficient to determine 
a behaviour” (Barto & Andrew, 1998). 
 Reward ሺܴሻ: The term reward refers to the goal of RL. It represents the direct 
reward the agent receives for executing a particular action in a given system state. 
Therefore, it determines the utility of an action taken by an agent. Strictly 
speaking, in the long term, the primary target of a RL agent is to maximize the 
total rewards received. Thus, a reward function indicates which action is correct 
immediately, while the value function specifies what is good in the long run. 
As shown in Figure 5.1, the RL model includes an environment and an agent. At a 
given time  , the environment gives a state ܵ�  to the agent and then the agent executes 
an action ܣ� according state ܵ� and policy �. After that, the environment changes to a 
new state ܵ�+ଵ Additionally, at the same time, the environment also gives a numeric 
reward ܴ�+ଵ, which is an immediate reward or penalty for choosing action ܣ� in state ܵ�  (Barto & Andrew, 1998). However, the goal of any RL approach is to improve the 
policy in order to maximize the long-term reward. 
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Figure 5.1 General RL system architecture (Barto & Andrew, 1998). 
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5.2.2 The Markov Property  
5.2.2.1 Markov Decision Process 
The mathematical foundation of general theoretical RL problems is a Markov decision 
process (MDP), which explains the evolution of a fully observable system. Therefore, if 
the state and action space are deterministic, the dynamics of the MDP can be described 
by the probability that the next state will be ܵ�+ଵ based on the fact that the current state is 
St and the chosen action is ܣ� . An MDP is primarily represented by a tuple ሺܵ, ܣ, ܶ, ܴሻ with the following objects (Feinberg, Shwartz, & Altman, 2002; Kaelbling, 
Littman, & Cassandra, 1998; Puterman, 2014). 
 ݐ ∈  ܰ specifies the time step.  ܵ refers to a state space of the environment.  ܣ indicates an action, ܣሺܵ�ሻ represents the authorized actions in the state 
St∈ S.  ܶሺܵ�+ଵ|ܵ�, ܣ�ሻ  is a deterministic state transition function: ܵ × ܣ × ܵ → [Ͳ, ͳ], which denotes the probability of achieving state St+1 starting from 
state ܵ� and using action ܣ� with ܵ�, ܵ�+ଵ ∈ S and ܣ� ∈ ܣሺܵ�ሻ.  a reward function ܴݐ =  ܴሺܵ�ሻ: ܵ →  ܴ  indicated the one-step direct 
reward starting from state ܵ�. 
The relationship between the various objects is explained by a one-step transition given 
an open (controllable) dynamic system for a state space ܵ. Being in an arbitrary state ܵ�  ∈ ܵ at time step t, the agent takes an action ܣ� ∈ ܣሺܵ�ሻ. As a result, the system develops to 
the next state ܵ�+ଵ  ∈  ܵ based on the transition function ܶሺܵ�+ଵ|ܵ�, ܣ�ሻ. At the same time, 
the agent obtains the reward ܴሺܵ�+ଵሻ  from state ܵ�+ଵ  (Feinberg et al., 2002). The 
sequence of actions and states produced are termed a trajectory.  
Due to the definition of the Markov property (def. 5.1) the next state ܵ�+ଵ is based on the 
action ܣ� and the current state ܵ�. In other words, the Markov property states that the 
evolution of the system is based on the last action taken and the system state (Feinberg et 
al., 2002; Gass & Fu, 2013). Therefore, it is independent of its history of previous states 
and actions. The Markov property in discrete time is thus stated as  ܵ଴ to refer to an 
arbitrary beginning state (Gass & Fu, 2013). 
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Definition 5.1. Markov property: a discrete stochastic process ܵ�  ∈  ܵ with action ܣ� ∈ ܣ and a transition function ܶሺܵ�+ଵ|ܣ�, ܵ�ሻ is called Markovian if for every ݐ ∈  ܰ it is:  ܶሺܵ�+ଵ|ܣ�, ܵ�, ܣ�−ଵ, ܵ�−ଵ, . . . , ܣ଴, ܵ଴ሻ  =  ܶሺܵ�+ଵ|ܣ�, ܵ�ሻ         (5.1) 
Additionally, the Markov property can be used in a formalized RL problem. When an 
agent is at time step ݐ, the agent receives information about the environment state ܵ�, and 
it must utilize the state ܵ� information to predict action ܣ�. If the agent takes an action 
depending on the current state ܵ�  and not based on any of the previous states ܵ�−ଵ , ܵ�−ଶ, … . , ܵ଴  , or any of the previous actions ܣ�−ଵ , ܣ�−ଶ, … . , ܣ଴  or any of the 
previous rewards ܴ�−ଵ , ܴ�−ଶ, … . , ܴ଴, then the state possesses the Markov property and is 
a Markov state. If all of the states in the environment have this characteristic, we can say 
it is a Markov environment and has the Markov property. 
The Markov property plays a vital role in any RL system because the agent makes an 
action based only on information about the current state. The majority of real system 
environments are not completely Markovian, but they approximate a Markov 
environment. 
Figure 5.2 represents the basic RL problem using a Markov decision process (MDP). The 
system environment is fully observable. Therefore, the observation of the agent's �� is 
equivalent to the deterministic environment state ܵ� . Therefore, based on the Markov 
property, the agent has all the information needed to select its next action ܣ� according to 
the sequential policy used for mapping between an observation state ��ሺ= ܵ�ሻand the 
next action. The environment then develops due to the transition function ܶሺܵ�+ଵ|ܣ�, ܵ�ሻ . 
Environment state
  
Action
At
St+1
Rt+1
St
a
te
 
S t
 
 
 
=
 
O
bs
er
va
tio
n
 
X
t
Agent
St Mapping At
 
Figure 5.2 Markov decision process (Schäfer, 2008). 
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5.2.2.2 Partially Observable Markov Decision Process 
The partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) was first explicitly studied 
by Drake in 1962 (Drake, 1962). Smallwood and Sondik  later introduced the first 
algorithmic work based on POMDP by combining the basic idea of the model of the 
Markov decision process with the concept of an agent which might be unable fully to 
know the environment state (Smallwood & Sondik, 1973).  
The POMDP differs from the MDP in the way that the state space S is not completely 
detectable. This is regularly applied to a real system’s operation in a dynamic 
environment, such as the Botnet detection problem. The agent only obtains an observation �� ∈ � as a sign of the immediate state of the system, ܵ� ∈ ܵ. Formally, a POMDP can 
be represented by a tuple (ܵ, �, ܣ, ܶ, ܴሻ, where � represents the observation space, which 
is a space that is contained within the state space S and may also include extra irrelevant 
information.  
Figure 5.3 provides a general graphical illustration of a partially observable Markov 
decision process. As opposed to the MDP (Figure 5.2), the state of an environment ܵ� is 
only partially observable by the agent, which is represented by the expression � � ⊂ ܵ�. 
This indicates that the agent has the additional job of having to approximate to decide 
actions ܣ�. In particular, the agent has to construct a model of the environment, which it 
applies as the foundation for its decision-making. Moreover, it utilizes the system’s past 
time state to improve future actions. 
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Figure 5.3 Partial Markov decision process (Schäfer, 2008). 
5.2.3 Reinforcement Learning Models  
There are several various ways to classify RL techniques. A primary difference can be 
created between table-based and function approximation methods. In the table-based 
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method, the agent stores the environment state and action within a look-up table. This 
approach suffers from the limitation of the computational requirements due to table size. 
Thus, such techniques are essentially used in RL with low-dimensional discrete state 
space problems, for instance Q-learning (Watkins, 1989) and adaptive heuristic critic (A. 
G. Barto, Sutton, & Anderson, 1983). On the other hand, in function approximation 
techniques the state and action are represented by an approximation function in order to 
increase the performance of the system and can be used for high dimensions problems. 
Examples of these are temporal difference approaches with neural networks (Tesauro, 
1994; Tsitsiklis & Van Roy, 1997) local basis functions (Barto & Andrew, 1998), as well 
as neural fitted Q-iteration (Martin Riedmiller, 2005).  
Another significant contrast can be made between model-free and model-based 
algorithms. In brief, model-free methods teach a controller without learning model, and 
without using a labelled dataset to build transition function policy. So, they immediately 
learn from data without making any effort to create a model. This leads to an efficient and 
simple implementation. In a model-based indirect adaptive method, the system first learns 
a model and then utilizes it to find an optimum policy. Therefore, it needs further 
computation, but gives the model extensions to deal with real-world problems like Botnet 
detection, which cannot be easily controlled without an available dataset to learn the 
model in the initial phase. 
In addition, function approximation machine learning approaches, such as artificial neural 
networks, determine optimal performance by looking at examples in the training dataset. 
This procedure is very beneficial when examples of optimal behaviour are readily 
available. However, in some problems a training dataset that represents the problem does 
not exist or it is incomplete, and so only limited information is available about the optimal 
solution. RL techniques discover the optimal behaviour by trial and error, which implies 
that no information is needed in advance about the optimal behaviour. This characteristic 
makes RL an important domain in artificial intelligence applications since it does not 
depend on a complete training dataset being supplied.  
5.2.4 Exploration Versus Exploitation  
RL is a technique of preparing an agent to learn. The agent learns by getting rewards 
following each action. It somehow keeps track of these rewards and then chooses actions 
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that lead to maximizing the reward, not automatically for the next action but in long-term 
execution (Barto & Andrew, 1998). The agent normally goes through the same 
environment several times to learn how to decide upon optimal actions. Balancing 
exploration and exploitation is especially necessary here; the agent may have obtained a 
sound goal on one path, but there might be an even best one on the different path. Thereby 
without exploration, the agent will regularly return to the first goal, and the most 
beneficial goal will not be attained. Alternatively, the goal may lie after many steps of 
agent action. Therefore, it is significant to balance exploration and exploitation in order 
to guarantee that the agent is learning the optimal actions. However, any RL techniques 
require a strategy to guarantee that there is such a balance. Various methods that can be 
utilized to achieve a good balance between exploration and exploitation, such as greedy 
exploration, frequency and recency-based exploration (Barto & Andrew, 1998), R-Max 
(Brafman & Tennenholtz, 2003), decaying exploration, and persistent exploration (Singh, 
Jaakkola, Littman, & Szepesvári, 2000). 
5.3 Formulation of Botnet Problem Using Reinforcement 
Learning  
Sutton and Barto studied the RL algorithms for learning to control a system effectively 
by communicating with the environment and perceiving the rewards received (Barto & 
Andrew, 1998). RL methods are a common selection for problems where it is hard to 
specify precisely an explicit software solution, but where it is possible to produce a reward 
signal, which is exactly the situation in our Botnet problem. Here the RL obstacle is 
expressed in the context of partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDP). 
POMDPs are normally used to represent dynamic systems such as Botnet detection 
systems. 
A POMDP is described by a set of states ሺܵሻ , depicting the probable states of the 
controller agent state ሺܣܩ��ሻ, neural network agent state ሺܰ �ܰ�ሻ and host state ሺܪ��ሻ. The 
neural network agent action at time ݐ is ሺܰ �ܰ�ሻ, and the neural network agent chooses 
actions based on policy �, where ܰܰ�ሺܪ��, ܣሻ is the probability of the agent choosing 
action ܣ  when it is the host in the state ሺܪ��ሻ . A reward function ܴ  is estimated as ܴሺܣܩ��ሻ. A transition function for the system control agent is ሺ �ܶ�ሻ. 
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The Markovian transition function defines the dynamics of the system and provides the 
possibility ܶሺܣܩ�� , ܰ �ܰ� , ܣܩ��+ଵሻ  of transitioning to state Agent ܣܩ��+ଵ  after taking 
action ܰ �ܰ� in state ܣܩ��. The reward function assigns the number of new hosts state ܪ�� 
and the total number of host states in the system is processed as integer numbers to state 
agent ܣܩ��. 
At any time, POMDP represents the system state, and when an action is selected by the 
neural network agent ܰ �ܰ� the host state value and controller agent reward are estimated. 
Next, according to the size of the reward collected, the transition function of the controller 
agent �ܶ� changes the neural network agent to a new state ܰ �ܰ�+ଵ. In this research, P2P 
Bot detection is expressed as a RL problem. This primarily involves selecting the value 
state function, the reward function, the action space and the transition function.  
Action Space: In defining the action space, the node on the network at every time window 
will be given a probability as a legitimate or Bot node. After that, the RL agent takes this 
probability into account in order to estimate the reward from these states.  
Agent Reward Function: The reward signal is defined at any time step to be equal to the 
number of new states processed by any node in the network during the number of the time 
window. Note that this reward signal will estimate the important of the new state using 
the value state function in set time windows, and here the new state can be a legitimate 
node or a node infected by a Bot.  
Value state function: Any ሺܪሻ node inside the network has many states based on the 
mode of use. Moreover, the value state function represents the expected reward from each 
host state ܪ�� under the policy ܰܰ�. The neural network agent output for every host state 
in every time-window can be divided into two sub-state of probabilities as Bot ܧሺܤሻ or 
legitimateܧሺܰሻ, and so the outcome of every host state is represented as ሺܧ. ܤ ሺܪ��ሻሻ or ሺܧ. ܰ ሺܪ��ሻሻ, as shown in Figure 5.4 
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Figure 5.4 Host states. 
 Value state function evaluation for Bot hosts: 
EVπ(H(B)) =∑ E(ܤ��ሺ௜ሻሻni=0 n  (5.2) 
EVπሺHሺBሻሻ  represents the average expected Bot status for the host in the ݊ time window. 
Here, E(BStሺiሻ) is the probability a malicious behaviour outcome from the computer under 
the current neural network agent policy. 
 Value state function evaluation for legitimate hosts: 
EVπ(H(N)) = ͳ − EVπ(H(B)) (5.3) EVπሺHሺNሻሻ  represents the average expected legitimate status for the host in the n time 
window. Here, Eሺ �ܰ�ሺ௜ሻሻ is the probability of a malicious behaviour outcome from the 
computer under the current neural network agent policy. 
 Value state function evaluation for controller Agent : 
�(s)=V(s) + {VሺBStሻ=argmax(BሺActionsሻ)     EVπ(HሺBሻSt>EVπ(HሺNሻStVሺNStሻ=argmax(NሺActionsሻ)   EVπ(HሺBሻSt<EVπ(HሺNሻSt  (5.4) 
where �ሺݏሻ  is the accumulated states which achieve maximum reward based on the 
current policy of the neural network agent ܰܰ�. 
Transition function. Next, the (controller agent) transition function must be defined. 
Any technique in the RL field requires some kind strategy which ensures that there is a 
balance between exploration and exploitation. The problem is how to find a good action-
selection policy based on the appropriate amounts of exploration and exploitation.  
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One purpose of this study is to find a beneficial technique in order to make a balance 
between exploration and exploitation for Bot detection problems. Therefore, a directed 
exploration approach is used. The goal of the exploration approach is to explore as much 
of the state and action as possible before switching strategy and starting to exploit this 
knowledge.  
The simplest directed exploration techniques are greedy methods that, in each state, select 
the state with the highest probability of experiencing value. Furthermore, the explorative 
strategy is followed by a series of steps in order to find hidden goals. If the goal is a new 
unique state for the system, then it is easy for the system to change from explorative to 
exploitive when this seems to be more beneficial. 
The transition function is then  
�ܶ� = ∑݊݁ݓ �ሺݏሻ∑�ሺݏሻ ≥ ߠ (5.5) 
where  �ܶ� indicates the rate of exploring new state ݊݁ݓ �ሺݏሻ over all the environment 
state �ሺݏሻ. Thus, the value of �ܶ� is variable depending on the amount of the analysed 
network traffic. In addition, θ is an adaptive threshold value that is determined by the 
network administrator depending on the desired security level of the network, for 
example, in an army network ߠ is very small in contrast to another type of networks such 
as, universities networks. Moreover, when θ has a low value this means that the learning 
rate is high. 
5.3.1 Bot Detection Algorithm Using Reinforcement Learning 
In terms of Bot detection, here is an explanation of the development of the Algorithm 5.1. 
The main components of the proposed algorithm, which its function is to detect Bot, are 
discussed in the previous section. In addition, Figure 5.5 illustrates the Algorithm 5.1 
steps.  
The proposed Bot detection system, the Algorithm 5.1, continually monitors the network 
environment. Firstly, it extracts an observation from the environment and decides an 
action based on the current neural network policy. Meanwhile, a vector �  is used to 
accumulate the new state and action for each observation. Whenever the agent 
accumulates the beneficial amount of new states, it changes to the exploitation state to 
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utilize these states. Finally, the main control agent evaluates the performance of the new 
neural network agent before using it.  
 
Algorithm 5.1: Bot detection using an RL technique. 
 1: Initialize V(s) = 0; 
 2: Initialize Tst =0; 
 3: All_Dataset=RefDataset; 
 4: Temp_Dataset=0; 
 5: Read current environment observation (state (St)); 
 6: Perform action NNπ ሺA | St, St + ͳሻ; 
 7: Execute action and extract rewards (R); 
 8: Estimate the probability of Bot node: 
EVπȋ(ȋBȌȌ =∑ Eȋܤ��ሺ௜ሻሻni=0 n   
 9: Estimate the probability of legitimate node: EVπȋ(ȋNȌȌ = � − EVπȋ(ȋBȌȌ  
 10: Extract the state with high expected reward: �ȋsȌ=VȋsȌ + {VሺBStሻ=argmax(BሺActionsሻ)     EVπȋ(ሺBሻSt>EVπȋ(ሺNሻStVሺNStሻ=argmax(NሺActionsሻ)   EVπȋ(ሺBሻSt<EVπȋ(ሺNሻSt  
 11: Check the amount of extracted reward: 
�ܶ� = ∑݊݁ݓ �ሺݏሻ∑�ሺݏሻ ≥ ߠ  
 12: If Tst >= θ   Temp_Dataset = Temp_Dataset +V(s).  Reset V(s). 
 13: (NN2π): Creation and Evaluation:  Create a new neural network (NNπʹ) using Temp_Dataset.  Evaluate the performance of ( NNπʹ ) using cross-validation 
techniques.  Evaluate the performance of (NNπʹ) using RefDataset. 
 14: IF (NNπ2) pass the evaluation phases   NNπ = NNπ2;  All_dataset= All_dataset+ Temp_Dataset;  Reset Temp_Datase;  EndIF 
 Return to step:1. 
 EndIF  
 
The key benefit of the approach introduced is that it will remain to a strategy for a period 
of time, and will not perform one-step in the exploratory direction and one-step in the 
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exploitative direction. However, managing the rate of learning (exploration) new 
behaviour (states) depend on the network traffic state. In the case of huge volumes of 
network traffic the controller agent will be found a high number of new state comparison 
with low network traffic. Once the system determines the most beneficial amount of 
reward it changes to the exploitative strategy by producing a new dataset from the old 
dataset and newly extracted states to use for retraining a new neural network agent. Once 
the new neural network agent is trained, three procedures are used to grantee the quality 
of the system outcome. Firstly, a cross-valuation approach is applied to evaluate the result 
of the new neural network agent and estimate performance evaluation matrices such as 
AUC, MCC, accuracy, and RMSE. Secondly, the new neural agent is evaluated using the 
old reference dataset (state and action) and estimating the performance evaluation of 
AUC, MCC, accuracy, and RMSE. Thirdly, if the system passes the evaluation test then 
the main controller of the system will replace the neural network agent with a new one. 
However, if the new neural agent fails to achieve good performance, the system retains 
the current neural network agent and reset the new state and action buffer. 
In summary, there are three neural network agents in the system’s reference neural 
network. The first initial agent’s neural network is trained using a reference dataset (states 
and actions). The second the neural network is created using new environment 
observations (states). Finally, the neural network with the best configuration that passes 
the evaluation phase is used in the detection process. 
The complex nature of the proposed approach is derived from the complex of the neural 
network with resilient backpropagation learning. Resilient back-propagation (RPROP) is 
considered the best an algorithm which combined robustness, speed and accuracy (M. 
Riedmiller & Braun, 1993). Furthermore, according to Christian Igel et al. (2005) the 
RPROP algorithm has linear time and space complexity (Igel, Toussaint, & Weishui, 
2005) 
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Figure 5.5 Neural Network Agent state. 
A multilayer neural network with ݅ inputs, ℎ hidden units, and ݑ outputs  has ܪ ሺ݅ + ͳሻ 
weights on the first layer and ݑ ሺℎ + ͳሻ weights in the second layer. Both space and time 
complexity of an MLP is  ܱ ሺℎ ·  ሺݑ +  ݅ሻሻ . When ݁  denotes the number of training 
epochs, training time complexity is ܱሺ݁ · ℎ ·  ሺݑ +  ݅ሻሻ. In an application, ݅ and ݑ are 
predefined and ℎ is the parameter that we play with to tune the complexity of the model 
(Alpaydin & Ethem, 2014).  
The complexity of the proposed approach is based on the complexity of the neural 
network. So, in our proposed approach, the complexity of create a new neural network ܰܰ�ʹ is: ܱ ሺ݁ ·  ℎ ·  ሺݑ +  ݅ሻሻ  =  ܱ ሺܰሻ (5.6) 
Where ܰ denote to the number of weights. 
In addition, the complexity of evaluation of new neural network based cross-validation 
approach is: 
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݂ ∗  ܱ ሺ݁ ·  ℎ ·  ሺݑ +  ݅ሻሻ  =  ܱ ሺܰሻ (5.7) 
Where ݂ is the number of folds.  
Finally, the complexity of proposed approach is ܱሺܰሻ.    
5.4 Online Bot Host Detection Approach 
At online detection stage, the learned neural network agent classifies the host inside the 
network continually and sends a report about the hosts’ activities to the network 
administrator. Moreover, as shown in Figure 5.6, the RL agent at the same time works to 
extract any new features that will help to improve the performance of the detection agent 
in the future.  
RL agent
Host features 
vectors
Malicious 
activity detector 
agent (NN)
Extract new 
behaviour
REPORT
State, Action 
Improve the NN 
agent using new 
behaviour Network
administrator
 
Figure 5.6 Overview of On-line Bot Detection Phases. 
This research introduces a new technique in which the RL agent’s activities are divided 
into two phases: a) new behaviour is extracted as shown in Figure 5.7, and then b) 
improving the neural network agent using the newly extracted behaviour as shown in 
Figure 5.8. 
A. Extract new behaviour using a RL agent: 
1. Extract the state of the environment and the action that it performs by use of the 
current neural network agent. 
2. Check if the state is a new state according to the reference set of states (training 
dataset), go to step 4. 
3. The agent is waiting for the next state and action, go to step 1. 
4. The agent creates a vector for every host on the network to store the state and 
action that occurred. 
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5. Check if the total number of the new states for any host in the network is equal to 
a threshold number, and then estimate the average of the actions that was done by 
the host in order to find the best reward value based on the probability and 
frequency of the action. Otherwise, return to step 1. 
6. Check that the overall amount of reward is the balanced between exploration and 
exploitation based on the adaptive threshold value. So, if a rate of new states 
satisfies the value of the adaptive threshold, then go to the next phase of the 
proposed framework in order to exploit the newly extracted features to improve 
the system. Otherwise, return to step 1 to increase the exploration rate. 
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Figure 5.7 Extract new behaviour phase. 
B. Improve the neural network agent using new extracted online behaviour: 
7. Create a vector for the reward (new state) to use it to improve the system to detect 
new states of attacks. 
8. Adopting new state and action by incremental training of the new neural network 
agent to add a new policy to the system. 
9. Evaluate of the efficiency of the new neural network using 10-fold cross-
validation. In addition, check if it success of satisfies the minimum requirements 
based on the cross-validation result of the new neural network agent and go to 
step 11. 
10. If the system does no change the neural network policy, reset the reward vector of 
state and action and return to step 6 to check f it has valuable new rewards. 
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11. Test the new neural network using the reference dataset. If it succeeds in satisfying 
the minimum requirements for classifying the host inside the network, go to step 
13. 
12. If there are no changes in neural network policy, reset the reward vector of state 
and action and return to step 6 to check if it gives valuable new rewards. 
13. Replace the last good configuration neural network (main agent) with the new 
neural network with incremental training using the new state and action that are 
extracted in the online phase, and reset the reward vector of state and action and 
return to step 6 to check if it gives a valuable new reward. 
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Figure 5.8 Improving the classifier agent. 
Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 shows the main components of RL agents. The model for extract 
new behaviour (learning agent) and the model of adopting the new behaviour phases are 
demonstrated. In This study, a novel connection between RL and neural networks is given 
in order to resolve the control problems with dimensionality and the partially observable 
environment. 
5.5 Experimental Results and Evaluation 
5.5.1 Experiments Using Differences Sliding Time-window Size 
This section gives an overview of the results of the proposed technique in Bot detection 
using the testing dataset (Table 3.1). We have conducted the experimental procedure that 
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mentioned in Section 4.5.2 in Chapter 4. The results obtained from the analysis of the 
online experiment outcomes are summarized in Figure 5.9 to Figure 5.12. 
As shown in Figure 5.9, the proposed approach using online evaluation gives the highest 
ACC, DR and F-measure rates of around 98.8%, 98.3% and 97.9% respectively using the 
60-seconds time window; meanwhile, the lowest performance of the proposed approach 
using these measures was achieved with a 10 seconds time-window. 
 
Figure 5.9 (a) ACC rates, (b) DR rates, (c) F-measure rates. 
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Figure 5.10 presents the performance measurement AUC and MCC for the imbalance 
dataset. The results show that the highest AUC and MCC rates were 99.96% and 95.6% 
respectively in the online testing dataset evaluation using a 60-seconds time-window. 
 
Figure 5.10 (a) AUC rates, (b) MCC rates. 
In addition, the quality of outcomes of the proposed method based on time window size 
was compared using the RMSE and NDEI measures, and the 60-seconds time window 
achieved the best RMSE and NDEI rate around 0.093 and 0.187 respectively as shown in 
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Figure 5.11. Furthermore, the lowest FPR and FNR were given with a 60-seconds time 
window size as shown in Figure 5.12. 
 
Figure 5.11 (a) RMSE rates, (b) NDEI rates. 
The proposed approach achieves the best performance results at the 60-seconds time-
window. Consequently, this size of time window is sufficient to collect Bots malicious 
behaviour and, therefore, achieve the best classification outcomes. In addition, to test the 
efficiency of the proposed approach in detecting P2P Bots, the ROC curve was plotted to 
show the trade-off between TPR and FPR. A perfect classifier would have an area under 
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the curve (AUC) close to 1.0, where the x-axis represents FPR and the y-axis represents 
TPR. 
 
Figure 5.12 (a) FPR rates. (b) FNR rates. 
Figure 5.13, plots the ROC for three time-windows 10, 30 and 60 as a sample in order to 
compare the performance of proposed approach in different time-window size. As shown 
in Figure 5.13 the 60-seconds time-window obtained the best performance in the AUC 
for both Bot and legitimate detection rates around 0.9916 and 0.9896 respectively. 
Therefore, it is found that the proposed approach performs well in classifying host inside 
the network traffic as a Bot or legitimate hosts. 
 
Figure 5.13 ROC comparison. 
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5.5.2 Testing on Zero-day Attack 
To further evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method with new P2P Botnet 
network traffic, Zeus, Waledac and Storm Bots were used to test the system for detection 
of zero-day attacks. It is evident from the results presented in Figure 5.14 that the 
technique adopted by our framework was powerful in detecting new P2P Bots types, with 
good accuracy rates. As shown in Figure 5.14, the detection rates for the Storm Bot and 
Waledac Bot using 60-seconds time-window were those higher than for the Zeus Bot 
96.83%, 98.2% and 93.8% respectively. This was because for the testing and training 
dataset we used Storm and Waledac Bots, but from different dataset sources as shown in  
Table 3.1. 
 
Figure 5.14 Detection rate (zero-day attack). 
From Figure 5.15, a significant observation is that the approach gives low FPR for the 
Zeus, Storm and Waledac Bots at around 0.04, 0.07and 0.09 respectively using 60-
seconds time-window. What is interesting in this result is that the proposed system is able 
to extract new features from the environment online and to utilize these features to 
enhance the system’s on detection of novel types of Bot behaviour. The results of this 
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experiment confirm that the proposed RL agent with proposed feature set can detect Bot 
even if it is a Zero-day attack. 
 
Figure 5.15 FPR (Zero-day attack). 
5.5.3 Reinforcement Learning Model Evaluations  
5.5.3.1 Evaluation the Efficiency of the Proposed Approach Based on Reference 
Dataset 
The evaluation results for training the neural network agent in the online phase based on 
the reference dataset (train dataset) are demonstrated in Figure 5.16 to Figure 5.19. The 
x-axis represents the training index of neural network agent. It can be clearly seen that 
different performance measurements on the result from different time-window sizes. 
Based on these, results for 10s, 30s, and 60s time-windows are calculated. Therefore, the 
evaluations of the online agent with reference dataset give the highest average accuracy 
rate is 99.20% with standard deviation of 0.004 based on a 60-seconds time-window; 
meanwhile, the lowest average accuracy achieved with a 10-seconds time window was 
95.92% and standard deviation 0.0143 as shown in Figure 5.16. 
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Figure 5.16 Online evaluations the ACC of a classifier based on a reference dataset. 
Subsequently, the performances of the proposed approach according to time window size 
and reference dataset were compared based on AUC, and the 60-second time window 
achieved the best average AUC rates of 98.37% and the standard deviation around 0.0067 
as shown in Figure 5.17. In addition, the lowest performance results given with a 10-
second time-window.  
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Figure 5.17 Online evaluations the AUC of a classifier based on a reference dataset. 
In addition, Figure 5.18 compares the evaluation of MCC result, and the 60-second time-
window achieves the best average rates around 94.9% with the standard deviation around 
0.0224. AUC and MCC are considered the most reliable performance measures for 
imbalanced datasets. 
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Figure 5.18 Online evaluations the MCC of a classifier based on a reference dataset. 
In addition, the performances of the proposed approach according to time window size 
and reference dataset were compared based on the average RMSE, and the 60-second 
time window achieved the best average RMSE rates at around 0.044 with standard 
deviation around 0.0365 as shown in Figure 5.19. In addition, the lowest rate given with 
a 10-second time-window with average and standard deviation 0.14 and 0.291 
respectively. 
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Figure 5.19 Online evaluations the RMSE of a classifier based on a reference dataset. 
As shown in Figure 5.16, Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18, the performance of the ACC, 
MCC, and AUC starts with high rates over the neural network training index, and then 
slightly decreases due to the probability of learning misclassified behaviours by the agent 
of malicious activity detector. Moreover, for the possibility of misclassified behaviours 
the RMSE increases over the neural network training index as shown in Figure 5.19.  
Furthermore, the RL agent achieves the best performance over the 60-seconds time-
window using reference dataset. By then, the 60-seconds time-window is sufficient to 
collect Bots malicious behaviours and it has low numbers of misclassified activities. In 
addition, the evaluation experiment results for time window 20, 40 and 50 seconds are 
demonstrated in Appendix A. 
5.5.3.2 Evaluation the Efficiency of the Proposed Approach based on Updated Dataset 
This section gives an overview of the evaluation results of the neural network agent in 
Bot detection using the updated dataset with new behaviours. The results obtained from 
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the analysis of the online experiment outcomes are summarized in Figure 5.20 to Figure 
5.23. As shown in Figure 5.20, the evaluation of the proposed approach using updated 
dataset online evaluation gives the best average of accuracy 98.26 with standard deviation 
around 0.0032 using the 60-seconds time window; meanwhile, the lowest evaluation of 
accuracy was achieved with a 10-seconds time-window with  average 94.48% and 
standard deviation around 0.0126.  
 
Figure 5.20 Online evaluations the ACC of a classifier based on an updated dataset. 
  
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 38
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
Neural Network Training Index
A
C
C
 
(b) 30-Seconds time-window
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 54
0.97
0.975
0.98
0.985
0.99
0.995
Neural Network Training Index
A
C
C
(c) 60-Seconds time-window
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
Neural Network Training Index
A
C
C
(a) 10-Seconds time-window
CHAPTER 5: REINFORCEMENT LEARNING APPROACH FOR ONLINE BOT DETECTION 
107 
Figure 5.21 and Figure 5.22 present the performance measurement AUC and MCC for 
the updated dataset. The results show that the highest average AUC and MCC rates were 
above 98.55% and above 95.22% respectively in the online testing evaluation using a 60-
seconds time-window. 
 
Figure 5.21 Online evaluations the AUC of a classifier based on an updated dataset. 
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Figure 5.22 Online evaluations the MCC of a classifier based on an updated dataset. 
The quality of outcomes of the proposed method based on time window size and the 
updated dataset is compared using the RMSE measure, and the 60-seconds time-window 
achieved the best average RMSE around 0.1255 and standard deviation of 0.0251 as 
shown in Figure 5.23. Furthermore, the lowest rate was given with a 10-seconds time-
window size with average of 0.1729 
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Figure 5.23 Online evaluations the RMSE of a classifier based on an updated dataset. 
As shown in Figure 5.20, Figure 5.21 and Figure 5.22, the performance of the ACC, 
MCC, and AUC starts with high rates over the neural network training index, and then 
slightly decreases due to the probability of learning misclassified behaviours by the agent 
of malicious activity detector. Moreover, for the possibility of misclassified behaviours 
the RMSE increases over the neural network training index as shown in Figure 5.23. 
Moreover, the RL agent achieves the best performance over the 60-seconds time-window 
using updated dataset. By then, the 60-seconds time-window is sufficient to collect Bots 
malicious behaviours and it has low numbers of misclassified activities. In addition, the 
evaluation experiment results for time window 20, 40 and 50 seconds are demonstrated 
in Appendix B. 
5.5.3.3 Evaluation Based on the Learning Rate  
This section gives an overview of the evaluation results of the RL agent in extraction new 
behaviour using the test dataset. The results gathered from the analysis of the online 
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experiment outcomes are summarized in Figure 5.24 to Figure 5.26. The x-axis represents 
the training index of the neural network agent and the y-axis represents the accumulative 
value of new Bot behaviour. It can be clearly seen that different numbers of the 
accumulated new Bot behaviours are extracted from different time-window sizes. Based 
on these, results for 10s, 30s, and 60s time-windows are calculated. Therefore, the 
evaluations of online agent to find new behaviour gives the highest accumulative number 
of new Bot behaviours is 4902 based on a 60-seconds time-window as shown in Figure 
5.26; meanwhile the worst case to find new Bot behaviour with a 10-seconds time window 
is 934 as shown in Figure 5.25 
 
Figure 5.24 Evaluations of the extract new behaviours based on 10s time-window. 
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Figure 5.25 Evaluations of the extract new behaviours based on 30s time-window. 
 
Figure 5.26 Evaluations of the extract new behaviours based on 60s time-window. 
From the empirical results of the evaluation to extract new behaviour (learning rate) as 
shown in Figure 5.26 the 60-seconds time-window has the best result to find new Bot 
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behaviour that improve the neural network agent online. In addition, as shown in above 
figures the RL agent has the maximum training index over the 60-seconds time-window 
due to this size of time window sufficient to collect Bots malicious behaviour and, 
therefore, discover the highest number of new Bot behaviours which improve the RL 
agent to detect a Zero-day attack as discussed in section 5.5.2. 
Figure 5.27 gives an overview of the proposed technique results in the Bot detection based 
test dataset and the reference neural network agent (reference neural network: is the first 
neural network which is trained based on the offline dataset). The overall results obtained 
from the analysis of an online experiment outcome are summarized in Figure 5.27. As 
shown in Figure 5.27(a), Figure 5.27(b) and Figure 5.27(c), the evaluation of performance 
reference neural network using test data set gives the highest accuracy, detection and F-
measure rate around 75%, 73% and 70%, respectively using 60-second time-window; 
meanwhile the lowest accuracy was achieved on 10-second time-window around 68%. 
Figure 5.27(e) and Figure 5.27(f) presents the imbalance dataset performance 
measurement AUC and MCC. The results show that the highest AUC and MCC rates 
were 90% and 85% respectively on testing dataset evaluation through 60-second time-
window. In addition, the quality of outcomes of the proposed method based on time 
window size is compared using the RMSE and NDEI, the 60-second time-window 
achieves the best RMSE and NDEI rate around 0.28 and 0.30 respectively as shown in 
Figure 5.27(g) and Figure 5.27(h). Furthermore, the lowest FPR was given on 60-second 
time-window size. 
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Figure 5.27 Test the online system based reference neural network. 
As shown in above Figure the reference neural network with testing dataset has a bad 
performance outcome. However, the primary aim of the evaluation using reference neural 
network is to prove that the proposed approach with RL agent can detect P2P bots and 
able to learn new behaviour in order to improve the detection system over time. More 
details for the experiment parameters are provided in Appendix C.   
5.6 Discussion 
There are an enormous variety of RL problems depending on the respective environments 
and objectives. In practice, any solution for a dynamic problem using RL, such as Botnet 
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detection, must be able to deal with the partial observability of the problem and the 
dimensionality of the data as well as the size of training data, as shown in Figure 5.28 
Data with high dimensionality rates normally come from huge volumes of input into a 
system, which may affect the solution of the problems in the dynamic environments. For 
that reason, RL methods which can deal with high dimensionality and that are easily 
scalable are required. All table-based methods are excluded, because these methods are 
inefficient in problems with huge dimensionality. Instead an efficient and accurate 
function approximation is required. 
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Figure 5.28 RL Characteristic. 
In dynamic real-world environments, the situation is only partially observable since it is 
either an inaccessible environment or too costly to inspect all states and actions. In such 
situations, model-based strategies are beneficial as they first build the system’s dynamics 
using current knowledge and utilize the current state to predict unobserved states. 
However, the quality of the first model is crucial. 
In the present research, a model-based learning approach utilizes information collected 
through the training (offline phase) very effectively. Since the agent tries to learn a model 
of the states of the environment, thus it can combine the knowledge from multiple 
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experiences. Besides the function approximation is applied overcome the storage problem 
with table-based approaches and to achieve data efficiency by generalizing to about 
unseen states. 
However, The Botnet detection method chosen should satisfy the requirement of novelty 
detection, adaptability and early detection. Based on these measures, a neural network 
with a resilient back-propagation learning algorithm is adopted as a classification 
technique. This has robust capabilities for nonlinear system identification and control due 
to an inherent ability to approximate arbitrary nonlinear problems. Moreover, using the 
resilient back-propagation learning algorithm minimizes the harmful effects of volumes 
of fractional derivatives, and it increases the adoption rate. In addition, utilizing the RL 
approach improves the capability of the proposed system to detect a zero-day attack. 
Table 5.1 shows the results of the comparison of our results with those of research using 
the same dataset in the offline phase that used by Zhao et al. (Zhao et al., 2013) and in 
online phase evaluation we used the same dataset as used by Babak et al. (Babak et al., 
2014). The table also shows that the Bots detection and FPR using the proposed approach 
are better than those gained by previous solutions. Moreover, the proposed system is an 
online technique. Additionally, our approach differs from previous ones because the 
analysis is not performed on all network traffic such the studies (Babak et al., 2014; Zhao 
et al., 2013), which they analysis the whole network traffic to detect Bot malicious 
behaviours. 
Table 5.1 Comparison with other published approaches. 
Approaches FPR Detection 
rate 
Traffic reduction 
rate 
    Babak et al. (2014) 0.1% 99.5% 0% 
    Zhao et al. (2013) 2.1% 98.1% 0% 
Proposed approach 
Online 0.012% 98.30% 
 40% -70% 
Offline 0.01% 99.1% 
5.7 Summary 
In this chapter, a novel combination of neural networks and reinforcement learning were 
introduced in the design of an efficient Bot detection method. Practicality in solving high-
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dimensional and partially observable RL problems in dynamic environments requires a 
model-based approach to identify Botnet malicious activity on the network. In addition, 
a technique was developed to achieve a balance between exploration and exploitation for 
the RL agent. In practice, a dynamic controller is constructed that obtains an optimal 
dynamic control policy under a RL framework. For the controller and its learning method, 
neural networks were used. The experiments with real Bot network traffic samples show 
that the controller succeeds in learning the optimal policy for a task of Bot detection. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND 
FUTURE WORK 
This chapter presents the thesis conclusions and summarizes its unique contributions 
along with suggesting directions for future work. The main conclusion of the research is 
presented in Section 6.1. A summary of contributions is given in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 
presents difficulties and solutions, and the limitations of the proposed approach are 
outlined in Section 6.4. Directions for future research are then indicated in Section 6.5. 
6.1 Thesis Summary 
Since the appearance of the Internet, network security has always been a primary interest 
of its users. Currently, Botnet detection is the most serious task in Internet security. 
Botnets can be utilized for many malicious activities such as DDoS, Spam and stealing 
sensitive information. Botnet detection, therefore, has assumed fundamental importance. 
This thesis has presented our research on the Bot host detection using network traffic 
reduction with RL approach. In this thesis, Chapter 2 had reviewed the relevant 
background on Botnet phenomena and couple of related work on Botnet detection. 
Chapter 3 had presented our proposed contribution on the network traffic reduction. 
Chapter 4 had described our proposed connection-level feature set. Besides, the design of 
our offline Bot detection system, the experimental procedures, the results evaluation 
matrix and further discussions have been described in the chapter.  
In Chapter 5, experiments are conducted to test the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
designed RL method. The RL algorithm for Bot detection is evaluated from different 
perspective using real world datasets. Furthermore, several methods of evaluation are 
used that cover balanced and imbalanced datasets. The results of the assessment show the 
efficiency of the proposed approach to deal with different types of Bot traffic and if the 
approach can detect zero-day attacks using the proposed RL algorithm. 
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6.2 Summary of Key Contributions 
The significance of the proposed system lies in the following aspects. Firstly, it can detect 
P2P Bots even when their malicious activities are hidden, and without inspecting packet 
payloads. Secondly, the approach is capable of online detection based on a powerful 
mechanism for traffic reduction and short detection time-windows. Finally, a RL 
methodology used in the proposed approach increases the ability of the system to evolve 
based on the environment evolving. 
Combining the use of network traffic reduction and RL approach gives our solution a 
valuable contribution to the field of Botnet detection. The experiments carried out 
involved testing and comparing with other research work based on the same datasets.  
The first contribution is traffic reduction approach. The result revealed that using the 
traffic reduction approach achieved better reduction rate and had a considerable effect on 
online Bot detection. Besides, the traffic reduction approach improvises the efficiency of 
the proposed solution to work as an online Bot detection system and to deal with massive 
volumes of network traffic. 
The second contribution is the connection-level feature set. To achieve earlier Bot 
detection and bypass the encrypted network traffic, connections-based detection 
mechanism was designed and implemented which utilizes the information in the header 
of TCP control packets. The evaluation result of the proposed connection-level feature 
set using offline model shows that our feature set achieved better accuracy and detection 
rate. Moreover, the performance of the proposed feature set is evaluated using offline Bot 
detection model and compared with existing detection methods, and achieves better 
results using the same dataset. 
The third contribution is the online RL model. To achieve adaptability in the proposed 
approach, a new model-based RL algorithm was designed and implemented. The 
experimental results revealed that using RL approach with traffic reduction method 
achieved high accuracy and detection rates compared with existing results using the same 
dataset. In addition, the solution has shown the ability to learn rapidly new attack patterns 
online. This important benefit supports intrusion detection systems and enhances their 
ability to detect zero-day attacks without the need for continuously external updates. 
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6.3 Difficulties and Solutions  
Despite all concerted efforts to reduce the influence of Botnets, improvements in Botnet 
evasion techniques are rapidly growing, which makes Botnet detection a very difficult 
task for the Internet security community (FBI, 2011; IBM, 2013; Plohmann et al., 2011). 
Botnets are becoming more complicated, employing a diversity of evasion methods such 
as protocol evasion techniques, rootkits, advanced executable packers and moving away 
from IRC to VOIP, HTTP, IPV6 and P2P protocols and networks. These evasion 
strategies enhance the survivability of Botnets and increase the rates of infection of new 
hosts. 
There are three principal difficulties in the classification of host behaviour: Firstly, the 
network traffic is continuous, which indicates that it is persistent and features will change 
over time. Furthermore, Botnets dynamically change via Bot updates or altering their 
operation in various life cycle stages after receiving instructions from a Botmaster. These 
phenomena are termed concept drift and this is currently a serious issue for any detection 
method (Dries & Rückert, 2009). Therefore, the proposed framework adopts the idea of 
RL to improve the system dynamically over time. Secondly, there is always the risk of a 
new Botnet emerging on a network. It's spread may be stealthy, such as in zero-day 
attacks, and the behaviour of the host might seem like legitimate behaviour, and the 
difficulty to detect malicious activities if the classifier not trained for this behaviour 
previously. These cases generate a problem of novelty detection for detection models. 
Therefore, the proposed framework continually extracts new features to improve 
detection rates over time. Thirdly, evaluating the entire network traffic in real-time is a 
computationally expensive task due to the speed of network traffic. Therefore, the 
proposed approach uses a traffic reduction method, which helps to set up a more 
lightweight, and speedy online detection method. 
6.4 Limitations  
In general, the major challenge for detection Botnet using data mining techniques is 
obtaining the training dataset. The universality and precision of the classifier depend on 
the training data sets quality. A diversity and illustrative training dataset are hard to obtain 
and to create one due to the time consuming and resource.  In addition, the majority of 
the available Botnet dataset is formed in academic experiment source due to the security 
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and privacy issue, it is very difficult for the researcher to get a Botnet traces from other 
such as corporate networks. 
6.5 Future Research Directions  
Our online Bot detection approach with its proof-of-concept design and implementation 
could be able to address the real-time objective. However, further research has to 
investigate the challenging of real-time implementation. Nevertheless, machine learning 
methods could be applied to a real-time solution. 
The following list contains summaries of several research topics that can be pursued in 
the near future as a continuation of the research work presented in this thesis: 
1. Discovery of further Botnet features. Based on P2P Bot communications, P2P 
applications and an analysis of the literature, 16 host features were created. It is 
possible to add informative connection-based features by analysing Botnets traffic 
using the UDP protocol. These features may be valuable for increasing the 
performance of any future Botnet detection system. 
2. Use different feature selection algorithms. Although the feature selection 
algorithms that used in this work helped to minimize the vectors dimensions of 
the feature set without greatly reducing the performance of the detection approach, 
other feature selection algorithms could perhaps be utilized to gain a better feature 
subset. 
3. Botnet detection in new trends, platforms and infrastructures. Many Botnets that 
work on smartphones have been classified, adding another threat to personal 
information. Consequently, exploring the experience gained from identifying 
Botnets on network to reduce their effects in developing infrastructures will be 
worthy of investigation in the future. 
4. New Types of Botnet Attacks. To reserve their Botnets, attackers always attempt 
to make Botnet C&C connections as hidden as possible. Therefore, new types of 
Botnets have begun to adopt the social networks as their new communication 
channel. Investigating how this communication protocol operates, and how 
Botnets utilize this channel, could be a new direction to continue the present work.  
5. An interesting direction might be to combine the connection-level feature with the 
host-level feature sets and using ensemble parallel classifiers. Such a combination 
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could add to the analysis of Botnet traffic which might improve the accuracy of 
the Botnet detection approach. 
6. Another area of interest might be to investigate the possibility of replacing the 
neural network in proposed strategy with other machine learning methods such as 
those employing unsupervised learning (for example, clustering algorithms).
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APPENDICES 
A  APPENDIX A 
A.1 Evaluation the efficiency of the proposed approach using 
reference dataset for 20, 40 and 50 seconds time windows. 
 
The evaluation results for training the neural network agent in the online phase based on 
the reference dataset (train dataset) are demonstrated in Figure A.1 to Figure A.4. It can 
be clearly seen that different performance measurements on the result from different time-
window sizes. Based on these, results for 20s, 40s, and 50s time-windows are calculated. 
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Figure A.1 Online evaluations the ACC of a classifier based on a reference dataset. 
 
Figure A.2 Online evaluations the AUC of a classifier based on a reference dataset. 
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Figure A.3 Online evaluations the MCC of a classifier based on a reference dataset. 
Figure A.4 Online evaluations the RMSE of a classifier based on a reference dataset. 
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B APPENDIX B 
B.1 Evaluation the efficiency of the proposed approach using 
updated dataset for 20, 40 and 50 seconds. 
 
This section gives an overview of the evaluation results of the neural network agent in 
Bot detection using the updated dataset with new behaviours. The results obtained from 
the analysis of the online experiment outcomes are summarized in Figure B.1 to Figure 
B.4 for 20s, 40s, and 50s time-windows are calculated. 
 
Figure B.1 Online evaluations the ACC of a classifier based on an updated dataset. 
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Figure B.2 Online evaluations the AUC of a classifier based on an updated dataset. 
 
Figure B.3 Online evaluations the MCC of a classifier based on an updated dataset. 
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Figure B.4 Online evaluations the RMSE of a classifier based on an updated dataset. 
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C LIST OF EXPERIMENT PARAMETERS 
1. The minimum level to accept the new neural network (after retrained) based on 
the reference dataset. 
Table C.1 Evaluation parameter of new neural network using reference dataset 
Evaluation Method Parameter value 
AUC >0.90 
MCC >0.80 
ACC >0.90 
RMSE <0.20 
2. The minimum level to accept the new neural network (after retrained) based on 
the updated dataset. 
Table C.2 Evaluation parameter of new neural network using updated dataset 
Evaluation Method Parameter value 
AUC >0.90 
MCC >0.80 
ACC >0.90 
RMSE <0.20 
3. The threshold number used of exploration step per host is five. 
4. The value of threshold factor that allow the proposed system to change state form 
exploration to exploitation.  ܶݏ ≥ Ͳ.ͳ5 
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5. Neural network parameter.  
Neural network parameter Parameter value 
Number of layers 5 
Input layer neurons 16 
output layer neurons 2 
Neuron per hidden layer 10 
Learning function Resilient Backpropagation 
epochs 1000 
goal 1e-5 
Error function of MSE 
 
6. Cross-validation 5-fold was used.  
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D IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK 
1. Traffic capture module. 
a) Pseudo code  
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.List; 
import org.jnetpcap.Pcap; 
import org.jnetpcap.PcapIf; 
import org.jnetpcap.packet.PcapPacket; 
import org.jnetpcap.packet.PcapPacketHandler; 
import org.jnetpcap.protocol.network.Ip4; 
public class PackageCapture  
{ 
public static void main(String[] args)  
{ 
List<PcapIf> alldevs = new ArrayList<PcapIf>();  
StringBuilder errbuf = new StringBuilder 
int r = Pcap.findAllDevs(alldevs, errbuf); 
if (r != Pcap.OK || alldevs.isEmpty())  
{ 
 System.err.printf("Can't read list of devices, error is %s", 
errbuf.toString()); 
return; 
 } 
System.out.println("Network devices found:"); 
int i = 0; 
for (PcapIf device : alldevs) 
{ 
String description = (device.getDescription() != null) ? 
device.getDescription():"Nodescription 
available";.out.printf("#%d: %s [%s]\n", i++, 
device.getName(),description); 
} 
PcapIf device = alldevs.get(0); // Get first device in list 
System.out.printf("\nChoosing '%s' on your behalf:\n", 
 (device.getDescription() != null) ? device.getDescription() 
: device.getName()); 
int snaplen = 64 * 1024; // Capture all packets, no trucation 
int flags = Pcap.MODE_PROMISCUOUS; // capture all packets 
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int timeout = 10 * 1000; // 10 seconds in millis 
Pcap pcap = Pcap.openLive(device.getName(), snaplen, flags, 
timeout, errbuf); 
if (pcap == null) {System.err.printf("Error while opening device 
for capture: "+ errbuf.toString()); 
return; 
} 
PcapPacketHandler<String> jpacketHandler = new 
PcapPacketHandler<String>()  
{ 
public void nextPacket(PcapPacket packet, String user) { 
byte[] data = packet.getByteArray(0, packet.size()); // the 
package data 
byte[] sIP = new byte[4]; 
byte[] dIP = new byte[4]; 
Ip4 ip = new Ip4(); 
if (packet.hasHeader(ip) == false) { 
return; packet 
} 
ip.source(sIP); 
ip.destination(dIP); 
String sourceIP = org.jnetpcap.packet.format.FormatUtils.ip(sIP); 
String destinationIP = 
org.jnetpcap.packet.format.FormatUtils.ip(dIP); 
System.out.println("srcIP=" + sourceIP + " dstIP=" + 
destinationIP + " caplen=" + packet.getCaptureHeader().caplen()); 
} 
}; 
pcap.loop(10, jpacketHandler, "jNetPcap"); 
pcap.close(); 
} 
} 
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2. Traffic reduction module. 
a) Input: network packets. 
b) Output: TCP control packets. 
c) Pseudo code: 
  function contrl_packets = Traffic_Reducton(raw) 
    temp = raw; 
    control_pak = []; 
    Res=[]; 
    for j = 1:size(temp,1)  
      SYN=~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[SYN]')); 
      ACK=~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[ACK]')); 
      FIN=~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[FIN]')); 
      RST=~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[RST]')); 
      SACK=~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[SYN, ACK]')); 
      FACK=~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[FIN, ACK]')); 
      RACK=~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[RST, ACK]')); 
       if (ACK | SYN | FIN | RST |SACK|FACK|RACK) 
        control_pak = cat(1, control_pak, temp(j, :)); 
        Res = cat(1, Res, temp(j, :)); 
     end 
    end 
    save('Cont_packet.mat', 'control2'); 
    contrl_packets=control_pak; 
  end 
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3. Connection-level features extraction module. 
a) Input: Time window size and TCP control packets. 
b) Output: Connection-level features list. 
c) Pseudo code: 
function extract_flow = extract(control_raw,time_w) 
temp2 = control_raw; 
temp = temp2; 
CPT = []; 
Res = []; 
while ~isempty(temp) 
x=[];    
   TIME_rACK=[]; % reactive ACK packets - time sequence per 
connection. 
    TIME_sACK=[]; % send ACK packets - time sequence per connection. 
    TIME_rSYN=[]; % receive SYN packets - time sequence per 
connection. 
    TIME_sSYN=[];% send SYN packets - time sequence per connection. 
    paket_seq=[]; % packets sequence per connection. 
    start_Conn=0; % start time of connection.  
    cp = 0;    % total number of packet. 
    NsendPacket=0; % total number of send packets. 
    NrecivePacket=0; % total number of receive packets. 
    TotalSendByte=0; %total number of send Bytes per connection. 
    TotalReciveByte=0;%total number of receive Bytes per connection. 
    NsendSyn=0;% number of send SYN packets per connection. 
    NreciveSyn=0;% number of receive SYN packets per connection. 
    NsendAck=0; %number of send ACK packets per connection. 
    NreciveAck=0;%number of receive ACK packets per connection. 
    NsendSynAck=0;%number of send SYN ACK packets per connection. 
    sACK=0; %number of send ACK=1 packets per connection. 
    NreciveSynAck=0;%number of receive SYN ACK packets per connection. 
    rACK=0;  %number of receive ACK=1 packets per connection. 
    NsendDupAck=0;%number of send double ACK packets per connection. 
    NreciveDupAck=0;%number of receive double ACK packets per 
connection. 
    NsendFinAck=0;%number of send FIN ACK packets per connection. 
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    NreciveFinack=0;%number of receive FIN ACK packets per connection. 
    SendRSTack=0;%number of send RST ACK packets per connection. 
    RecivdRSTack=0; %number of receive RST ACK packets per connection. 
    avg_time=0; % Avg. time between packets. 
    defrent_time=0; % time between connections. 
    avgLengthSendPacket=0;% Avg. length of send packets. 
    avgLengthRecivedPacket=0;%Avg. length of receive packets. 
    avgLengtPacket=0;% Avg. length of packets. 
    SendFailedConnection =0;% number of send fail per connection. 
    TotalRConnection=0;% Total number of receive connections. 
     RecivdRST=0; % number of receive RST packets per connection. 
     RecivdRSTack=0;% number of receive RST ACK packets per 
connection. 
     SendRSTack=0;% number of send RST ACK packets per connection. 
     SendRST=0;% number of send RST packets per connection. 
     scanCount=0;% number of scanning activates. 
    % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % % %     
    cpt = 0; 
    temp = temp2; 
    host_A=temp(1, 2); 
    host_B=temp(1, 3); 
    port_A=temp(1, 4); 
    port_B=temp(1, 5); 
    start_Con=cell2mat(temp(1,6)); 
   s1 = strcat(temp(1, 2), temp(1, 3),temp(1, 4),temp(1, 5)); 
    for j = 1:size(temp, 1) 
        s3 = strcat(temp(j, 2), temp(j, 3),temp(j, 4),temp(j, 5)); 
        s4 = strcat(temp(j, 3), temp(j, 2),temp(j, 5),temp(j, 4)); 
        if strcmp(s3, s1) % send packet 
            timePacket=[timePacket cell2mat(temp(j,6))]; 
            Res = cat(1, Res, temp(j, :)); 
            NsendPacket=NsendPacket+1; 
            TotalSendByte=TotalSendByte+cell2mat(temp(j,7)); 
            if ((~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),  
           '[SYN]'))&(isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[TCP  
             Retransmission]')))... 
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             & (isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[TCP Out-Of- 
                Order]'))))) 
               NsendSyn=NsendSyn+1; 
              paket_seq=[paket_seq 's1,']; 
              TIME_sSYN=[TIME_sSYN num2str(cell2mat(temp(j,6)))';']; 
              timesyn=cell2mat(temp(j,6)); 
            end 
            if (~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[SYN,  
            ACK]'))&& ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), 'Seq=0  
             '))) 
                NsendSynAckseq0=NsendSynAckseq0+1; 
                paket_seq=[paket_seq '1s2,']; 
            end 
            if ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[SYN, ACK]')) 
                NsendSynAck=NsendSynAck+1; 
                 timeSrstack=cell2mat(temp(j,6)); 
            end 
            if ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[ACK]')) 
                NsendAck=NsendAck+1; 
            end 
           if (~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[FIN,  
            ACK]'))&& ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'Seq=1  
            Ack=1 '))) 
                NsendFinAck=NsendFinAck+1; 
                paket_seq=[paket_seq '1s7,']; 
                timeSfinack=cell2mat(temp(j,6)); 
           end 
            if ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), 'Dup')) 
                NsendDupAck=NsendDupAck+1; 
            end 
            if ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[RST]')) 
                SendRST=SendRST+1; 
            end 
             
            if (~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[RST]'))&&  
           ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), 'Seq=1 '))) 
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                SendRSTseq1=SendRSTseq1+1; 
                paket_seq=[paket_seq '1s4,']; 
                timeSrst=cell2mat(temp(j,6)); 
            end 
            if ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[RST, ACK]')) 
                SendRSTack=SendRSTack+1; 
            end 
            if (~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[RST,  
             ACK]'))&& ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), 'Seq=1  
             ')))  
             SendRSTackSeq1=SendRSTackSeq1+1; 
             paket_seq=[paket_seq '1s5,']; 
             timeSrstack=cell2mat(temp(j,6)); 
            end 
 
            ACK1=~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[ACK]')); 
            ack_seq=~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'Seq=1  
            Ack=1 ')); 
            dumack=isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'Dup '));  
            keepAliveAck=isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[TCP  
            Keep-Alive] '));  
             
            if(ACK1 & ack_seq & dumack & keepAliveAck) 
             sACK=sACK+1; 
             TIME_sACK=[TIME_sACK num2str(cell2mat(temp(j,6))) ',']; 
             timeSack=cell2mat(temp(j,6)); 
             paket_seq=[paket_seq '1s3,']; 
            end 
            temp2(j-cpt, :) = []; 
            cpt = cpt + 1; 
            cp = cp + 1; 
        elseif strcmp(s4, s1) % receive packet 
            Res = cat(1, Res, temp(j, :)); 
            timePacket=[timePacket cell2mat(temp(j,6))]; 
            NrecivePacket=NrecivePacket+1; 
            TotalReciveByte=TotalReciveByte+cell2mat(temp(j, 7)); 
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            if ((~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[SYN]'))& 
           (isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[TCP Out-Of-Order]'  
            ))))) 
             NreciveSyn=NreciveSyn+1; 
             paket_seq=[paket_seq 'r1,']; 
             TIME_rSYN=[TIME_rSYN num2str(cell2mat(temp(j,6))) ';']; 
            end 
            if ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[ACK]')) 
                NreciveAck=NreciveAck+1; 
            end 
             if (~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[SYN, ACK]'  
              ))&& ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'Seq=0 ')))  
                 NreciveSynAckseq0=NreciveSynAckseq0+1; 
                 paket_seq=[paket_seq '1r2,']; 
                  timeRsynack=cell2mat(temp(j,6)); 
             end 
                               
            if ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[SYN, ACK]')) 
                NreciveSynAck=NreciveSynAck+1; 
            end 
            if ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), 'Dup')) 
                NreciveDupAck=NreciveDupAck+1; 
            end 
             if ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[RST]')) 
                RecivdRST=RecivdRST+1; 
            end 
             if (~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[RST]'))&&  
                ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), 'Seq=1 '))) 
                RecivdRSTseq1=RecivdRSTseq1+1; 
                paket_seq=[paket_seq '1r4,']; 
                timeRrst=cell2mat(temp(j,6)); 
             end 
            if ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[RST, ACK]')) 
                RecivdRSTack=RecivdRSTack+1; 
            end 
          if (~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[RST, ACK]'))&&  
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           ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), 'Seq=1 ')))  
               RecivdRSTackseq1=RecivdRSTackseq1+1; 
                paket_seq=[paket_seq '1r5,']; 
                timeRrstack=cell2mat(temp(j,6)); 
            end 
           if (~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)), '[FIN,  
            ACK]'))&& ~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'Seq=1  
            Ack=1 '))) 
                NreciveFinack=NreciveFinack+1; 
                paket_seq=[paket_seq '1r7,']; 
           end 
 
            ACK2=~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[ACK]')); 
            ack_seq=~isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'Seq=1  
            Ack=1 ')); 
            dumack=isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'Dup '));  
            keepAliveAck=isempty(strfind(cell2mat(temp(j,8)),'[TCP  
            Keep-Alive] '));  
            if(ACK2 & ack_seq & dumack & keepAliveAck) 
            rACK=rACK+1; 
            TIME_rACK=[TIME_rACK num2str(cell2mat(temp(j,6))) ',']; 
            paket_seq=[paket_seq '1r3,']; 
            end 
            temp2(j-cpt, :) = []; 
            cpt = cpt + 1; 
            cp = cp + 1; 
        end 
    end 
    temp = temp2; 
    if (NsendPacket>0) 
        avgLengthSendPacket= TotalSendByte/NsendPacket;  
    end 
    if(NrecivePacket>0) 
        avgLengthRecivedPacket=TotalReciveByte/NrecivePacket; 
    end 
  avgLengtPacket=(avgLengthSendPacket+avgLengthRecivedPacket)/2; 
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  if (NsendSynAckseq0==cp) 
    synackscan=NsendSynAckseq0; 
  end 
  % send connection info. 
  SendFailedConnection1 =(NsendSyn-sACK); 
SendFailedConnection2=SendRSTackSeq1+SendRSTseq1+RecivdRSTackseq1+Re
civdRSTseq1+synackscan; 
  if (SendFailedConnection1>=SendFailedConnection2) 
      SendFailedConnection=SendFailedConnection1; 
  else 
      SendFailedConnection=SendFailedConnection2; 
  end 
  % Received connection info. 
    RecivedFailedConnection1 =(NreciveSyn-rACK); 
    RecivedFailedConnection12=RecivdRSTackseq1+RecivdRSTseq1; 
        if (RecivedFailedConnection1>=RecivedFailedConnection12) 
      RecivedFailedConnection=RecivedFailedConnection1; 
  else 
      RecivedFailedConnection=RecivedFailedConnection12; 
    end 
  conection_Duration=timePacket(size(timePacket,2))-timePacket(1);  
 
if ~isempty(TIME_sSYN) 
     TIME_sSYN_vector=((TIME_sSYN))'; 
     num_TIME_sSYN_vector=size(TIME_sSYN_vector,2); 
 if (num_TIME_sSYN_vector>1) 
        for i = 2:num_TIME_sSYN_vector 
            defrent_time=defrent_time+(TIME_sSYN_vector(i)-
TIME_sSYN_vector(i-1)); 
         end 
       avg_time=defrent_time/(num_TIME_sSYN_vector-1); 
     end 
 end 
  x=[time_w,start_Con,host_A,host_B,port_A,port_B,... 
       paket_seq,... 
       TIME_sSYN,...  
 APPENDICES 
153 
       TIME_rSYN,... 
       cp,... 
       NsendPacket,... 
       NrecivePacket,... 
       TotalSendByte,... 
       TotalReciveByte,... 
       NsendSyn,... 
       NreciveSyn,... 
       NsendAck,... 
       NreciveAck,... 
       NsendDupAck,... 
       NreciveDupAck,... 
       avgLengthSendPacket,... 
       avgLengthRecivedPacket,... 
       avgLengtPacket,... 
       SendFailedConnection,... 
       RecivedFailedConnection,... 
       sACK,... 
       rACK,... 
       NsendSynAck,... 
       NreciveSynAck,... 
       TotalSendByte+TotalReciveByte,... 
       NrecivePacket/cp,... 
    
avgLengthSendPacket/((avgLengthSendPacket+avgLengthRecivedPacket)/2)
,... 
      (NsendSyn-sACK)/NsendSyn,... 
       NsendSyn-NreciveSynAck,... 
       NsendFinAck,... 
       NreciveFinack,... 
       SendRSTack,... 
       RecivdRSTack,... 
       avg_time,... 
       NsendSynAckseq0,... 
       SendRSTseq1,... 
       SendRSTackSeq1,... 
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       NreciveSynAckseq0,... 
       RecivdRSTseq1,... 
       RecivdRSTackseq1,... 
       
SendRSTseq1+SendRSTackSeq1+RecivdRSTseq1+RecivdRSTackseq1+synackscan
,... 
      conection_Duration]; 
        CPT = cat(1, CPT, x); 
  cp = 0; 
end 
 extract_flow=CPT; 
end 
4. Host features extraction module. 
a) Input: connection features. 
b) Output: Host features. 
c) Pseudo code: 
function extract_IP = extract_host_features flow,time_w) 
temp2 = flow; 
temp = temp2; 
CPT = []; 
Res = []; 
Targets=[]; 
paket_seq=[]; 
xx=[]; 
while ~isempty(temp) 
    cpt=0; 
    cp=0; 
    Nsendflow=0; %number of send flows.   
    NsendCon=0;  %number of send connections.   
    NreciveCon=0;%number of receive connections. 
    NsendSyn=0;  %number of send SYN packets. 
    NSfailCon=0; %number of send failed connection. 
    fail_conn=0; %total number of failed connections. 
    timeSeq=[];  % packets time sequence. 
    timeSeq1=[]; %packets time sequence. 
    avg_flow_time=0; % average time flow between flow.  
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    sendConseq=0; %receiver IP address. 
    portASeq=[]; % sender ports sequence. 
    portBSeq=[]; % receiver ports sequence. 
    defrent_time=0; % time between connections. 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% inter packet %%%%%%% 
    clinet_synAck=[]; % Number of send SYN ACK packets in a 
connection per host.   
    clinet_synRst=[]; % Number of send SYN ACK packets in a 
connection per host.   
    clinet_synRstack=[];% Number of send RST ACK packets in a 
connection per host. 
    server_synRst=[];  % Number of receive RST  packets in a 
connection per host. 
    Server_synRstack=[];% Number of receive RST ACK  packets in a 
connection per host. 
    srver_finackRst=[];% Number of receive FIN ACK  packets in a 
connection per host. 
    server_synSynack=[];% Number of receive SYN ACK  packets in a 
connection per host. 
 %%%%%%%%%%%% number send, receive and total control packet %%% 
   total_control=[];  
   send_control=[]; 
   recive_control=[]; 
  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% connection - duration %%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  connections_Durations=[]; 
  Avg_connections_Duration=0; 
  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% port - severity %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  portSH=0; 
  portSL=0; 
  portDH=0; 
  portDL=0; 
    host =temp(1,3); 
   for j = 1:size(temp, 1) 
      hostSend= temp(j,3); 
  if strcmp(host, hostSend)  
      Nsendflow=Nsendflow+1;% total of connections 
      if (cell2mat(temp(j,15))>0 || cell2mat(temp(j,46))>0 || 
       cell2mat(temp(j,47))>0 ) 
          timeSeq=[timeSeq num2str(cell2mat(temp(j,2))) ';' ];  
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          timeSeq1=[timeSeq1 cell2mat(temp(j,2))]; 
          end 
     sendConseq=[sendConseq cell2mat(temp(j,4)) ';' ];% destination 
IP address 
     portASeq=[portASeq, temp(j,5)];% sender ports. 
     portBSeq=[portBSeq, temp(j,6)];% destination ports. 
     NsendCon=NsendCon+cell2mat(temp(j,26)); % number send Packets 
Start Ack. 
    NreciveCon=NreciveCon+cell2mat(temp(j,27)); % number of Packets 
receive start ack. 
    NSfailCon=NSfailCon+cell2mat(temp(j,24)); % number of fail 
connection. 
   NsendSyn=NsendSyn+cell2mat(temp(j,15)); % number send packets 
start SYN.  
  fail_conn=fail_conn+cell2mat(temp(j,24)); 
   ailconnseq =[failconnseq num2str(cell2mat(temp(j,24))) ',']; 
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% inter packet %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
   clinet_synAck=[clinet_synAck (cell2mat(temp(j,48))) ',']; 
   clinet_synRst=[clinet_synRst (cell2mat(temp(j,49))) ',']; 
   clinet_synRstack=[clinet_synRstack (cell2mat(temp(j,50))) ',']; 
   server_synRst=[server_synRst (cell2mat(temp(j,51))) ',']; 
   Server_synRstack=[Server_synRstack (cell2mat(temp(j,52))) ',']; 
   srver_finackRst=[srver_finackRst (cell2mat(temp(j,53))) ',']; 
   server_ack_rest=[server_ack_rest (cell2mat(temp(j,54))) ',']; 
   server_synSynack=[server_synSynack (cell2mat(temp(j,55))) ',']; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Ports severity %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
   if (find (cell2mat(temp(j,5))== portHseverity)) 
     portSH=portSH+1; 
   else 
     portSL=portSL+1; 
    end 
    if (find (cell2mat(temp(j,5))==  portHseverity)) 
     portDH=portDH+1; 
   else 
     portDL=portDL+1; 
    end 
   %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% connection duration %%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
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  connections_Durations=[connections_Durations 
num2str(cell2mat(temp(j,56))) ',']; 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%% number of sent received control packet %%%%%%%%%% 
total_control=[total_control num2str(cell2mat(temp(j,10))) ',']; 
send_control=[send_control num2str(cell2mat(temp(j,11))) ',']; 
recive_control=[recive_control num2str(cell2mat(temp(j,12))) ',']; 
          temp2(j-cpt, :) = []; 
          cpt = cpt + 1; 
          cp = cp + 1; 
  end 
 end 
 temp = temp2; 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
    Avg_clinet_synAck=mean(clinet_synAck); 
    Avg_clinet_synRst=mean(clinet_synRst); 
    Avg_clinet_synRstack=mean(clinet_synRstack); 
    Avg_server_synRst=mean(server_synRst); 
    Avg_Server_synRstack=mean(Server_synRstack); 
    Avg_srver_finackRst=mean(srver_finackRst); 
    Avg_server_ack_rest=mean(server_ack_rest); 
    server_synSynack=mean(server_synSynack); 
    Avg_connections_Duration=mean(connections_Durations); 
avg_clinet_interarival=(Avg_clinet_synAck+Avg_clinet_synRst+Avg_cl
inet_synRstack)/3; 
avg_server_interarival=(Avg_server_synRst+Avg_Server_synRstack+Avg
_srver_finackRst+Avg_server_ack_rest+server_synSynack)/5; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
   NportASeq=size(portASeq,2); % number of using port at sender 
   NdefPortA=size(unique(cell2mat(portASeq)),2);  
   NportBSeq=size(portBSeq,2); % number of using port at receiver. 
   NdefPortB=size(unique(cell2mat(portBSeq)),2);  
Nsend_Def_flow=size(unique(strread(sendConseq,'%s','delimiter',';'
)),1); % number of send different IP address. 
    rateDeffIP=Nsend_Def_flow/Nsendflow; 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Avg time between connection per second %%%%%% 
  if ~isempty(timeSeq) 
      TIME_flow_vector=(timeSeq1); 
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      num_TIME_flow_vector=size(TIME_flow_vector,2); 
  if (num_TIME_flow_vector>1) 
         for i = 2:num_TIME_flow_vector 
            time=[time num2str(TIME_flow_vector(i)-
TIME_flow_vector(i-1)) ','] ; 
            defrent_time=defrent_time+(TIME_flow_vector(i)-
TIME_flow_vector(i-1)); 
          end 
        avg_flow_time=defrent_time/(num_TIME_flow_vector-1); 
  end 
  end 
  if Nsendflow>NsendSyn 
      conn=Nsendflow; 
  else 
     conn= NsendSyn; 
  end 
%%%%%%% different time between connection time- entropy %%%%%% 
if size(str2num(time),2)>1>1 
tim_EntropyResult= Entropy(fix(str2num(time)')); 
else 
tim_EntropyResult=0; 
end 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% entropy control packet number %%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
if size(str2num(total_control),2)>1 
total_control_EntropyResult= Entropy(fix((total_control)')); 
else 
 total_control_EntropyResult=0; 
end 
if size(str2num(send_control),2)>1 
send_control_EntropyResult= Entropy(fix((send_control)')); 
else 
 send_control_EntropyResult=0; 
end 
if size(str2num(recive_control),2)>1 
recive_control_EntropyResult= Entropy(fix((recive_control)')); 
else 
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 recive_control_EntropyResult=0; 
end 
    result=[time_w,host,Nsendflow,... 
    NsendCon,NreciveCon,...send and receive connections with 
ACk(1). 
   NportASeq,NportBSeq,... total number of send and receive ports. 
    NdefPortA,NdefPortB,...total number unique of send and receive 
ports. 
    Nsend_Def_flow,.... 
    NSfailCon,... 
    NsendSyn,...  
    NSfailCon/conn,... 
    sendConseq,... 
    avg_flow_time,... 
    rateDeffIP,... 
    NdefPortB/NportBSeq,... 
    NdefPortA/NportASeq,... 
    time,... 
    timeSeq,... 
    fail_conn,... 
    failconnseq,... 
    clinet_synAck,... 
    clinet_synRst,... 
    clinet_synRstack,... 
    server_synRst,... 
    Server_synRstack,... 
    srver_finackRst,... 
    server_ack_rest,... 
    server_synSynack,... 
    total_control,... 
    send_control,... 
    recive_control,...  
    connections_Durations,... 
    portSH,... 
    portSL,... 
    portDH,... 
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    portDL,... 
    portSL/(portSL+portSH),... %rate of low severity source port 
number 
   portDL/(portDL+portDH),...% rate of low severity destination 
port number 
   Avg_clinet_synAck,... 
   Avg_clinet_synRst,... 
   Avg_clinet_synRstack,... 
   Avg_server_synRst,... 
   Avg_Server_synRstack,... 
   Avg_srver_finackRst,... 
   Avg_server_ack_rest,... 
   server_synSynack,... 
   Avg_connections_Duration,... 
   total_control_EntropyResult,... 
   send_control_EntropyResult,... 
   recive_control_EntropyResult,... 
   avg_clinet_interarival,... 
   avg_server_interarival];... 
CPT=cat(1, CPT, result); % results 
 cp = 0; 
end 
  extract_IP=CPT; 
 end 
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5. Entropy algorithm model. 
a. Input: Number of control packets per connection. 
b. Output: Connection entropy value. 
c. Pseudo code: 
function Entropy = Entropy(X) 
[n m] = size(X); 
H = zeros(1,m); 
for Column = 1:m, 
    % Assemble observed alphabet 
    Alphabet = unique(X(:,Column)); 
    % Housekeeping 
    Frequency = zeros(size(Alphabet)); 
     % Calculate sample frequencies 
    for symbol = 1:length(Alphabet) 
        Frequency(symbol) = sum(X(:,Column) == Alphabet(symbol)); 
    end 
    % Calculate sample class probabilities 
    P = Frequency / sum(Frequency); 
    % Calculate entropy in bits 
    % Note: floating point underflow is never an issue since we are 
    %   dealing only with the observed alphabet 
    H(Column) = -sum(P .* log2(P)); 
 end 
Entropy=H; 
end 
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6. Reinforcement learning agent  
a) Input: Host state (neural network outcomes). 
b) Output: new updated neural network. 
c) Pseudo code: 
function check_NN_sataus() 
   if (newBotitem+newNormalitem)/a >=threshold 
      alldataset2= cat(1,alldataset,newdatasetitem); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%% evaluation cross-validation for new dataset %%%% 
result_cross_newDataset_online2=cross_valadition(alldataset2(:,19:20
)',alldataset2(:,1:16)'); 
      
result_cross_newDataset_online=cat(1,result_cross_newDataset_online,
result_cross_newDataset_online2); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%train NEW neural network   %%%%%%%%%      
    net_test = patternnet([10 10 10]); 
    net_test.trainFcn = 'trainrp'; 
    net_test.trainParam.epochs=500; 
    net_test.trainParam.showWindow=false; 
    net_test.trainParam.goal=1e-10; 
   net_test.divideParam.trainRatio = 100/100; 
   net_test.divideParam.valRatio = 0/100; 
   net_test.divideParam.testRatio = 0/100; 
   net_test.trainParam.showWindow=false; 
   net_test.trainParam.showCommandLine = false; 
 [net_test,tr]= 
train(net_test,alldataset2(:,1:16)',alldataset2(:,19:20)'); 
     Y = net_test(alldataset2(:,1:16)'); 
    error=Y-alldataset2(:,19:20)'; 
result_cross_newDataset_online; 
all_result_newDataset_online2=result_evaluation(alldataset2(:,19:20)
',Y,0,0)'; 
all_result_newDataset_online = cat(1,all_result_newDataset_online, 
all_result_newDataset_online2); 
% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%% make decision for change neural network %%%%%  
if (result_cross_newDataset_online2(1,7)>0.95 &&   
    result_cross_newDataset_online2(1,11)>0.5) 
    net_last_good = net_test; 
    alldataset= cat(1,alldataset,newdatasetitem); 
    newdatasetitem=[]; %   
    newBotitem=0;%   
    newNormalitem=0;%   
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    totalNumber=0; 
    Y1 = net_last_good(olddataset(:,1:16)'); 
    all_result_oldDataset_online2=result_evaluation(olddataset 
     (:,17:18)',Y1,0,0)'; 
    all_result_oldDataset_online =    
cat(1,all_result_oldDataset_online,all_result_oldDataset_online2);%%   
 else 
    newdatasetitem=[];  
    newBotitem=0;  
    newNormalitem=0;  
    totalNumber=0;     
    net_fail_index=net_fail_index+1; 
end 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% system reset when missing old dataset%%%%%%%% 
if (all_result_oldDataset_online2(1,7)<=0.90)  
  net_last_good=net_ref; 
  net_rest_index=net_rest_index+1; 
  alldataset=olddataset; 
  newdatasetitem=[]; %  reset new dataset 
  newBotitem=0;      %  reset botnet item counter  
  newNormalitem=0;%  reset normal item counter  
  totalNumber=0;  
end 
 end 
end              
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